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Century Representations of Home 
 
Susan Quesal, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Co-Supervisors: Stephen Marshall and Shirley Thompson 
 
This dissertation explores the historical and contemporary interactions between 
blackness and the structure, sense, and practice of home. Informed by Afro-pessimist 
scholarship that finds traces of the logic of slavery in present-day cultural and social 
formations, this project describes the plantation as a tangle of conflicting, interacting, and 
antagonistic homes. Taking as its central object(s) the different structures of home on the 
plantation—for example, the white supremacist-masculinist dominion and racial anxiety 
that informs what home means for the slave-master, or the artful fugitive practices that 
allowed the enslaved to hide their homes in plain sight—this dissertation explores the 
way these social and material structures haunt representations of home in 20th century art 
and literature, thus mapping the locations where blackness and home constitute and 
produce one another.  
The intervention of this project is two-fold: First, it seeks to trouble the 
assumptions of certain strains of Afro-pessimist thought—particularly those invested in a 
totalizing narrative of perpetual, inescapable violence and oppression, rooted in 
plantation slavery but extant in the present. By looking at how black writers, thinkers, 
and visual artists in the 20th century engage the structure, space, and affect of home, this 
project charts a counterhistory of resistance and freedom rooted in the geography and 
culture of slavery but fugitive from its logics of domination. Second, it seeks to theorize 
“home” in a way that disengages the term from normative domesticity, opening the 
concept to include alternate ways of being at home not rooted in power or possession but 
rather in a sociality that antagonizes the normative domestic through its embrace of 
fugitivity. Following scholars who engage critical geography to disrupt flattened or 
overdetermined understandings of home, I look for moments that both confirm and 
disrupt dominant narratives about the legacy of slavery and its impact on home. My 
project thus works to complicate our understanding of how the past shapes and delimits 
individual and collective freedom in the present.  
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 1 
Introduction 
“Home is not where you were born; home is where all your attempts to escape cease. “ 
—Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006) 
 
 In 1979, Audre Lorde delivered a paper at the Second Sex Conference entitled, 
“The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” In this paper, she lays 
out the stakes of intersectional feminism, demanding not only a tolerance of difference 
but a recognition that only through the dynamic polarities of difference might actual 
social change come to be. Her talk builds to the statement that would give title to her 
paper: “For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow 
us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about 
genuine change.”1 At this key moment in the development of feminist ideology and 
praxis, Lorde chose a house as her metaphor for the structures of power that continue, 
then as now, to undermine the possibility of real social change.  
 Home has been and remains a central locus of social power and, therefore, of 
social struggle. This fact makes it a particularly apt location from which to begin an 
interrogation of the possibility and limitations of black freedom in the 20th century. The 
labor of enslaved people kept up the master’s house to which Lorde refers, and the same 
master’s house owed its material existence to the wealth produced via the oppressive 
system of slavery. Meanwhile, the enslaved built homes of their own, despite the 
                                                
1 Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” This Bridge Called My 
Back: Writings By Radical Women of Color (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983). 
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plantation’s pretensions to totality. Following Emancipation, home became a site through 
which newly-free black persons articulated their citizenship and argued for their propriety 
and deservingness. Homes of poor or working-class black persons were a focus of racial 
uplift campaigns, while black domestic workers took care of the homes and families of 
white elites. Despite the long history of scholarship on the relationship between black 
persons and the overdetermined category of “domesticity,” however, only recently have 
scholars begun to imagine what else black “homes” might be, outside of this prescriptive 
rubric.  
 This recent scholarship, and the lacunae in research it points to, impels the central 
questions of this dissertation. How did people make homes or make themselves at home 
within the foundational violence of plantation slavery? How do those forms of home then 
travel from that historical reality into the art and literature of the 20th century? How do 
representations of home change and shift as black Americans gain access to new sources 
of individual and social power?  
 At core, this dissertation seeks to uncover how fictional representations of home 
draw on the history of plantation slavery to uncover strategies for the production of free 
selves within a world still structured by oppressive social hierarchies. This line of inquiry 
seeks to trouble the assumptions of Afro-pessimist thinking, described in more detail later 
in this introduction. In particular, I seek to disrupt the strains of theory that invest in a 
totalizing narrative of perpetual, inescapable violence and oppression, rooted in 
plantation slavery but extant in the present. Instead, I offer the home as a concept through 
which scholars might be able to see the persistence of resistance, theft, absence, and other 
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strategies of liberation, beyond and within the well-documented history of racial 
oppression.  
HOME AS PRACTICE 
 Before examining historical forms of home, as I will do in the first chapter, I must 
begin by defining what it is I mean when I say the word home. Too often, academic 
scholarship flattens the concept of home, conflating it with “the domestic” and failing to 
interrogate the relationship between these two discrete terms. However, home is a more 
slippery category that such thinking allows, as there is maybe nothing so fraught and yet 
so unquestioned and naturalized as the concept of home. An individual’s conception of 
the term inevitably rises up—be it good or bad—any time someone invokes the term. The 
difficulty of conceptualizing home lies in the fact that it, as a term, has a shared 
significance but extensive particularities. Homes seek a normative ideal, but these 
normative ideals vary widely even within a shared culture. Home creates and inhabits a 
legible space, but simultaneously affirms ties of intimacy by working to control who can 
or cannot read or access the space it produces. I am drawn to the current scholarship that 
has begun to move away from defining home through the lens of mainstream domesticity, 
describing what homes might exist beyond this firm conceptual boundary.2 Following 
this turn in scholarship, my dissertation seeks to offer a new frame through which 
                                                
2 The key writing in this new move toward a broader understanding of home is Sara Ahmed, Claudia 
Catañeda, Anne-Marie Fortier, and Mimi Sheller, eds., Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and 
Migration, New York: Berg Press, 2003. Also useful are Iris Marion Young, “House and Home: Feminist 
Variations on a Theme,” Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy, 
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997: 134-164; Doreen Massey, “A Place Called Home?” Space, Place, and 
Gender, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994: 157-174; Allison Blunt and Robyn M. 
Dowling, Home, New York: Routledge, 2006; among others. 
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scholars might think about home, in order to continue this move toward an understanding 
of home that might offer more egalitarian access to the protections and rights afforded by 
the term.  
 The key to this kind of significant but inclusive definition of such an unwieldy 
object as home is to conceive of it not as a single material thing or space, but rather as a 
practice that engages an assemblage of material objects, relationships, spaces, habits, 
actions, senses, emotions, affects, tastes, smells, and so on, in order to produce a 
culturally legible space, sense, or affect. The assemblage is not a fixed collection but a 
potentially shifting assortment of things that can come into and out of connection with 
one another depending on the various factors that might impact such connections.3 The 
home(s) I imagine, then, look more like the shape a flock of birds make than a single-
family dwelling with a yard and picket fence. The picket fence might be an object of 
aspiration or a material marker that at some point becomes part of the collection that 
constitutes an individual’s home, but the picket fence need not be a permanent part of the 
assemblage.  Further, the same physical picket fence might serve in one assemblage as a 
positive boundary that indicates belonging within an intimate group, while functioning as 
an exclusionary boundary in the home assemblage of the child who lives one yard over.  
This is just one example, but the idea is to allow a shared set of things (objects, 
relationships, spaces, habits, etc.) to be part of multiple homes simultaneously, without 
demanding a kind of exclusivity, possession, or ultimate meaning for any given one. 
                                                
3 My conceptualization of the assemblage grows from Deleuze and Guittari’s seminal work in A Thousand 
Plateaus, and is also greatly informed by the work of Bruno Latour on actor-network theory in his text 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford UP, 2005). 
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 It is for this reason that practice is central to my definition and understanding of 
home. As I mentioned above, I want to move the definition of home away from 
residential space, the nuclear family, or a legally protected private sphere. Rather, I see 
home as a practice that engages an assemblage of elements, like those listed above, in 
order to produce something legible within a culture. The home need not be legible to a 
dominant group to be culturally legible, as a dominant culture may not be the only extant 
culture in a given milieu. Indeed, as I will argue in the next chapter, illegibility to systems 
of domination can actually serve to protect vulnerable homes. Despite this potential for 
misrecognition, however, the word “home” also has a linguistic meaning that registers 
across cultures that share a language, indicating a shared set of elements that mark home. 
If the product of home is culturally legible, it must offer some recognizable set of 
attributes that mark it for those who would see, hear of, or otherwise experience it. Often 
in the literature, home is defined as a particular sort of space that incubates and protects 
particular kinds of relationships and feelings—a single-family dwelling, for example, that 
protects the heteronormative nuclear family and produces the privacy and safety 
necessary for good citizenship. If home is, as I contend, a practice, however, the spatial 
result is not necessarily the core of home. Rather, the core of home is what it does. Home 
intends to incubate, resuscitate, and insulate the self, providing a venue—either physical 
or psychic—in which the activities and relationships critical to the protection and 
reproduction of cultural life can occur. The result of this practice, therefore, might be the 
dwelling described above, but its result might also be something else entirely.  Home is 
not solely geography or architecture, although both those ways of knowing might inform 
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the sense of home. Home as I conceive of it is a practice that produces an affective 
charge—a sense of being-at-home, created through the orientation of material bodies and 
objects toward or away from one another in a shifting and familiar assemblage.  
 To my thinking, the practice of home serves the central purpose of mediating an 
individual’s experience of precarity. Judith Butler’s essays in Precarious Life (2004) 
provide the foundation for my engagement with this term. Butler writes about what she 
calls “primary vulnerability”—the idea that humans are all subject to a “vulnerability to 
the other that is part of bodily life, a vulnerability to a sudden address from elsewhere 
that we cannot preempt.”4 Precariousness, or precarity as I term it, emerges from the 
knowledge of this vulnerability, even when that “knowledge” might be embodied or 
instinctual rather than cognitive. A sense of precarity arises when a person becomes 
aware of his or her primary, bodily vulnerability and the corollary dependency on others 
to permit and sustain both cultural and individual life. Butler connects this experience of 
precarity to the concept of mastery, writing that while an acknowledgement of 
vulnerability and our fundamental dependency on others presents an opportunity to invest 
in non-violent or non-military solutions or redress, the response to vulnerability often 
takes the form of a “fantasy of mastery”5 that can produce or provoke violent, militarized 
responses. Although Butler specifically seeks to understand the changes in the world 
wrought by the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, this fantasy of mastery also 
appears in more mundane historical practices of control or containment that seek to 
                                                
4 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (New York: Verso, 2004): 29. 
5 Ibid. 
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disavow precarity. The home itself illustrates a fantasy of mastery at times, although as 
Butler points out, one’s relationship to precarity—whether it is acknowledged or 
disavowed—plays a primary role in how one chooses to respond to its inescapable 
presence.   
 Precarity is a useful concept in that it allows for the existence of a sense of danger 
without demanding the presence of an explicit, perceptible threat. Butler is careful to 
argue that while vulnerability may be universally human, it must be “perceived and 
recognized in order to come into play in an ethical encounter.”6 This is incredibly useful 
when we think about the role of precarity in the ethics of conflict. Ethical impact aside, 
however, Butler maintains that a “‘common’ corporeal vulnerability”7 exists for all 
humans, whether they choose to recognize it or not. Precarity as I use it here and as it 
informs the practice of home does not require conscious recognition to exist. Often, it 
makes its presence known through the appearance of practices that work to deny its 
existence, meaning that the subject engaged in a home might never consciously 
experience precarity despite actively working against it. I contend that people often 
experience precarity affectively rather than intellectually or emotionally,8 as a pre-
                                                
6 Ibid., 43. 
7 Ibid., 42. 
8 The relationship between affect and emotion is complex and well-studied, although at this point still not 
completely understood or agreed upon by scholars. To my thinking and training, affect is something that 
exists before analysis or naming—affect is a pre-emotional embodied sensation—which is what makes it 
different than emotion as we generally understand it. One might experience something one later labels as 
“anger,” even though in the moment what that person felt in his or her body had not yet been given a name. 
In this project, then, emotion is something narrativized, invested with meaning, and used to communicate 
more simply and easily with other human beings that share our languages and cultures. Affect is whatever 
comes before that—a moment of knowing, a sinking feeling, a sureness, a motion toward or away from 
something, a tingling. Neither is privileged here as a superior object of analysis, but they are absolutely 
different and need to be marked as such. 
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cognitive, embodied sense or sensation rather than a narrativized, named category of 
feeling that is imbued with cultural meaning. Precarity might take the form of a visceral 
sense of dread, for example, or a heightened anxiety vibrating through the bodies 
engaged in a home, attaching itself to any object or idea it bumps up against. Precarity 
might appear in a silent room full of people exchanging glances as an embodied 
knowledge of danger flies about like a trapped bird, or in the quiet desire to drink oneself 
into oblivion of one’s own volition before the unpredictable mess of human circumstance 
offers an arbitrary obliteration instead. These moments take on meaning when someone 
calls them “fear,” “frustration,” or “hopelessness,” and a person might seek to 
communicate them to another human being or to oneself using a rational, relatable 
narrative—anything from the bad stock performance that threatens a retirement account 
to the fact of sharing a physical space with a person who might someday kill you. 
Narratives attach meaning to affects and allow us to compare and contrast dangers, risks, 
and safety nets, something Butler correctly insists is important as certain social 
conditions can exacerbate feelings of precarity for those with less access to the means or 
opportunity for self-defense.9 For my general definition of home, however, these 
narratives matter less than the embodied experience that occurs before they arise. 
Dangers might be particular, and so might individuals’ responses to them, but the sense 
of precarity as I define it here is universally human.  
 Home, then, stands as a medium through which its inhabitant(s) can negotiate the 
affective experience of precarity, attempting to push it away although also potentially 
                                                
9 Butler, Precarious Life, 29. 
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confirming the presence of a threat through the set of practices that work against it. Setha 
Low’s Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress 
America (2003) offers an illustrative example of the way home might precipitate 
precarity through the very practices intended to ward it off. Her text finds that fear and 
uncertainty are central among the reasons given by inhabitants of gated communities for 
their choice to live in such a neighborhood. While the source of fear was different for 
many of the residents Low interviewed, their living “behind the gates” was consistently 
framed as an attempt on their part to mediate their fear through the practice of home. 
However, Low found that life behind the gates often produced as much fear as it 
mitigated—in fact, those living in these “safe” neighborhoods ended up feeling more 
precarious than people living outside of them. Driving through the gate, a practice meant 
to invoke a sense of safety in the inhabitants of the neighborhood, served as a reminder of 
the dangers that exist in the wider world. Those living in a house without a gate might be 
able to forget the thieves at the door, but those in a gated community are reminded of 
their perceived presence, and the need to protect against it, every day.10  
 Home might also precipitate precarity in what Lauren Berlant terms its “cruel 
optimism,” which she defines as a relation in which “something you desire is actually an 
obstacle to your flourishing.”11  Because home—particularly in the form of an 
idealized space of private property, separate and safe from the wider world—has always 
been central to the American Dream, it remains deeply tied to the promise and failure of 
                                                
10 Setha Low, Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America (New 
York: Routledge, 2003). 
11 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke UP, 2011): 1. 
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American life. However, safety, comfort, or other positive adjectives generally associated 
with the culturally dominant idea of home fail to take into account that home is 
constantly becoming rather than ever being some fixed entity. Although social structures 
necessarily impact the levels of precarity experienced by particular bodies, even the most 
powerful human in a social system remains subject to Butler’s primary vulnerability—
despite all his or her work to the contrary, death, sickness, or bad luck could at any 
moment alter the psychic or material landscape of any given subject. However, in 
America, with our Dream of equality and prosperity through respectability and hard 
work, the failure of ascension to negate the immutable facts of mortality and chance 
actually might precipitate a sense of precarity for those who anticipated that a finish line 
of security and stability would appear somewhere along the way. In turn, a subject’s 
desire for this promised safety prompts a reiteration of home and a redoubling of efforts 
to keep precarity at bay. Unfortunately, this entrenchment in necessarily unsuccessful 
practices of home produces further precarity in that each failure to achieve permanent 
safety reminds the home-maker that no available strategies can actually eliminate the 
contingency of human life in the way that was promised. Rather than allowing a subject 
to try other ways of doing home, however, this cruel optimism traps them in a cycle of 
promise and disappointment, perpetuating the precarity home intended to keep away 
through the very practice of home. In this way, home both ameliorates risk and is a risky 
practice itself, even for those who sit in secure social positions. 
 11 
 Although home does not always produce a static space, it is necessarily 
geographical.12 Even homes that actively push back against traditional ideas of territory 
retain a spatial dimension, if only on the scale of the body. The geography of home might 
be a wide network of individuals, a hierarchical and rigidly-defined material space of 
domination, a disruptive collective of people taking up space, a zone of nurturance, or 
any number of other forms. In each case, however, home serves to link an individual to a 
broader geography and its attendant ideologies and logics. As the following chapters will 
show, the geographies home creates reflect Butler’s categories of response to precarity: 
some homes produce geographies of domination rooted in control and the pursuit of 
mastery, while others engage strategies of connection and care that produce flexible 
geographies capable of “staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability,”13 to borrow 
Butler’s terms. This dissertation views home as the geographical product of a practice 
which seeks to mediate the experience of precarity.  
 One of the primary mechanisms by which home accomplishes its task is by 
producing a threshold between the self or the intimate sphere and society. Much of the 
existing literature on home works out of the private/public dichotomy first articulated in 
western philosophical constructions of the individual and the public sphere. This idea that 
the public and private spheres can be understood separately, despite the myriad relations 
                                                
12 I root my understanding of geography and geographical knowledge in Katherine McKittrick and Clyde 
Woods, eds., Black Geographies and the Politics of Place (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2007). This 
text seeks a way to reemphasize the spatial within black studies, without reinscribing systems of dominance 
onto the landscape. The authors argue that an examination of black geographies holds the potential to 
“move us away from territoriality, the normative practice of staking a claim to place,” and toward a 
recognition that one can produce geography by existing in space without necessarily needing to claim it. 
See page 5 of the text for the discussion I cite here. 
13 Butler, Precarious Life, 29. 
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that exist between the two, informs much of our contemporary understanding of the role 
of the individual in society and of the relationships between the individual citizen and the 
wider economic structure of the nation/world. However, scholars, particularly those who 
engage the question of intimacy in relations of power, repeatedly mark sites where these 
two ostensibly static and separate categories bleed into one another, not simply through a 
process of relation but in a blending that troubles the work of separating these spheres. In 
order to produce a definition of home that can bear this indeterminacy, I use the term 
“threshold” to describe the role of home in a social world. Rather than thinking of home 
as a thickly-bounded space of privacy within a larger public, the concept of the threshold 
recognizes how a social world and a personal self or intimate domain—the public and the 
private, the common and the intimate—necessarily interact through a permeable 
boundary. For those homes which seek mastery over precarity, this threshold is a space of 
policing, where interested agents get territorial and conflict with forces or actors that 
would infringe upon the self. Other homes treat the threshold differently, managing social 
and human flows through less conflictual means. The concept of the threshold also allows 
for the fact that home necessarily cultivates selfhood in both relation to and separation 
from the social world beyond it. This definition intends to recognize the existence of the 
individual self and its need for regeneration, as well as the impossibility of separating it 
or its intimate relations from the world in which it exists.  
 As objects, bodies, and spaces cross this threshold, they become incorporated into 
the self. The material objects that home arranges come to be experienced as a part of the 
self, and any threat to their loss thereby becomes a threat of violation to the self. The 
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blurring of the line between the individual self, often imagined as a human body, and the 
inanimate objects, other selves, or physical spaces that a home engages sheds light on the 
weight of private property law in the U.S., particularly in homes where the threshold 
between self and society demands policing or legal protection. In practice, this becomes a 
question of attachment—to what things will one become so attached that the loss of that 
thing constitutes a violation of the self? Children and houses are two mainstream answers 
to this question. Recognizing this potential for loss, some homes will attach fewer objects 
to the central self and others will attempt to secure the things attached to the self in the 
hope of staving off such a loss. In extreme behavior like hoarding, this attachment 
between object and self within the home becomes disproportionately unhealthy for the 
person or persons within the home, and the proliferation of attachments to objects which 
means to mediate a sense of precarity only serves to deepen the fear of object loss and 
violation of the self. However, the attachment of self to body, object, or space is part of 
all homes, no matter their relationship to precarity. It is merely a matter of scale.  
 Home also serves as a means of social reproduction, even in my loose definition. 
This aspect of home is one of the most compelling and widely-studied facets of the 
concept found in the existing literature. My research supports this contention. Social 
reproduction to my thinking means both the physical act of producing more living 
humans to live within a social system and the indoctrination of existing humans into a 
social world. By taking both of these senses of “social reproduction” into account, my 
definition allows home to be a locus of beginning without necessarily being a point of 
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origin.14 Further, I argue that social reproduction is also a means of mediating precarity. 
“Social” here does not imply dominant sociality but rather reflects the myriad 
overlapping social systems within any given space. Homes seek to create and broaden 
social worlds through intimate relations—a social world grows larger through the 
intimate seduction of the home. This does not always occur sexually, as the following 
chapters will show. For example, the seduction of the intimate might take the form of 
receiving care, acceptance, or support from someone who lives according to a different 
ideology when the ideology by which one lives would not allow for that care, acceptance 
or support. The seduction of the intimate might also be a promise of power or 
domination. For example, a particular home might implicitly promise a son that if he 
defers to patriarchal authority, someday he will be a powerful patriarch. I also see 
magazines like Dwell, which promise social dominance through the production of 
particular kinds of spaces, as an intimate seduction, as much as the smell of familiar 
cooking or the promise of love between individuals. Engaging with the intimate sphere of 
a home draws an agent into its sociality, which broadens the possibility of social 
perpetuity for members of that social world.15 Home is how people bring others into their 
cultural world, and homes are just as apt to indoctrinate an inhabitant into an oppressive 
ideology as a liberating one. In other words, home must been seen as a neutral object 
                                                
14 This point grows out of work done in the excellent Ahmed, et al., Uprootings/Regroundings, which 
centers migrant, immigrant, and refugee homes in order to disrupt the “naturalization of homes as origins, 
and the romanticization of mobility as travel, transcendence, and transformation.” By looking first at homes 
that move, these authors seek to understand how homes begin and begin again, and how this practice itself 
produce one’s sense of home. See the introduction to that text for more. 
15 The intimacy of home also provides space for the sharing of secrets or the passing-along of knowledge. 
Indeed, one of the primary ways home reproduces the ideologies of a social system is through the practice 
of social instruction. 
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rather than an instrument of comfort or good—the sociality that is reproduced can just as 
easily be one of domination, oppression, and violence as safety, support, and love.  
 Often, the practice I have described here produces a stereotypical or mainstream 
space or set of relationships out of a similarly rote set of objects. However, while my 
definition of home clearly applies to those spaces already recognized and marked as 
homes in the U.S., it also provides space for alternative homes not currently recognized 
as such. A homeless encampment, for example, would signify a home within my 
framework, troubling the term “homeless” itself. Along the same line, I define home as a 
practice rather than a tangible object, so that persons need not produce a static material 
result to prove the presence of a home. Conversely, according to my thinking, a person 
might not necessarily feel “at home” simply because of the presence of particular kinds of 
objects in a particular kind of space. Rather, people can and do feel “at home” in a 
panoply of situations and spaces, and this definition provides space, and perhaps 
eventually protection, to alternative forms of home.  
 Above all, however, home mediates an individual’s sense of precarity. Home 
works against anxiety and fear but does not necessarily arrive at safety or security. In fact 
for some, home might ward off precarity by inviting or invoking a known discomfort—an 
abusive partner, perhaps, to recreate the familiar dangers of an abusive childhood, or a 
social and/or physical isolation that provides a sense of control to an otherwise vulnerable 
subject. Home seeks to ameliorate the precarity that inheres in being human. Home is 
more incantation than action, however, in that a sense of safety might never arrive, but 
the practice of home continues. The only product necessarily produced by the practice of 
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home is a self, connected to a social world through ideology and intimate ties, and more 
or less able to manage the contingency of human existence.  
AFRO-PESSIMISM AND SLAVERY 
 Home’s relationship to precarity makes it a salient category of analysis for the 
history of plantation slavery and the lived experience of enslavement. As I discuss in 
more depth in the following chapter, the practice of home among the enslaved affirms 
that despite varied and powerful forms of oppression, the enslaved still found ways to 
mediate the precarity these oppressions precipitated. An examination of plantation homes 
also reveals a deeper experience of precarity for slave-masters, slave-mistresses, and 
other powerful agents than a totalizing narrative might allow. By complicating both the 
position of master and the position of slave, then, an analysis of home on the plantation 
complicates Afro-pessimist assertions of the constancy and totality of racial oppression.  
 The term “Afro-pessimism” emerged in Frank B. Wilderson III’s provocative text 
Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structures of U.S. Antagonisms (2010). 
Wilderson coined this term to describe the shared assumptions of a set of scholars he lists 
in the text: “Hortense Spillers, Ronald Judy, David Marriott, Saidiya Harman, Achille 
Mbembe, Frantz Fanon, Kara Keeling, Jared Sexton, Joy James, Lewis Gordon, Goerge 
Yancy, and Orlando Patterson.”16 These scholars, he writes, are “theorists of structural 
positionality”17 who “share Fanon’s insistence that, though Blacks are indeed sentient 
beings, the structure of the entire world’s semantic field…is sutured by anti-Black 
                                                
16 Frank B. Wilderson, III, Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structures of U.S. Antagonisms 
(Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010). 
17 Ibid., 58. 
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solidarity.”18 Blackness for Wilderson then is not a “variously and unconsciously 
interpolated identity”19 but a “position…predicated on modalities of accumulation and 
fungibility.”20 Wilderson asserts that the Human comes into being through the murder of 
“the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the 
social death of Blacks.”21 The foundation of Wilderson’s theory is the premise that the 
Black cannot be Human—cannot even be—within the cultural constructions of western 
modernity, and that this immutable fact can only be undone or altered via a radical break 
with history. 
 One of Wilderson’s central theoretical constructions in the text is that of a 
“Master/Slave dichotomy,”22 in which all persons (minus native people) fall into one of 
the two categories. This theorization grows out of the contention that “the Black…is 
always already positioned as Slave.”23 He roots himself in Orlando Patterson’s Slavery 
and Social Death, arguing that because the status of slave bore a social dishonor and natal 
alienation that exceeded labor function, the Slave is actually “an anti-Human”24 against 
which the Master/Human “establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal 
integrity.”25 Wilderson’s return to Fanonian ontology, then, emerges from what he sees as 
the fundamental inability of the state or civil society to offer real emancipation to black 
subjects. Because the “imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
22 Ibid., 11. Wilderson also discusses the Settler/Savage dichotomy, and often refers to the White position 
as Master/Settler. 
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 Ibid., 11. 
25 Ibid. 
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Passage,” none of the structures that organize the world in the present could even exist 
without the Slave. As Wilderson succinctly puts it: “No slave, no world.”26 For 
Wilderson, the infrastructural involvement of slavery in the ideological construction(s) of 
modernity produces a social grammar that restricts all of us to the category of Master or 
Slave, and the antagonism between these categories cannot resolve without the 
obliteration of one of them.   
 Many of the other scholars on this list share Wilderson’s belief that the 
foundational violence of slavery has an afterlife that haunts the post-Emancipation world. 
Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection is one such text, which examines how the 
relationship between pleasure and terror that was present in structures of desire for both 
white and black people within the system of slavery persisted beyond the temporal 
endpoint of Emancipation. Patterson, too, defines slavery into a social process rather than 
a historical peculiarity in order to understand why contemporary social structures register 
the after-effects of an institution that has ostensibly disappeared.27 Additionally, Hortense 
Spillers’ canonical “Mama’s Baby/Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” 
describes how the conflict between property and kinship in slave communities, and the 
idea that that condition of the child follows the condition of the mother, both haunt late-
20th century representations of black motherhood.28 However, these scholars, even in their 
shared recognition of the impact of slavery, differ from Wilderson in their suggestions for 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 
1982). 
28 Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby/Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Diacritics 17:2 
(Summer 1987): 64-81. 
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how one might lessen the impact of this history on the present. Hartman, for example, 
frames her project’s intervention as one of relative hope “that the instances of insurgency 
and contestation narrated herein and the relentless proliferation of small acts of resistance 
perhaps offer some small measure of encouragement.”29 Even as she writes about the 
profound circumscription of slave agency, she seeks a reiteration of historical resistance 
for the purpose of shoring up a future.  
 Spillers, for her part, rejects the label of Afro-pessimist. Her panel talk from the 
Future of American Studies Institute at Dartmouth in June of 2015 critiques Wilderson’s 
“absoluteness of posture,”30 which she recognizes as seductive but also finds limiting for 
analytical possibilities. By investing in violent solutions and trafficking in ahistorical 
categories of being, she argues, Wilderson’s theory produces a totalizing orthodoxy of its 
own. In response to Wilderson’s provocation, Spillers questions to what extent “Slave” or 
“Black” can be considered ontological, as those are not categories one can be borne into, 
according to her thinking. Rather, Spillers suggests a recognition that there “was never a 
Slave,”31 which is to say that even during the era of enslavement, this category of being 
was a construction of power, meant to refuse the humanity of a being which never ceased 
to be human. Spillers encourages scholars to recognize that “at any given moment, all the 
strategies of possibility are available at once…[and] the potential for something 
                                                
29 Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1997): 14. 
30 Hortense Spillers, “Afro Pessimism and the Elders: Critical Transformations” (plenary paper, 
Futures of American Studies Institute, Dartmouth College, June 24, 2015). 
31 Spillers, “Afro Pessimism and the Elders” 
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transformative is really quite rich because you have a whole precedent…to pull from.”32 
Like Hartman, she suggests that rather than seeing the foundational violence of slavery as 
only productive of negative relations, interested parties might also seek the strategies of 
possibility employed by those living within that oppressive system in order to find more 
tools for liberation in the present. Echoing Lorde, she rejects Wilderson’s claim for the 
necessity of a violent break as a reproduction of the very structures of power he 
ostensibly seeks to unmake. Similar arguments against Afro-pessimism, which seek 
possibility within the violent history of slavery without denying the reality of its violence, 
now populate Black Studies scholarship.  
 In particular, Katherine McKittrick’s “Plantation Futures”33 serves as a model for 
my own work in this dissertation. Her geographical/historical/literary approach to the 
resonance between plantation slavery and present-day urbanity allows her to affirm the 
productive and difficult claims of Afro-pessimism while resisting its movement toward 
totality or reductive categorization. Where Spillers claims that “there never was a Slave,” 
McKittrick notes that the ideological construction of a space as “unlivable” does not 
negate the very real presence of life in such a space. Rather, the terms of oppression 
which structure perceptions of the space engender the dismissals of life within such 
spaces, and not the other way around. Her essay then seeks evidence of that life—not just 
survival, but thriving—within the reality of oppressive histories and within the later 
literary productions of black writers. Like Fred Moton, McKittrick mines black artistic 
                                                
32 Spillers, “Afro Pessimism and the Elders” 
33 Katherine McKittrick, “Plantation Futures” small axe, vol. 42 (Nov. 2003): 1-15. 
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production for evidence of radical blackness, even (or especially) in places one does not 
expect it to be.  
 This dissertation enters happily into this intellectual fray, taking seriously the 
provocations of Afro-pessimist scholarship without losing sight of the historical realities 
of both black humanity within enslavement and black economic and social ascension in 
the 20th century. While I find it impossible to deny the perpetuation of anti-black violence, 
systemic racism, and the broad devaluation of black life, the perpetual presence of black 
resistance and black life throughout history and into the present confounds the reduction 
of black persons to ontological impossibility. My dissertation interrogates the claims of 
Afro-pessimism by examining how black artists and writers in the 20th century manipulate 
or reflect the world of the plantation in their work. At core, this dissertation suggests that 
the dialectic between the quest for justice and equality in the 1960s and the invocation of 
strategies of life in un-freedom provide the terms and means for black thriving in the 
present day and beyond.  
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 Chapter One, “Dominion and Fugitivity: Theorizing the Plantation Home,” 
provides the theoretical framework and historical background for the rest of the 
dissertation. Drawing from archeological texts on the geography and material 
arrangement of plantations as well as from the deep historiography of slavery and 
plantation culture, I theorize plantation homes as existing on a spectrum between 
dominion and fugitivity. By dominion, I mean a sense of home aligned with white 
supremacist patriarchy that relies heavily on control, command, and property ownership, 
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and, by fugitivity, I mean a sense of home aligned with blackness that antagonizes 
dominion through its refusal to fully succumb to its logics. In this chapter, I articulate a 
subtle difference between fugitivity and resistance, arguing that the fugitive antagonizes 
dominion by absenting itself from power rather than through resistant engagement. While 
dominion can and does enact violence on unruly bodies and subjects within the reach of 
its power, the fugitive home becomes a present absence always under threat of that 
violence but invisible to those that might enact it and absent from its geographies of 
control. I argue that all persons who inhabited the plantation south constructed their home 
through some set of practices on the spectrum between these two polar absolutes. In other 
words, it was a rare and perhaps impossible subject who found him- or herself inhabiting 
true and complete dominion or fugitivity. These were ideal forms sought with varying 
success by many different kinds of people who borrowed spaces, objects, and practices 
from one another in an attempt to create the affective experience of being at home.  
 Chapter Two, “Possibility and Loss in the Underground: Ralph Ellison’s Invisible 
Man,” looks at the protagonist’s underground home in Invisible Man as both as a 
metaphor for the novel’s role in its historical moment and as a means of describing the 
limitations of the fugitive home for black liberation. Noting the resonances between the 
novel’s fugitive characters, the underground home of the protagonist, and the work on 
fugitivity in Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning 
and Black Study (2013), this chapter seeks to place Ellison in historical context and to 
understand why his vision for the possibilities of the fugitive home fails to understand its 
connection to the creation of a social world. Ellison’s depiction of the fugitive home 
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emphasizes the sacrifice it demands, which he frames as an alienation from the broader 
national community or shared social world. However, Ellison’s novel itself masks the 
potentially subversive nature of some of its characters with the strategic invocation of 
stereotype and subtle linguistic play. Because Ellison employs fugitive strategies himself, 
I argue that his novel recognizes their possibility, despite the fact that the text and its 
author remain invested in racially-inclusive democracy and the integrationist politics that 
held sway over the black public at mid-century. Invisible Man worries over what is lost 
through an embrace of the fugitive home, without completely abandoning its ideologies 
and practices.  
 In Chapter Three, “Fugitive Domestic: Toni Morrison’s Pedagogy for Freedom,” I 
describe how Toni Morrison uses descriptions of home in Song of Solomon, Beloved, and 
Home to map a path to thriving in her fiction. This chapter argues that Morrison’s fiction 
refuses to define freedom in terms that would reify the totality of white supremacist, 
capitalist, or patriarchal ideologies. Invoking Katherine McKittrick’s concept of “plot-in-
plantation,” I map the spaces in Morrison’s novels that cultivate the extant humanity 
already running rogue within old and powerful systems. The same ghosts that animate 
Afro-pessimist scholarship—the inescapability of violent history, perpetual racial 
antagonism, and the residue of impossible choice—haunt these novels, but Morrison’s 
fiction remains ambivalent about their inescapability or impact. Primarily, I assert that 
Morrison’s writing has always focused on practical, livable politics that would allow for 
survival, thriving, or fully-fledged freedom depending on a person’s access to social and 
economic resources. This chapter then continues the project begun in Chapter Two of 
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locating and describing the possibility of fugitivity while recognizing its limitations in 
order to trouble scholarly assumptions about the impact and/or totality of dominant forms 
of power.  
 This emphasis on indeterminacy persists in Chapter Four, “Subtle Subversion and 
Fugitive Threat: Carrie Mae Weems’ American Icons.” In each of the photographs in this 
series, racist objects—ashtrays, salt-and-pepper shakers, thermometers, figurines—appear 
in mundane domestic still-life scenes. This chapter argues that the images in Weems’ 
American Icons series depict the indeterminacy of power relations within the mundane 
domesticity that descends from plantation slavery, undermining the totality of dominant 
power by indexing the possibility of subversion. Invoking the tropes of the still life genre 
while using playful compositional techniques to resist definitive readings, the 
photographs in this series animate overdetermined racist objects in order to encourage the 
viewer to inhabit the uncanny space created by the repressed history of the violences and 
vulnerabilities of domestic slavery. This series pushes back against the image of domestic 
servants as docile human-objects existing within a scene of total power on the part of the 
master. Instead, these photographs imply resistance, absence, and threat through their 
indeterminate arrangement of racist objects. Using Darieck Scott’s work on abjection and 
Jared Sexton’s concept of social life as social death, this chapter asserts that the playful 
indeterminacy of Weems’ images positions the social and ideological reality of blackness 
as never wholly subjugated even in its subjection.  
 The conclusion of my dissertation discusses the cultural context for the rise of 
Afro-pessimism, noting the proliferation of “post-racialist” discourse and the attendant 
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racial backlash against the election and presidency of Barack Obama as inciting incidents 
for a re-evaluation of the possibilities for black existence within the U.S. I suggest that 
my dissertation charts a historical trajectory as black people move away from the lived 
history of slavery and toward a historical or theoretical reimagining of its structures. I 
also address how my dissertation uses an exploration of human practice to disrupt the 
totality of Wildersonian Afro-pessimism. Although Wilderson rejects historical 
epistemology as it is too ingrained in the ideologies of western modernity to be a way to 
disrupt his theoretical constructions, I use his discussions of home in Red, White, and 
Black to point to the way his theoretical constructions shore up the very power structures 
he wishes to undo. I conclude by asserting the saliency of home as a frame through which 
to see black thinkers grappling with the best ways to seek radical black freedom, from the 
time of slavery through the present.  
  
 26 
Chapter One⎯Dominion and Fugitivity: Theorizing the Plantation 
Home 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to map out the continuum of homes that existed in 
plantation slavery, primarily during the 19th century. Drawing from historiography and 
archaeology, I theorize a spectrum of home between two ideals forms that I term 
dominion and the fugitive home. Within the system of the plantation, these two ideals 
existed in tension with one another, and various actors on any given plantation oscillated 
between the two to ensure survival or thriving for themselves. Each of these ideals 
attaches to certain ideologies and generally produces similar material arrangements. On 
historical plantations, their material and social geography comprised the various products 
of individual striving toward either or both ideals, and an examination of this geography 
reveals their antagonistic and dialectical relationship to each other. This map lays the 
groundwork for the rest of the dissertation. I contend, as mentioned in the introduction, 
that the homes that existed in plantation slavery continue to resonate into the present, in 
line with Afro-pessimist thinking that sees the roots of present-day social formations in 
the history of U.S. slavery.  
 However, the project of this chapter is tricky as it engages with two conceptual 
forms—the plantation and the home—that cannot be easily separated from the ideals, 
ideologies, and nostalgia that surround and inform them.34 Home has also been the object 
                                                
34 An excellent example of historical work that aims to describe the variety of landscapes 
and social arrangements included within the umbrella term of “plantation” is Rhys Isaac, 
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of an idealizing discourse for most of Western history. Since the Greek and Roman 
writings on the household, thinkers have worked to described how best to arrange, 
inhabit, and make use of a home, particularly for those in the cultural and social position 
to determine how the home is ordered. Throughout the late-18th, 19th and 20th centuries, 
prescriptive home literature and programming strove to create ideal citizens in the 
growing U.S. The influence of so-called family values on the political landscape in the 
late 20th and early 21st century indicates that home remains a central ideal to which 
national subjects are expected to strive. At present, however, much of the scholarship on 
the home actively works to undermine or complicate the relationship between the ideal 
middle-class or national home and the lived experiences of people in a world where the 
attainment of this ideal grows increasingly less possible.35 Even more radical disruptions 
of the “domestic” maintain that home must equal comfort, safety, or any number of other 
positive attachments. This powerful ideal colors how people view and describe their own 
experiences, and filters which narratives get passed around. This was no less true in the 
19th century.  
 During the antebellum period, prescriptive writings on the inchoate bourgeois 
home came mostly from Northern women who were, more often than not, also 
abolitionists. In the South, however, another prescriptive literature circulated among 
masters regarding the ideal way to manage the plantation household. The fact that in the 
                                                                                                                                            
The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982). 
35 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Ahmed, et 
al., eds., Uprootings/Regroundings. 
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North, prescriptive home literature was addressed to women while in the South, the 
literature of the household was addressed to masters speaks to the regional sense of who 
was responsible for the space of the home. In the North, where the ideology of separate 
spheres dominated, women were tasked with working on the ideal home. In the South, 
with its intrenched patriarchy and paternalism, men were expected to control all aspects 
of the plantation, from the fields to the living room.36  In both cases, however, 
prescriptive writing on the home and its management tells us less about the home as it 
was and more about the home as elites imagined it should be.  
 Indeed, the fact that people have precious little access to homes that they do not 
inhabit regularly makes any attempt to understand and describe homes as they are 
actually lived in very tricky. Even among a person’s closest friends and family, home 
retains a performative aspect in that living rooms, kitchens, and the other social spaces of 
the home often serve, as Elizabeth Alexander describes, as a means of performing the 
self.37 The performativity of home, as well as the performativity of first-person historical 
accounts like diaries, oral histories, and letters, necessarily complicates any historical 
research on older versions of home-life. Failure to fulfill the ideal was recorded far less 
often than success at the endeavor. This demands reading the archival sources and 
scholarship of slavery against the grain, and seeking moments when a person’s self-
reported sense of home belies itself or gives something away. For example, as many 
                                                
36 For more on the agro-industrial aspects of plantation slavery see Sidney W. Mintz, 
Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking Press, 
1985). 
37 Elizabeth Alexander, The Black Interior (St. Paul, MN: Greywolf Press, 2004). 
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historians of the culture of mistresses have noted, slaves were often blamed for domestic 
shortcomings in the South. In these moments of reported frustration with house slaves, 
we can read the failure of Southern women to perform home properly, often due to their 
inability to coerce their slaves into supporting the domestic endeavor to the extent they 
demanded. The Southern mistress’ practice of home, then, included an assemblage of 
bodies expected to act as extensions of her own self, but which were unruly and difficult 
more often than not. A mistress’ sense of home then is characterized not as a living ideal, 
but rather as a striving toward this ideal marked by persistent, frustrating failures to reach 
it.38 
 The plantation itself is a similarly idealized form, beyond the fact that it was also 
a home. Many of the plantation histories written since the 1970s focus on challenging this 
image by complicating the “Big House” plantation ideal propagated by the Lost Cause 
crusaders following the end of the Civil War and examining previously ignored variables 
like region, gender, time-period, or class.39 Many historians, as well as black studies 
scholars and archeologists, have also worked hard to expand our understanding of the 
black experience of slavery and the interactions between the white and black worlds that 
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would have overlapped and mingled in the confined space of the plantation.40 I take these 
interventions seriously, drawing evidence from a broad historiography in order to locate 
shared ideological attachments rather than a universal set of lived experiences. Based on 
extensive historical evidence, there is no question that few plantation dwellers, black or 
white, inhabited the ideal imagined plantation, just as few northern women of the time 
maintained a perfect bourgeois home. I contend, however, that this ideal still informed 
the lived experience of Antebellum plantation inhabitants, influencing the way they 
talked, wrote, thought about, and made their own plantation homes.41  
 However, I maintain that the plantation presents an interesting place to begin an 
examination of the American home, in that its relationship to contemporary northern 
descriptions of home as well as present-day conceptions of home in the U.S. has been the 
subject of debate. The primary reason that scholars work to separate the plantation home 
from home as we understand it today is due to the fact that the plantation home served as 
a economic unit of production rather than a separate sphere of escape from the economic 
and political world. This idea of “home” as separate from economic production stems 
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from late 18th and early 19th century Northern writers, and it continues to inform theories 
of home today. However, recent scholarship on the role and nature of the home in the 
U.S. has indicated that the false and idealized dichotomy between home and wider social 
or economic world never really existed in the way prescriptive literature or elite self-
presentation might indicate.42 Bodies and objects—domestic laborers, citizens, books, 
newspapers, currency, wealth—circulated both within and without the home, creating 
discursive, intellectual, and economic circuits connecting these ostensibly “separate 
spheres.” Along these same lines, much of the Antebellum work done to separate the 
bourgeois “home” from the plantation “household” intended to distance the North and its 
reputation as an abolitionist space from the slave South. Abolitionist writers mobilized 
the ideal of privacy in the home as an argument against the culture of slavery, attempting 
to deny proper womanhood to Southern women who engaged enslaved labor in the 
creation and management of their domestic sphere. For example, Thavolia Glymph offers 
                                                
42 Too many recent texts on working-class and poor white women, women of color, 
and/or rural women have made this argument for me to be able to provide an exhaustive 
list here. In my own thinking, the following texts have been most influential on this point: 
Maria Kaika, “Interrogating the Geographies of the Familiar: Domesticating Nature and 
Constructing the Autonomy of the Modern Home.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 28.2 (June 2004): 265-286; Linda Kerber, Women of the Republic: 
Intellect and Ideology in Republican America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980; Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, 
Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812, New York: Vintage Books, 1990; Amy Kaplan, 
“Manifest Domesticity.” American Literature 70, no. 3 (1998): 581-606; Claudia Tate, 
Domestic Allegories of Political Desire: The Black Heroine’s Text at the Turn of the 
Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Laura Wexler, Tender Violence: 
Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000. For a discussion of more recent blurring between the 
economic/political/social world and the home, see Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: 
American Families in the Cold War Era, New York: Basic Books, 1988. 
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evidence from the letters and diaries of Northern women living in the South who 
critiqued the detrimental effect of slavery on their ability to maintain a proper American 
home that would produce good Republican citizens. While Glymph never explicitly 
argues that a Northern critique of the South existed within the ideology of domesticity, 
the evidence she presents reveals that Southern women sought the same kind of 
domesticity prescribed by Northern writers and that Northern women often criticized the 
failure of the plantation system to allow this kind of domestic space and practice.43 The 
political intention of prescriptive home writing necessarily demanded an emphasis on the 
separation of economics and the domestic in Northern homes and an overstatement of the 
economic function of their Southern counterparts.  
 While it remains true that the nature of plantation slavery and the social and 
spatial structure of plantations in relation to one another did produce a sphere of home 
that looked different in many cases from similarly elite homes in the north, the fact 
remains that the plantation still served as a home, nostalgically, ideologically, habitually, 
and materially, for those Americans, white and black, who grew up in and inhabited the 
antebellum south. The space of the plantation and its surrounding area made up “home” 
for disparate sorts of people with attitudes and approaches toward various objects that 
were markedly different. The enslaved black body, understood to be paradoxically both 
                                                
43 See in particular Glymph’s chapter on household management and the difficulty of 
willful slaves (Out of the House of Bondage, New York: Cambridge UP, 2008: 63-96). 
Here, Glymph draws extensively from Elizabeth Fox-Genovese’s Within the Plantation 
Household. Although both writers argue for a distinction between the plantation 
“household” and the bourgeois “home,” their evidence belies this division. 
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human and object in the antebellum South,44 serves as one of the most obvious examples 
of the layered nature of material realities on the plantation that complicate any reading of 
the homes it comprised. Additionally, recent archeological literature on plantation 
grounds indicates that even the architecture of the planation—its physical orientation and 
purposeful design—offered different geographies to the different sorts of people who 
moved through the space of the plantation.45  
 My conception of the plantation home as a set of overlapping and connected 
assemblages borrows heavily from Dell Upton’s seminal work on the white and black 
landscapes of slavery. Although Upton’s archaeological work is grounded in the material 
structure of the plantation, his assertion that “an apparently unified landscape may 
actually be composed of several fragmentary ones, some sharing common elements of the 
larger assemblage”46 inspires my discussion of the plantation in the pages that follow.  
Scholars of space and place have long debated the definition and relationship between 
these two forms, with most agreeing that space is physical and material while place is 
cultural and social, without being so easily disconnected in reality as they are in theory. 
Scholars of landscape often focus on the relationship between space and place by 
                                                
44 This idea is generally referred to as the chattel principle, and was most notably 
articulated by William Goodell in The American slave code in theory and practice: its 
distinctive features shown by its statutes, judicial decisions, and illustrative facts, (New 
York: American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1853). 
45 Theresa A. Singleton, ed., The Archaeology of Slavery and Plantation Life (Orlando: 
Academic Press, 1985); Clifton Ellis and Rebecca Ginsburg, Cabin, Quarter, Plantation: 
Architecture and Landscapes of North American Slavery (New Haven: Yale UP, 2010), 
Vlach, Back of the Big House. 
46 Dell Upton, “White and Black Landscapes in Eighteenth-Century Virginia,” Places 2:2 
(1985): 59-72. Reprinted in Ellis and Ginsburg, Cabin, Quarter, Plantation. 
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examining how people create physical spaces with the intention of performing some kind 
of social or cultural function, from the reinforcement of a dominant person’s power to the 
altering of “deviant” behavior among marginal groups.  Upton’s intervention in his essay 
is to argue that any given landscape may be perceived and used differently by different 
bodies that inhabit it.  In the case of the 18th century plantation, Upton argues, the grand 
vistas intended to impress invited visitors to the plantation would not have even been 
seen by the enslaved people that worked in the plantation’s fields.  At the same time, 
many of the barriers to crossing that would have informed a visitor of his or her 
proximity or intimacy to the family would not have been barriers to enslaved people at 
all.  Rather, enslaved people would have seen these intimate, familial spaces as spaces of 
labor or of the strange intimate labor that characterized so much master/slave interaction 
on the plantation. The barriers that existed for enslaved people, then, were far more social 
or cultural than material or visible. Upton uses this different way of looking at the 
landscape to argue for the existence of multiple geographies—for visitors, white laborers, 
masters, mistresses, black slaves, and so on—within the same plantation landscape.  
 Upton also contends that the unified landscape is composed of fragmentary 
landscapes that share common elements, and that the plantation as a whole exists through 
this assemblage of elements. This framework allows me to map the homes I see co-
existing within the material and social landscape of the plantation without needing to 
wholly separate them from one another. As scholars of the plantation have extensively 
noted, race, gender, economic status (particularly for non-elite whites) and region all 
impacted how people experienced the plantation regime, and it is difficult to offer a 
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general overview of the realities of slavery without erasing its particularities or flattening 
the complicated relationships it produced. As mentioned above, historians and 
archaeologists continue to debate to what extent the “Big House” form existed in reality 
and to what extent it merely served as an aspirational or nostalgic ideal. The intimate 
relationships between people on the plantation, perhaps most infamously the “Mammy” 
relationship between white children and enslaved women, have also been questioned and 
often deemed historically inaccurate, or at the very least far more complex and fraught 
than earlier historians had assumed them to be.47 In my project, then, the difficulty of 
offering a coherent description of the home(s) that existed on the plantation is doubly 
complicated by the fact that neither “home” nor “the plantation” exists as a simple or 
unified object of study. For this reason, then, it helps to understand both home and the 
plantation as potentially fragmentary and composed of a shared set of elements.48 The 
plantation as a place comprises these elements, although not necessarily as a unified 
whole, and home is a practice that orients these elements toward or away from one 
another and connects them in a loose network. Just as one plantation landscape might 
contain multiple fragmentary landscapes, a single “plantation home” might actually 
                                                
47 See Diane Roberts, The Myth of Aunt Jemima: Representations of Race and Region 
(New York: Routledge, 1994); Deborah Gray White, Ar’n’t I A Woman?: Female Slaves 
in the Plantation South (New York: WW Norton and Co., 1985); Patricia A. Turner, 
Ceramic Uncles and Celluloid Mammies: Black Images and Their Influence on Culture 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1994). 
48 My approach also borrows elements of actor-network theory and Bruno Latour’s work 
on the social.  In Latour’s terminology, my work seeks to trace the “associations” 
between shared elements that produce both home and the plantation as real objects that 
were historically lived and experienced. See Latour, Reassembling the Social. 
 36 
consist of multiple competing or coexisting homes that draw on the same well of 
elements.   
 However, I do not wish to offer so many particularities of the plantation that it 
ceases to be a category of space. In this chapter, my purpose is to offer some broad 
categories of home that might complicate the notion of a unified plantation home without 
rendering the plantation meaningless as a social unit. Katherine McKittrick’s excellent 
work on “plantation futures” offers that the logic and schemas which the historical fact of 
plantation slavery produced persist in present-day social, cultural, and economic forms. 
Because ways of life codified in the plantation past still resonate in the present, it is 
necessary that the plantation remain a functional unit of historical comparison and 
cultural analysis. Plantation slavery and the plantation as a material and cultural form 
were deliberately constructed systems of oppression and racialization that served to 
dehumanize black bodies and turn persons into property. The U.S. in particular and the 
western world more broadly have not yet been able to fully correct or undo the impact of 
this foundational violence. However, as McKittrick reminds us, perhaps the best way to 
work through the persistence of plantation schemas in order to imagine a different future 
is to “seek out secretive histories”49 of the plantation that provide a record of black life, 
rather than a rehearsal of black death. In other words, McKittrick calls on scholars to look 
at the form of the plantation in new and different ways, in order to locate the spaces of 
resistance already present on the plantation that might be harnessed for the purposes of 
                                                
49 Katherine McKittrick, “Plantation Futures” small axe, vol. 42 (Nov. 2003): 11. 
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black liberation in the present. It is with this in mind that I pursue this project of 
mapping.   
PLANTATION HOMES 
 In the introduction to this dissertation, I defined home as a practice with the 
intention of opening up the category without stripping it of all shared meaning. This 
chapter’s discussion of the forms of home on the plantation will attempt a similar move. 
The geographical or physical space of the plantation and its assemblage of objects, 
relationships, bodies, buildings, and spaces were shared and used to make home by a 
variety of people up and down the social hierarchy. Everyone from the field slaves to the 
master moved through the same physical landscape, with more or less power to alter that 
landscape and/or orient the bodies and objects within it toward or away from one another. 
At times, different practices of home conflicted with one another; at other times, multiple 
homes existed simultaneously in shared space without issue. However, due to the vast 
variations between the material realities of different plantations and the impact of 
plantation and domestic ideals on the historical record of plantation life, it is difficult to 
specifically locate these conflicts or to predict which persons’ enactments of home would 
have conflicted with one another. It seems likely that slave practices of home would have 
conflicted with the master’s sense of home, but how did different slave homes interact 
with one another? What about the interaction between the master and his wife or 
children? Did their practices of home conflict or coincide?   
 In an attempt to provide a model through which to think about these questions 
without essentializing or deadening the plantation as both a lived and ideal space, I 
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propose a framework for categorizing plantation home(s) along a spectrum between two 
ideals, each of which attaches to a primarily imagined but potentially real subject position 
in the geography of the plantation south. At one end of the spectrum lies dominion, 
characterized by a total control of space, relationships, bodies, and self, and ideologically 
informed by the patriarchy, paternalism, and white supremacy of slavery. At the other lies 
fugitivity or the fugitive home, characterized by absence, illegibility, and indeterminacy, 
and informed by a refusal of the ideological and physical oppressions of slavery and 
paternalism, as well as by a desire to cultivate alternative socialities and knowledge. 
Those who sought to build fugitive homes were not necessarily enslaved nor necessarily 
legally categorized as fugitives, but rather absented themselves from power in myriad 
ways, regardless of whether these strategies made them legally free. 
  Both these forms of home were in many ways unreachable ideals, but the tension 
between them and different agents’ movement toward one or the other provides a means 
of conceptualizing how different people found themselves at home on the plantation 
without attaching particular forms of home to particular bodies. While it seems safe to 
presume that the white masters of most plantations sought dominion, a skilled slave 
might also seek dominion of a sort as well. That same slave, however, might also engage 
in fugitive practices as a potential subject of the master’s dominion. Similarly, a mistress 
might seek dominion over her domestic slaves, but might also become fugitive from her 
husband’s home in an effort to resist his dominion over her. People moved between these 
two poles, accepting and rejecting different structures of power at different moments. A 
person need not be white to invest in white supremacy, just as a person need not be black 
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to reject or resist it. A similar statement can be made about gender and patriarchy. So 
while dominion might most often be practiced by white men, it was not practiced solely 
by white men, and while fugitive homes were predominantly black, white plantation 
inhabitants also engaged in fugitive practices.  
 Importantly, my research suggests that most historical actors did not solely 
engage in either form of home. If home, as I discussed in the introduction, at core 
mediates an individual’s relationship to precarity, understood to be a person’s recognition 
of their fundamental human vulnerability, power necessarily played a role in how persons 
came to feel at home in a system of oppression predicated on the imagination of one 
person’s total power over everyone else within a particular geography. Recent work on 
forms of resistance and power within the plantation south, however, encourages a reading 
of the landscape that rejects both the totalizing power of the slave master and the total 
freedom from that power, which is often attached to the figure of the fugitive slave.50 This 
scholarship encourages a nuanced understanding of how agency functioned within the 
system of slavery, making space for considerations of the relational nature of power. 
Plantation homes were a sphere in which both the assertion of power and resistance to 
that power played a role. Individual actors moved between the poles of the spectrum, at 
certain times seeking dominance over the landscape and at other times seeking to be free 
                                                
50 Many texts suggest this complexity, but most central to my thinking are Walter 
Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1999); Stephanie Camp, Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and 
Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004); Glymph, Out of the House of Bondage; Isaac, The Transformation 
of Virginia. 
 40 
from forms of domination. Although antagonistically intertwined, the polar ends of this 
spectrum also dialectally produce a panoply of individual homes and, more holistically, 
the shared geography of the plantation south.  
 This spectrum evokes the similar dialectical constructions of the relationship 
between whiteness and blackness in the U.S., and even more broadly, dialectical 
understandings of the general relationship between power and resistance.51 My work 
enters into these conversations about the nature of power and the efficacy of resistance by 
offering the home as a space in which such power relationships were and are created, 
contested, enacted, and subverted. Rather than seeing dominion as a public act of care-
taking, divorced from the “private” or “intimate” space of the home, I argue that 
dominion actually takes its root and draws strength from the intimate relationships that in 
part comprise the home. Similarly, I do not see the fugitive home as an exile from an 
intimate world that exists in an oppressive geography, but rather as an escape from 
oppression that works in part by creating and protecting an intimate world that can hide 
in plain sight amid the geography of oppression. As home is a means of incubating, 
sustaining, and reproducing cultural life, it serves as a critical battleground in the war 
between power and freedom.  
DOMINION 
 I term the dominating form of home on the plantation “dominion” in order to 
emphasize the centrality of control and command to this sense of being at home. In 
                                                
51 Camp, Closer to Freedom; James Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990); James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 
Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale UP, 1985). 
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addition to seeking an absolute control, those engaged in this form of home practice also 
described themselves to other members of their social class as weighted by a sense of 
responsibility for those who fell within their sphere of control.52 Dominion as a form of 
home correlates directly with the concept of mastery as it has been theorized in the 
literature on slavery and the plantation—dominion is only experienced by those who 
attempt to maintain and exert a total control over the space of their home and the persons 
and bodies within it, and for those who practice dominion, such control is necessary to 
produce the effects of home.53 However, dominion also demands a sense of care-taking or 
concern for those people who are subjects within this total home, and it further demands 
the performance of gratitude on the part of those same subjects for this ostensible care-
taking.54 Dominion produces a threshold between self and society via practices of spatial 
arrangement and visual display. Notably, however, dominion allows the enslaved into 
even the most intimate spaces on the plantation, incorporating their bodies into the 
                                                
52 For evidence of these self-descriptions among planter-class men, see Steven M. Stowe, 
Intimacy and Power in the Old South: Ritual in the Lives of Planters (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1987); Peter W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, 
and Law in the Nineteenth Century South (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995). 
53 The presence of this control and its relationship to mastery is evident in the practices of 
record-keeping found in the archives of plantation masters. See Caitlin Rosenthal, “From 
Memory to Mastery: Accounting for Control in America, 1750-1880,” Enterprise & 
Society 14:4 (2013): 732-748. 
54 Robert Olwell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South 
Carolina Low Country, 1740-1790 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998). Olwell writes at 
length about how the provision of clothes, food, blankets, and other necessities was 
framed as benevolence on the part of the master, despite the fact that the labor of the 
slaves had actually paid for these goods. In turn, the slaves were expected to perform 
gratitude in a careful dance that maintained order and shored up the master’s sense of 
power and righteousness. 
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selfhood of the master. The presence of slaves within the intimate sphere demands the 
construction and reproduction of a set of ideologies that ameliorate the sense of precarity 
such a presence might cause. Namely, dominion traffics in white supremacy, patriarchy, 
and traditional legal ownership, and serves to both ward off precarity and reproduce a 
social system through the perpetuation of these particular ideologies.  
 For those practicing dominion, a sense of control in part derived from spatially 
arranging the landscape to carefully control of what was or was not visible and to whom. 
The self that dominion protects and (re)produces relies on the control of bodies, objects, 
and spaces within its geography to recognize its existence and safety. In the absence of 
the actual ability to maintain this type of control, visual arrangement served as a proxy 
for power. The physical plantation landscape shored up dominion through visual logic 
and the production of sight lines that confirmed the location and direction of power. This 
meant different things for different planters, however.55 In Vlach’s Back of the Big 
House, he writes about inconsistencies in the archeological record about the location of 
work and slave buildings in relation to the “Big House” or master’s residence on various 
plantations in various regions. On some plantations, “an ensemble of service structures, 
including several slave quarters, might flank the roadway leading to the mansion,”56 
which Vlach reads as a desire to “enhance the visitor’s perception of the planter and his 
                                                
55 Although my argument here relies on Vlach’s text, Isaac’s The Transformation of 
Virginia discusses similar variations in the spatial arraignments of plantations as well. 
56 Vlach, Back of the Big House, 21. 
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estate.”57  Other planters mixed slave quarters among the work buildings in the yard, in 
particular for those slaves that worked in the kitchen, stable, or other specialized trades, 
combining “the personal lives and the domestic chores of his servants…into one seamless 
experience.”58 Still others chose to locate slave quarters far away from their residence, 
effectively hiding the existence of slaves and masking the master’s reliance on their 
labor, allowing the master to see himself as the unequivocal source of all the wealth he 
held. In each case, the visibility (or invisibility) of the slave quarters or slave homes 
reinforced the planter’s sense of power through the use of visual knowledge.59 For some 
whose sense of power came from the possession and display of black bodies, the slave 
quarters needed to be highly visible not to the master or his family but to those arriving at 
the plantation to visit. For others whose sense of power came from the ability to surveil 
the activities of their slaves, the landscape had to allow them to keep a close watch on the 
work of their enslaved laborers. Still others needed to feel that they had made the land 
they owned productive, which demanded that they not confront the presence of slave 
labor that actually produced their livelihood. In all three cases the essential practice is the 
same, however: through spatial organization and the physical layout of the plantation, the 
planter intended to control the visibility and location of the enslaved in order to reaffirm 
                                                
57 Vlach, Back of the Big House, 21. Vlach also comments that having these small houses 
appear before one arrived at the planter’s mansion made “the main house seem more 
impressive.” (21) 
58 Vlach, Back of the Big House, 21. 
59 As I will talk about later, however, the visibility or invisibility of slave bodies also 
became a space of resistance for the enslaved, allowing them to produce fugitive homes 
within the space of the plantation. 
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his own power and sense of self. He positioned himself at the center of the world of the 
plantation by controlling who could see what and how those vistas were consumed.   
 Dell Upton’s work on the archaeological record of 18th-century plantations also 
describes how the landscape served to define relationships and roles between the various 
people who lived on the plantation. He writes that the planter “intended that his landscape 
would be hierarchical, leading to himself at the center.”60 Because the plantation served 
not only as a home but also a space of commerce, education, and sometimes politics, 
planters designed their landscape as “a network of spaces”61 where certain spaces held 
certain meanings. This allowed planters to move between roles as they moved through 
the physical space of their plantations. For example, as a planter moved from the fields, 
where he might be the head of economic production, into his house, where he might be 
head of a family or an important community figure receiving guests, the various 
“physical barriers that are also social barriers”62 constructed in the landscape would 
ensure that only those who had permission to see him inhabiting a certain role could do 
so. In the ideal dominion, the plantation master held single authority over the plantation, 
legally and physically demarcating spatial boundaries within the plantation and 
determining what and who belonged in each space.  
 However, these spatial boundaries of the plantation applied less, if at all, to the 
enslaved. While certain slaves belonged in certain spaces—for example, those slaves 
tasked with domestic chores belonged in the house where slaves who worked in the field 
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61 Ibid., 129. 
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did not—no one practicing dominion saw slaves as part of a social world beyond the 
threshold of master’s plantation home. This fact reflects the impact of the chattel 
principle, which described the paradoxical legal status of slaves as simultaneously both 
human and object, on the practice of dominion.63 This principle existed not just in law but 
also in social structures, informing how those inhabitants of the plantation who were not 
enslaved viewed those who were and impacting the slaves’ perception of their own status 
as well.64 While scholarship has uncovered the existence of extensive social worlds 
among the enslaved, some of which even connected the enslaved on multiple 
plantations,65 the ideologies that attach to dominion prevented a recognition of those 
social worlds as such. Rather, within dominion, the slaves were either viewed as objects, 
like in the example above where their quarters were lined up as a display of the master’s 
wealth, or as persons within an intimate sphere sometimes described as “our family, 
white and black.”66 In both cases, those practicing dominion saw the enslaved as part of 
                                                
63 The chattel principle is noted in many texts. A description of it can be found in 
Olwell’s Masters, Slaves, and Subjects, pg. 187-188. It is also discussed on pages 43-44 
of this dissertation. 
64 The difference between a recognition of this status and a belief in its validity will be 
discussed in the section on fugitivity. I do not want to suggest here that all slaves 
internalized the cultural logic of the plantation owner, but I do wish to recognize the 
power of such ideology within the plantation geography. 
65 White, Arn’t I A Woman?; John B. Boles, Black Southerners, 1619-1869 (Lexington, 
KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1984); Damian Alan Paragas, The Quarters and the 
Fields: Slave Families in the Non-Cotton South (Gainsville, FL: University Press of 
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66 Fox-Genovese, Within the Plantation Household. 
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themselves, like any other body, object, or person that they attached to their home, and 
not as part of the social world beyond its threshold.  
 However, the historical record suggests that the actions of the enslaved often 
disrupted this ideological construction. While the debate among scholars about the 
presence and limitations of slave agency continues to rage, everyday forms of resistance 
appear to have been relatively widespread in the plantation south.67 Such disruption of the 
master’s sense of total control threatened to precipitate a sense of precarity, however, and 
in order to mediate this, a set of discursive and material practices masked or punished this 
resistance for those seeking dominion. The use of violence and threat by slave owners to 
control the slave population, which absolutely functioned as a practice of home that 
worked to ameliorate precarity, is well documented in the literature.68 However, I suggest 
it is equally important to mark the affective work performed discursively through the 
perpetuation of stereotype and other beliefs about the capacity of black humans,69 which 
fulfilled a similar function. Those practicing dominion avoided the violation of their 
sense of self both via violence and force and through a careful management of their own 
sense of the possibility of agency on the part of their slaves.  
                                                
67 Johnson, Soul By Soul; Camp, Closer to Freedom; Glymph, Out of the House of 
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69 This thinking stems from Patricia A. Turner, Ceramic Uncles and Celluloid Mammies: 
Black Images and Their Influence on Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1994) and 
Glymph, Out of the House of Bondage. 
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 Thavolia Glymph offers historical examples of the mental reticulations necessary 
to sustain dominion. Although she writes primarily about white women of the planter-
class, her chapter on domestic slave resistance and the discursive response to it analyzes 
historical records produced by both masters and mistresses.70 Glymph describes how 
women of the south had to rely on slave labor to “meet the standards of domesticity”71 
outlined in contemporary prescriptive literature and shared with bourgeois homes in the 
northern U.S. and in Europe. When slaves failed to perform tasks correctly or refused to 
work, however, white women’s homes fell below these standards, calling both their 
womanhood and the “civilization” of their household into question. Women and men of 
the planter-class saw enslaved domestic laborers as objects within their home—as tools 
for proper house-keeping. However, slaves recognized that by disrupting the domestic 
sphere, they could disrupt or resist their masters’ and mistresses’ sense of safety and 
power.72 Glymph’s text argues that in order to feel safe within their homes, planter-class 
men and women couched their descriptions of acts of resistance in the language of 
“behavior,” as this was a “less disturbing framework for fear.”73 Rather than seeing 
everyday resistance as such, those practicing dominion filtered these acts through the lens 
of racial stereotype, which suggested the in-born ineptitude for domestic tasks and 
                                                
70 I am specifically talking about chapter three of her text, which draws from the diaries 
and letters of planter-class women, as well as legal records which would have been an 
arena more heavily populated by planter-class men. See Thavolia Glymph, Out of the 
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71 Glymph, Out of the House of Bondage, 65. 
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inherent “filthiness” of enslaved women. The inability of slaves to perform the 
“civilized” tasks of domesticity also reinforced the ideology of benevolent paternalism 
with which dominion aligned. The discursive conversion of slave resistance into slave 
ineptitude mediated the threat of resistance, not by force but through language.  
 I do not want to suggest here that domestic slaves were not subject to violence 
and force—indeed, the first chapter of Glymph’s text centers on the violence of white 
women within plantation slavery, and her work here is in good scholarly company. As 
Robert Olwell writes, even in a ideological struggle for the control of slaves, “masters 
held the whip hand in a very literal sense.”74 However, a discursive erasure of potential 
resistance existed alongside these physical forms of violence and coercion, mediating a 
sense of precarity through the machinations of a rhetorical magic trick which disappears 
the resistant power of those beneath a person on a social hierarchy. Stephanie Camp 
describes the system of relations on the planation as a “paternalistic combination of 
hegemonic cultural control and violent discipline.”75 Because the plantation household 
relied on the presence of enslaved people to function, even in its most intimate spaces, 
the ideology of paternalism and the belief in white racial superiority masked the risk 
inherent in the intimacy of domestic slavery to preserve the ideal of dominion.   
 This discursive work points to one of the central paradoxes of dominion. Despite 
the fact that this form of home rests at the top of the social hierarchy, dominion could not 
exist without the acquiescence, or the performance of acquiescence, of everyone within 
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the plantation. As Kirsten E. Wood writes, “power did not flow automatically from 
property titles and slave codes.”76 Rather, cultural and physical control of slaves had to 
“extract not only obedience but even consent from enslaved people.”77 The enslaved, as 
well as the planter’s wife, children, and employees, all had to legitimate the master’s 
social dominance, and resistance from any group threatened his dominion over all 
others.78 Plantation masters often experiencee a sense of insecurity or vulnerability, 
despite their distinct legal and material advantage. Because perfect control is a mythic 
ideal, their social, cultural, and physical domination of the plantation “had to be 
constantly asserted, defended, and if possible extended”79 lest a master find himself 
“beset with work stoppages, truancy, theft…arson or murder.”80 The oppressive social 
structures of slavery and the social order of the plantation household demanded an 
acquiescence to authority that left little ideological room for the agency of women, 
children, or the enslaved. Therefore, racially-informed patriarchy and paternalism 
invoked notions of stewardship and reciprocal responsibility to allow masters to feel 
themselves to be in total command while masking this oppression as a benevolent care 
for populations deemed incapable of taking care of themselves.81 This ideological 
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loophole provided a justification for the legitimacy of the plantation hierarchy, and 
equally importantly, delegitimated challenges to that authority by those within his home.  
 The anxiety of mastery and the ideological responses to it can be seen in a variety 
of primary sources from the time.82 One example is Thomas Jefferson’s well-studied 
grappling with the morality of slavery and the nature of racial difference in Notes on the 
State of Virginia. Query 18, ostensibly intended to cover the topic of manners particular 
to Virginia, concerns itself primarily with the impact of slavery on the culture of the state. 
Jefferson, himself a slave-owner, nevertheless views the “unremitting despotism”83 that 
inheres in mastery as troubling to the “manners and morals”84 of Southern men. In this 
query, Jefferson recognizes the dissonance between the notion of natural liberty that 
spurred the American Revolution and the institution of slavery that sustained its 
economy. He writes that “considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a 
revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible events,”85 
meaning that he foresees a moment when the masses of the enslaved might rise up in 
revolution as the colonies recently had (and as Haitian slaves shortly would). His 
reference to “numbers” suggests an awareness of how vastly outnumbered were masters 
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by slaves. He ends the query hoping that the “total emancipation” whose inevitability he 
imagines might occur “with the consent of the masters, rather than by their extirpation.”86 
Here again, he worries that a slave revolution or the freeing of slaves might lead to the 
death of masters like himself.  
 A similar anxiety appears in Query 14, which includes a long meditation on what 
Jefferson sees as the natural basis of racial difference and incompatibility. He begins this 
section of the query by discussing why it would not be wise to allow the formerly-
enslaved black population to remain in Virginia following emancipation. He lists a set of 
reasons, including “ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have 
sustained,” which would “produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the 
extermination of the one or the other race.”87 In this query, then, as in Query 18, Jefferson 
articulates an awareness that the “injuries” of slavery might lead to the destruction of 
those in the planter-class when the system of slavery ends.  
 In Query 14, however, Jefferson follows this recognition of the potential for 
revolutionary violence on the part of the slaves with a long rationale for his eventual 
“suspicion” that “the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time 
and circumstances, are inferior to whites in the endowments of both body and mind.”88 
While Jefferson offers a more measured and skeptical discussion of racial difference than 
apologists of the 19th century, the sheer volume of writing and thinking Jefferson devotes 
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to this point reflects his deep need to convince himself of its truth. It is particularly telling 
that this meditation on race comes immediately after his discussion of the legal 
possibility of mass emancipation in a query wholly unrelated to the question of race 
itself. When he mentions the future absence of the legal oppression of slaves, which 
promises total mastery over the them, Jefferson retreats to a reaffirmation of his racial 
superiority through the abuse of reason. He uses the discursive strategy of dominion to 
reaffirm his total power—his “natural” power, even—when the thought of emancipation 
and the potential vengeance of the slaves precipitates a sense of precarity.  
 Beyond using these discursive strategies to shore up the belief in the necessity of 
the slave system, dominion also worked to ensure the perpetuation of this social system 
through various discursive and material practices. Jefferson attributes the perpetuation of 
the violence of slavery to a passive absorption of its “passions” by (white) children.89 
However, the primary sources cites in Glymph’s text reveal more intentional “rituals of 
power”90 meant to maintain social hierarchy. For example, she notes a WPA slave 
narrative in which Harriet Robinson remembers having to “say ‘Yessuh Master’ and bow 
real low”91 before any new white children born to her master. She reports that all the 
slaves across the plantation, even those who worked in the fields and had less contact 
with the master’s family, had to queue up to perform this act of deference before an 
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infant. This kind of action reflects and reinforces the white supremacy inherent to the 
practice of dominion.  
 Other material practices encouraged children to understand their slaves as 
extensions of themselves, incorporating their behavior and bodies into their sense of self. 
For example, Glymph relays the story of a slave who would be hit by the mistress when 
her children made spelling errors.92 This moment could be read as gratuitous violence on 
the part of the mistress, or an indication of childhood empathy for the enslaved, but I 
suggest this practice laid the groundwork for the later ability of children to rely on 
enslaved labor for their domestic success or economic livelihood without disrupting their 
sense of home. Punishing a child’s errors by beating a slave works to attach the child’s 
individual success or failure to the bodily well-being of another human. This kind of 
practice sets up a dynamic that will perpetuate the blurring of the line between master and 
slave necessary to a sense of dominion.  
 The tension between harmful action and the rhetoric of helpfulness vibrates at the 
core of dominion. Both these structures provide a means through which dominion can 
mediate a sense of precarity, even as it simultaneously precipitates that precarity. The 
sense of threat produced by structures of control demands additional control and the 
performance of deference by all those within the geographic sphere of dominion. Of 
course, total control of other humans is nearly, if not wholly, impossible. The ideal of 
dominion, then, stood most vulnerable to those who refused its power and stole 
themselves away.  
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FUGITIVE HOMES 
 I have termed the mobile, cunning home at the other end of the spectrum the 
“fugitive” home in order to place myself within the extensive scholarship on the 
fugitivity of blackness in modern systems. When speaking of slavery, “fugitive” certainly 
has more concrete and legal connotations, but a home need not be inhabited by a fugitive 
slave to be a fugitive home. Here, I use the term to describe a home that exists as a refuge 
for persecuted persons, or a home that is in hiding. While fugitive homes may have 
existed within the physical geography of the plantation, the sociality they produced 
intentionally allowed an escape from the totality of the masters’ dominion. The core of 
the fugitive home is freedom through refusal and strategic absence—what Fred Moten 
calls, “fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed 
social logic.”93 I also draw from Neil Roberts description of freedom to understand 
fugitivity. He writes, “Freedom is not a place; it is a state of being.”94 The fugitive home 
produces freedom in spite of domination, producing subjects who refuse subjection or 
providing an escape that cultivates agency. A fugitive home can be simultaneously within 
and without, subject to and hidden from,95 rooted in place and on the run.  
 I root my description of this type of home in the figure of the “runaway” slave, 
although not the one that most commonly appears in the popular imagination. While the 
national narrative of those who escaped slavery is a long journey north to freedom, the 
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historiography of the plantation records that many slaves would escape the space of the 
plantation “but remained hidden in close proximity to their husbands, wives, parents, or 
children.”96 These runaways often lived in nearby woods or swamps in order to stay close 
to their “home” plantation.97 These runaways would remove themselves from the 
ostensibly total geography of the plantation, from the slave rosters, from the sight-lines or 
domination of the slave master, but would not remove themselves from the social world 
of black people. In fact, often without the knowledge of the slave master (or to his 
frustration), these slaves would reappear on the plantation to see friends or relatives on 
days of rest, but would return to their hiding place following the visit. For their part, 
masters continued to see fugitive slaves as part of their property, and subject to their 
dominion, despite their having absented themselves from the labor and oppression of 
slavery. In others words, these fugitives moved through the geography of the plantation, 
but would not allow themselves to be subject to its domination. This practice serves as a 
metaphor for the practice of the fugitive home as I see it. The fugitive home does not 
necessarily exist outside of the geography of the plantation, but it does produce an 
alternative geography in which enslaved people or other plantation dwellers could be at 
                                                
96 Lenus Jack Jr., “‘I Looked for Home Elsewhere’: Black Southern Plantation Families, 
1790-1940,” in Plantation Society and Race Relations: The Origins of Inequality, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999): 77-87. 
97 Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom; Blassingame, The Slave 
Community; Larry E. Hudson Jr., To Have and To Hold: Slave Work and Family Life in 
Antebellum South Carolina (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997). 
 56 
home by absenting themselves from the dominion of another, sometimes only briefly and 
sometimes permanently.98  
 The fugitive home mediated the sense of precarity that precipitates from being 
dominated by some form of power, be it a system or an individual. Most obviously, 
scholarship and testimony have documented the spectacular violence performed on the 
bodies of the enslaved, particularly at the hands of overseers but also at the hands of 
masters, mistresses, and even black drivers. This violence intended to ensure the 
compliance and obsequiousness of the enslaved, and its constant threat served as a source 
of vulnerability. The enactment of power also had a psychological dimension, however, 
in that slaves, as salable goods, had limited control over where they lived and worked,99 
or over the conditions of that life and labor. Family units or social networks could be and 
frequently were disrupted because of the master’s economic problems or his need for a 
dowry. Rations, the condition of housing, and the physical safety of friends and relatives 
were beyond the direct control of the enslaved.100  Although scholars have argued 
compellingly for the existence of slave agency and slave resistance,101 Saidiya Hartman 
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notes that “agency,” for the enslaved and for others oppressed by a social structure, is 
circumscribed by the limitations of their social position and the oppressiveness of the 
system in which they must survive.102 This circumscription and its associated contingency 
would have created a sense of precarity for those who sought to practice the fugitive 
home. The inhabitants of the fugitive home would have necessarily recognized their 
vulnerability to the unilateral exercise of power by those above them on the social 
hierarchy and its chaotic, unpredictable, and disruptive results.  
 Rather than confronting domination with an equal but opposite assertion of 
power, however, the fugitive home instead masks, hides, and absents the bodies and 
minds of those who wish to be free from oppression. I see the fugitive home as in a 
relation of “antagonism,”103 to borrow Frank B. Wilderson III’s terms, with dominion. 
The two homes cannot be reconciled, and so they exist in antagonism perpetually until 
one ceases to exist. The act of creating a fugitive home is a theft in the eyes of the master, 
in that some object or subject rightfully within his power has gone missing. Moten calls 
fugitivity “stolen life,”104 but complicates the idea of theft by asserting that the fugitive 
also refuses ownership. This is to say that while the fugitive home is a theft, the purpose 
of the theft is not ownership but the freedom to refuse ownership. Fugitivity does not 
confront dominion so much as it refuses its logics and structure, allowing persons to 
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move “out of the frame”105 without regard to their physical mobility. Fugitivity is not then 
the opposite of dominion, so much as a refusal of it.  
 The fugitive home exists primarily through a set of narrative and spatial practices 
that limited the access of those in power to the fugitive home and its inhabitants while 
also producing and maintaining a social world. Because the fugitive home serves in large 
part to absent a person from the ostensibly totalizing geography of the plantation, the 
slave cabins themselves were not necessarily a spatial demarcation of the fugitive home, 
although fugitive practices did at times take place within the space. For example, 
Stephanie Camp tells the story of a woman named California who hung up abolitionist 
prints in the slave cabin she inhabited while hired out to another plantation. This woman 
recognized that she was beyond the dominion of her master, and antagonized the owner 
of the plantation on which she worked by passively asserting her desire for liberty.106 
While Camp remarks on the rarity of this kind of act, it does reveal that slave quarter 
could be a space of antagonism and improvised dissent. However, the visibility of slave 
cabins within the plantation geography and their accessibility by the master, overseer, or 
other powerful people made them insufficient spaces for the protection or production of a 
self in the absence of other practices.  
 The enslaved on a plantation generally had precious little control over the 
planning and design of the physical layout of the spaces they inhabited. As discussed in 
the previous section, the layout of the plantation was a conscious plan intended to 
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confirm and reassert the power of the master and the subjection of those beneath him on 
the social hierarchy. The enslaved had little choice about where they slept or the physical 
condition of their housing. On certain plantations, slaves who performed non-field labor 
(e.g. cooks, nurses, blacksmiths) slept near their job sites107 rather than returning to a 
central quarters at night. The design of the plantation objectified the slave, connecting 
their person wholly to a sphere of work rather than recognizing a humanity beyond their 
usefulness. Slaves had precious little control over the spaces in which they made a life, 
which demanded that the practice of home take on dimensions beyond the spatial in order 
to fulfill its purpose.  
 When fugitive homes did produce a physical space, that space often appeared 
“unhomely” to the white people who held positions of power. Vlach, for example, writes 
that slaves created a landscape “at the margins of the plantation…that generally escaped 
much notice, mostly because it was marked in ways that planters either considered 
insignificant or could not recognize.”108 His archeological work suggests a preference 
among the enslaved for “a landscape marked by few overt boundaries and fixed 
sites….open to and characterized by movement.”109 Rebecca Ginsburg similarly suggests 
that “enslaved workers’ territorial systems were typically more fluid…than…those of 
elite whites.”110 These kinds of landscape formations often registered among white 
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observers as “sloppy (or worse, ‘nasty’)”111 or as indications of the “Indolence and 
Nastiness”112 produced via the system of enslavement. Barbara Heath cites evidence that 
slaves grew “edible Chenopodium plants” near their homes, likely to supplement their 
rations, which was “misunderstood by nonresident whites as neglectful or untidy.”113 
Here again, white observers misperceive intentional landscape construction as evidence 
of untidiness. On the whole, Ginsberg argues, “whites often failed to recognize the 
components of enslaved workers’ environments, the sites and paths, for what they were 
and how they were really used.”114 Fugitive homes created a landscape that was illegible 
to those in power. 
 Archaeological and historical scholarship indicates that the illegibility of this 
landscape was intentional. Ginsburg writes that because those in power could not 
recognize the black landscapes within the geography of the plantation, these sites and 
paths became “a useful place for acts [slaves] wished to hide from whites, such as eating 
stolen goods, enacting rituals, taking a break from work, or meeting friends and family 
away from eyes that might look askance at such visits.”115 While Ginsberg’s chapter 
focuses on how daily inhabitation of this fugitive landscape aided runaway slaves who 
sought permanent liberation from the system of slavery, others, like Stephanie Camp, 
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focus on how such a landscape provided the possibility of “short-term flight”116 and other 
“masked and short lived”117 forms of quotidian resistance. This illegibility functioned on 
two levels: one, it produced thresholds that could only be seen by those who could read 
the spatial language, and two, it protected the spatial practices of the fugitive home from 
disruption by making them appear not to exist. Although in its ideal form the fugitive 
home would provide permanent absence from the dominations and oppressions of 
enslavement, descriptions of the role of landscape in less permanent forms of refuge still 
reveals the practices that composed the fugitive home.  
 For example, a common practice among the enslaved was to “steal away”—to 
steal oneself from the master—for shorter or longer periods of time, escaping into the 
woods, swamps, or other land surrounding the plantation, while remaining near the 
plantation itself. Slave registers continued to list slaves who had run away, particularly 
those believed to be living in maroon communities or making their home near to the 
plantation, even after they had left the active ownership of the slave-master. Ginsburg 
notes that the black landscapes that made these acts possible were legible to the enslaved, 
despite the fact that their “markers were indecipherable to most whites.”118 Relating the 
story of a man who evaded capture for months despite not leaving the woods beyond the 
plantation where he had been enslaved, Ginsberg notes that he “inhabited a system of 
trails and spaces known to and apprehended by other slaves”119 and was “fed regularly by 
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other enslaved people who knew of his whereabouts and kept this information among 
themselves.”120 By his own testimony, he would not have been able to remain free 
without both knowledge of this landscape and the support of this community.  
 Misrecognition, masking, and other strategies of illegibility produced the freedom 
that is central to the fugitive home, even for those who did not “steal away” from the 
physical geography of the plantation. While the domination of the plantation was 
ostensibly total, those living in the quarters or in other slave housing still found moments 
in which they were beyond the surveillance or control of the master, mistress, or 
overseer.121 The fugitive home, then, also existed within the geographical boundary of the 
plantation but out of sight—things that happened at night, on days of rest, or in the daily 
moments of empowering invisibility that would inevitably have occurred in a space 
where those in power were so extensively outnumbered by the people they sought to 
control.122 In these moments of freedom, the enslaved engaged in practices that supported 
their social reproduction—sharing gossip, taking food or other resources from the stores 
of those in power, educating one another about tactics and strategies for refuge and 
survival.123 These hidden practices sustained slave life both physically and socially, 
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through the taking of resources that would assuage hunger or sickness and through the 
creation of a social network of knowledge, care, and support that allowed slaves to affirm 
themselves as part of something beyond the oppressions of slavery. Although still very 
much present within the geography of the plantation and at risk of becoming subject to its 
violent dominations, the enslaved could inhabit the fugitive home in these stolen 
moments of invisibility, reaffirming their connection to a social world and warding off 
the sense of danger and vulnerability produced by systemic slavery.  
 Harriet Jacobs’ escape into the garret of her grandmother’s slave cabin serves as 
an extreme example of this kind of fugitive home, while also complicating the 
relationship between mobility and fugitivity. As Katherine McKittrick notes, Jacobs’ 
found a “loophole of retreat”124 in the garret where she could see the plantation and keep 
an eye on her children without being seen by the master. Because she was absent despite 
being present—absent from the visual dominion of the master but present in the fugitive 
home made by herself and the other slaves who knew her whereabouts—she found a 
larger freedom in the cramped garrett than she had found moving freely around the 
plantation grounds. Jacobs’ story reminds us that the fugitive home produced other 
discomforts even as it worked against the precarity present in the lives of those living 
subject to the patriarchal and white supremacist logics of slavery. Both Jacobs and those 
slaves mentioned above who lived beyond the boundary of the plantation could be found 
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and returned by force at any point. Through the practice of hiding, however, or the 
practice of “stealing away,” those inhabiting the fugitive home could relieve themselves 
of the constant sense of precarity experienced within the space of the plantation. Beyond 
sight or reach of the plantation master or other figures of power on the plantation and 
protected by a social network and secret knowledge, fugitives could produce a sense of 
selfhood that pushed back against the complete subjection desired by a system and 
ideology in which they were as much property as person.  
 A set of visible spatial practices on the plantation also produced fugitive homes. 
For example, Garrett Fesler’s analysis of soil data at the Utopia plantation site revealed 
the existence of swept yards attached to slave quarters in South Carolina. Fesler found 
archeological evidence that “halos” of debris—animal bones, animal and human waste, 
ashes—had encircled the slave cabins, although the spaces directly next to the cabins had 
no such remnants. Fesler argues that this indicates a regular practice of yard sweeping 
among the slaves on this plantation. Fesler suggests that this practice of yard sweeping 
“may have helped people living under unimaginable stress to find comfort”125 through a 
“remembered way of living”126 carried over from Africa, connecting the enslaved to both 
a wider social world of black people and to an ancestral tradition. Heath also mentions 
the “subtractive practice of yard sweeping,”127 noting that it may have been a means of 
“dissuad[ing] malevolent spirits from harming the living.”128 In both studies, scholars 
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interpret the practice of yard sweeping not as a means of claiming space but as a spatial 
practice that connects a home with a social or spiritual world.  
 While this practice does visibly mark the boundary of the home, the 
impermanence of the practice implies a stronger connection to fugitivity than dominion. 
The yard would have had to been swept regularly and repeatedly, perhaps even daily, 
rather than providing the kind of permanent demarcation of a boundary found in the 
fences and legal plots of dominion. More similar to the domestic labor that might have 
produced a sense of home for women in both the north and south, the practice of yard 
sweeping fails to produce a defensible space despite revealing a person’s sense of 
connection to a plot of land. I see this practice as productive of a threshold for the self—a 
line beyond which debris can collect without being part of the home—without necessarily 
rooting the fugitive home to the land through a permanent claim to space. Instead, this 
practice is mobile. If a fugitive home relocated, the same practice could immediately 
demarcate a new boundary. When they do create space,  fugitive homes do so through 
impermanent practices of care, which contrast the legal claims to space or permanent 
fences of dominion. 
 The garden plots of slaves are a similar kind of space, kept up through labor 
independent of enslavement but still productive of a visible space. Scholars of plantation 
life continue to debate the role of these plots in slave life. Some view them as a survival 
mechanism, meant to augment the meager rations provided by slave masters.129 Some 
masters even enforced the cultivation of slave gardens and appropriated surplus 
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vegetables to supplement their own income.130 Other scholars see them as a means of 
limited economic independence, as slaves often sold the vegetables grown in their 
gardens either in a public market or to their owner or his family.131 Robert Olwell has 
gone so far as to argue that the production of marketable vegetables in slave gardens, 
particularly in the late 18th century, provided slaves with a means to see themselves as 
labor, rather than as dutiful subjects of the master. Olwell argues that the language and 
concepts of the market economy allowed slaves a way to understand their lives that was 
separate from the ideology of patriarchy that otherwise controlled life-ways on the 
plantation.132 For Olwell, then, garden plots not only provided a small window of 
economic independence but also gave slaves access to structures of thinking that changed 
their understanding of the nature of slavery as an institution. Although not all scholars 
would go so far as Olwell regarding the power of the garden plot within slave life, most 
agree that the production and maintenance of gardens by slaves acted as a way to gain a 
limited freedom, either from something as simple as hunger or something as complex as 
the ideology of patriarchy, within the geography of the plantation but in antagonism of or 
as a “loophole of retreat” from its dominating power structures.  
 In this way, the garden plots serve as an excellent example of a spatial practice 
that produced a threshold between the self housed in a fugitive home and the wider social 
world of the plantation. Katherine McKittrick has written extensively about the nature of 
fugitivity on the plantation, particularly as a figure for describing black geography or 
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black geographic knowing. Her recent work takes up the garden plot as a particular 
example of the spaces of freedom, subversion, or resistance that existed within the 
plantation.133 I follow this thinking in arguing that the garden plot was a space of care and 
nuturance that would have been part of the fugitive home. In the garden, the willing labor 
of slaves cultivated life-sustaining or economically viable food/market goods that 
perpetuated and benefited slave life beyond, but still within, the dominations of slavery. 
The garden plot is a particularly apt metaphor for the relationship between fugitive home 
and the wider plantation, in that its role in sustaining the life of the enslaved perpetuated 
the system of slavery by fueling plantation labor. At the same time, however, these 
garden plots also disrupted the total control of the slave-master, in that they provided 
food to persons regardless the desires of the person ostensibly in charge of such things. 
They also allowed those visible to the master to feed those who remained invisible to the 
master, sustaining social networks beyond the control of the plantation. The garden plot’s 
fugitivity exists in its ability to look like one thing—a space of cultivation that preserved 
and strengthened the slave-master’s labor force—while possibly being something more 
subversive than that.  
 The garden plot, then, is not illegible so much as indeterminate. The production of 
indeterminacy is another means by which the fugitive home masked its inhabitants, 
activities, and existence, particularly in instances where invisibility or absence were 
impossible. Garden plots would have been a somewhat risky space, as their visibility and 
slaves’ investment in them might have allowed masters to threaten such spaces as a 
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means of punishment or control. However, the garden held meaning in multiple registers 
simultaneously. The master could perceive the food grown in them as indicative of the 
consent of his slaves to the perpetuation of the system of slavery or of their willingness to 
support the economic productivity of his plantation. However, the food grown in them 
might also have fed persons living beyond the geography of the plantation, free or 
fugitive from the master’s dominion. These gardens potentially fulfilled multiple 
purposes then, rather than having a specific purpose that directly supported a particular 
ideology. Those purposes that were legible to the plantation owner protected the space by 
appeasing power, while the more subversive purposes of the space could remain hidden, 
if they existed at all.  This indeterminacy relates to the spatial misdirection and 
misrecognition which protected those selves that inhabited fugitive homes.  
 In addition to these spatial practices, the fugitive home also relied on illegible 
narrative techniques to demarcate the threshold between self and society. Rather than 
police a physical threshold, the fugitive home encrypts the threshold so that anyone who 
knows the code can pass. Using narrative or discursive strategies to mark the threshold of 
the home allowed a continuity of self despite the highly contingent nature of slave life, as 
well as protecting the self from that contingency by hiding its investments within coded 
language. Scholarship has documented the vast extent of these linguistic practices, from 
the hidden meanings in slave songs to the coded messages that directed fugitives and 
runaways.134 These verbal practices most closely relate to the “messy” spatial practices 
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that produced illegible homes. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. also cites the existence of linguistic 
trickster figures, borrowed from African folk traditions, within the slave cultures of the 
Americas. Within the cosmologies of the enslaved, these tricksters often became seen as 
liberators or as enemies of the enslavers, while also retaining their attachment to 
linguistic indeterminacy.135 This indicates an ideological connection between 
indeterminate or “tricky” language—what Gates would call the practice of 
“signifyin(g)”—and freedom from slavery. This indeterminate language, which can mean 
one of two things or both things at once, more closely parallels indeterminate spatial 
practices like the garden plot. In all cases, however, coded language determined who 
could enter the fugitive home and also served to sustain its intimate connections.  
 For example, scholars note the prevalence of “away marriages,” which reveal how 
narrative practices often produced the intimate sphere of the fugitive home. In an away 
marriage, two married slaves lived on different plantations but had been allowed to marry 
one another by their respective masters.136 Often these slaves were able to procure passes 
to see one another, but any children that came from the union remained with the mother 
and the nuclear family was generally not permitted to live together while both parents 
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remained enslaved. Since family or kin networks generally connect to the self, rather than 
being seen as part of the social world beyond the home, these families could not rely on 
spatial creation or policing alone to mark the threshold between the two. Instead, the 
historical record indicates that parents (usually fathers) who lived “away” were kept 
present in the home through storytelling and other narrative practices that kept absent 
persons present in a planation-based network. If a father could not visit often, he would 
be kept alive through the mentioning of his name or descriptions of his behavior and 
beliefs. Slaves who escaped, either north or into the regions around the plantation, were 
kept present in a similar way. Then when those absent slaves returned to visit, or when 
relatives were allowed to visit their “home” plantation, they were less strangers because 
they had been a narrative presence even in their physical absence. 
 Although most away or abroad marriages were recognized and sanctioned by 
slave masters, narratively connected social networks ideally produced truly fugitive 
homes as well. For example, the story above from Ginsberg’s chapter about the fugitive 
who survived in the woods thanks to the help and support of other enslaved people 
reveals how narrative networks connecting the enslaved sustained black selves who 
sought juridical freedom. Ginsberg’s research supports the idea that black social networks 
generally tracked those slaves that were “missing” from the plantation, suggesting that 
enslaved people shared geographical information among themselves. Citing the existence 
of an “identifiable black sphere,”137 she argues that the enslaved “formed bonds of 
support, trust, and resistance to white control” via their participation in “a shared, hidden 
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landscape.”138 The blurring here of intimate bonds and engagement with a landscape 
reflects how the fugitive home relied on both geographical knowledge and social 
connection to exist. The threshold of the fugitive home and its ability to ward off 
precarity relied equally on linguistic, narrative, and spatial practices to produce the 
illegibility, misunderstanding, and indeterminacy necessary for fugitive survival and 
thriving.  
 Often these practices intentionally engaged structures of oppression in order to 
create invisibility or to hide fugitive acts. For example, the structure of thought that 
allowed those practicing dominion to hide slave resistance within the rhetoric of 
ineptitude functioned as much to cultivate and protect that resistance as it did to shore up 
the ideologies of mastery. In Glymph’s text, she writes that even in the historiography, 
enslaved women are “rendered childlike and irresponsible,” meaning that they could not 
be “serious contenders for the status of rebels.”139 However, she also cites numerous 
examples of resistant behavior masked by these assumptions about the capability of the 
enslaved. Additionally, Glymph notes that enslaved women mobilized these stereotypes 
to lighten their workloads, getting out of doing certain tasks by feigning an inability to 
complete them properly. This suggest that the enslaved used the stereotypes applied to 
them to their advantage, particularly in moments when the misrecognition of someone in 
power would lead them to have a bit more freedom. Fugitive homes, then, engaged 
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whatever materials were available, including structures that ostensibly shored up 
oppression, to create spaces for the cultivation of selves and social worlds.  
 Religion offered a similar kind of structure, which masters intended as support for 
the social hierarchy on which they relied, but which slaves appropriated and altered as a 
means of producing and protecting the subversive social connections necessary for the 
production of a fugitive home. Albert J. Raboteau describes how religion among the 
enslaved was both “formally organized and spontaneously adapted,”140 in that slaves both 
attended formal services, which more often than not served mastery, and gathered in 
secret in the “hush harbors” near the plantation to worship on their own terms, beyond the 
gaze of the master. This latter, invisible kind of religion provided opportunity not only for 
worship, but also for social connection and for the reproduction of the fugitive home 
through the communication of its central ideologies. In particular, slave Christianity 
rejected tenets of institutional Christianity that shored up the power of the master and 
reinforced a set of rules which supported the survival and thriving of the enslaved and 
their social world. For example, Raboteau quotes William Wells Brown, who notes that 
slaves “thought that to deceive whites was a religious duty.”141 Rather than accepting 
theft or lying as unequivocal sins, as the master’s version of Christianity might have it, 
the enslaved chose to see theft against or lying to whites as integral to their survival, and 
to only recognize such behavior as a sin when it broke the trust of the enslaved 
community. In this way, the enslaved used the materials of Christianity to produce codes 
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of moral behavior that functioned to protect the slave community from the abuses of 
power—they used Christianity to produce a fugitive home.  
 Of course, none of these practices changed the legal status of the enslaved. The 
fugitive home did not seek to directly confront or undo the systemic structures that 
supported dominion. Rather, the fugitive home simply refused to recognize or validate 
the logics and ideologies that underpinned the dominations of slavery. Just as dominion 
could not recognize the legitimacy of fugitive home, so the fugitive home did not 
recognize dominion as legitimate. In the context of the U.S., then, fugitivity did not seek 
to incorporate enslaved persons into the national imaginary or into the category of 
national citizen. This home practice did not engage in the politics of confrontation, 
attempting to overpower those responsible for dominion. Instead, the fugitive home 
refuses power and makes known the fallacy of its domination through its antagonistic 
unwillingness to engage on the terms of power. The fugitive home, like non-violent 
protest tactics, antagonizes power by refusing its legitimacy. Unlike non-violent protest, 
however, the fugitive home also masks its action to protect the selves engaged in the 
practice from the violence of power, rather than working to make the violence of power 
visible.  
 
THE SPECTRUM OF PLANTATION HOMES 
 Of course, both ends of the spectrum of home I describe here are very much 
ideals. The real practices of home on the plantation intended to move individuals toward 
either of these ideal forms. As discussed above, much of the literature of slavery speaks 
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about the sense of insecurity or vulnerability experienced by those seeking dominion, 
despite their social, cultural, and physical power over those beneath them on the social 
hierarchy. This anxiety constantly threatened to disrupt the sense of control necessary to 
ideal dominion. Resistance of even the most mundane sort would have undermined this 
ideal feeling of power, suggesting that it is unlikely that anyone seeking dominion ever 
truly experienced the total power it promises. Rather, some homes on the plantation 
sought dominion, attaching themselves to its logics and finding a cruel optimism in their 
inability to ever reach the final goal.  
 However, the fugitive home I describe is also very much an ideal. Being close to a 
physical and familiar place and yet absent from the power structures of the plantation, 
maintaining the ties of a social network without necessarily enjoying a geographic 
proximity, and having freedom of movement in a social world that certainly did not wish 
to allow it would all be difficult goals to reach for an enslaved person. Based on the 
literature, scholars know that many fugitive homes, even well-established and relatively 
large maroon communities, often came under attack by more powerful entities that 
wished to exert dominion over them and re-establish or reaffirm the dominant social 
order. Rather than growing out of a prescriptive literature, however, as the planter’s sense 
of dominion did, the ideal of the fugitive home grew out of the social and cultural 
experience of oppressed people, primarily slaves, in the antebellum South. The practices 
of the fugitive home produced a space of self and social cultivation, protected through 
indeterminacy and a willingness to live with, rather than control, contingency. Any 
“control” over others would have taken the form of education or social instruction—here, 
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a practice of cultivation or care rather than a practice of domination. However, this ability 
to cultivate an alternate social world was no less an ideal than the total control of the 
master’s dominion. These two ideals existed in tension with one another, not only for the 
enslaved and the master, but for the mistress, overseer, black driver, and any other 
persons building their home within the geography of the plantation. It is through this 
tension, and through the engagement with both ideals by plantation inhabitants, that 
individuals within the world of the plantation made their homes.  
 In this chapter, I have delineated and described two clear poles that anchored the 
spectrum of home practice evident in the historical record of plantation life. Between 
these two poles, and produced dialectically through the tension between them, lay myriad 
individual homes and the practices that composed them. Landless white men, for 
example, often produced fugitive homes in the marginal spaces between established 
plantations, while perhaps also seeking or idealizing dominion in a quest for stability, 
power, or wealth.142 These men might use the practice of fugitivity to sustain a life that 
might eventually lead to a economic rise, at which point dominion might become the 
more appealing practice. A white planter-class woman might escape her husband’s 
dominion through absenting herself from his home to visit family, while skirting the 
reach of her father’s dominion or that of her sister’s husband due to her still present 
position within her husband’s plantation home. Her absence did not make her free from 
subjection to patriarchy writ-large, but she could perhaps find a moment in which the 
strictures of particular social structures had less grip on her life by moving her body 
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beyond a boundary and into another “inside” that might not so clearly oppress her. Black 
drivers might find themselves versed in the language of the fugitive home and might find 
its spatial markers legible, but might also find themselves aligned with the ideologies of 
dominion or more firmly compelled by its promise of safety. In other words, their 
position within the hierarchy of the plantation might necessitate their practice of 
dominion or their striving for that ideal, despite their access or ties to the fugitive homes 
of the enslaved. White overseers might have oscillated between dominion and fugitivity 
in their home practice, particularly if they had families, desiring to be the patriarchal 
master of their wives and children, but resistant to the control of their employer or 
resentful of his demands and expectations. While a white overseer did not get marked as 
an instrument or object in the same way as the slaves he managed, the master did use the 
position of overseer as a repository for the ill-will or mis-management of his slaves.143 
Because of this, the overseer might have sought a freedom from this instrumentality 
through fugitive practices, attempting to find a kind of freedom that might escape the 
reach of the master’s power.  
 Archival and historical materials are full of individual examples of home practices 
and conflicts that support the idea that neither of these idealized poles served as the single 
home practice for the majority of individuals, white or black. Home is a primarily 
individual act, and most of the tension between the two poles of the spectrum I propose 
lies in the conflict between desire to be free from domination and the existence of social 
hierarchies that deny an individual that ability. The practice of home wards off the 
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precarity precipitated by engagement with these social structures and the added risks 
associated with the contingent nature of human life. Precariousness at the top of the 
social hierarchy grows out of the (perhaps hidden) knowledge that one’s position in the 
world relies on the labor, subjection, and oppression of those beneath him or her, 
meaning that the foundation of one’s home rests on the complicity of the oppressed with 
their own oppression. Precariousness at the bottom of the social hierarchy stems from the 
ever-present threat of violent domination or discipline. Home responds to one’s relative 
position on such hierarchies to produce the maximum sense of protection possible within 
the circumscription of the social world.  
 The rest of this dissertation will examine texts and images from the 20th century 
for resonances with the framework of plantation home(s) I have just described. In 
particular, the strategies of the fugitive home delineated here draw a direct line between 
the practices of resistance on the plantation and the liberation and reimagining of black 
life by black artists in the 20th century. However, these later representations also reflect 
the presence of black dominion in eras of black economic ascension, as well as the 
limitations of the fugitive home as a strategy for black liberation. In all cases, however, 
both dominion and the fugitive home appear in literature and art produced by black 
authors and artists over the course of the 20th century, indicating their salience as 
categories of analysis.  
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Chapter Two⎯Possibility and Loss in the Underground: Ralph 
Ellison’s Invisible Man 
 
 An entire dissertation could be written about the various homes in Invisible Man 
and what they communicate about strategies for black freedom. The most prominent 
home in the novel, however, and the one from which the whole of its story is narrated, is 
the underground room in which both the prologue and epilogue are set. In this space, the 
protagonist muses on his grandfather’s riddle, speaks to an old slave woman, and steals 
electricity to power his turntable and his 1,369 lightbulbs, among other things. Although 
the novel begins in this room, the reader learns that the protagonist finds himself there at 
the end of a long journey—that his inhabitation of the underground room is the result of a 
set of experiences over the course of his life that culminated in his decision to remain 
below ground for some unstated amount of time. This chapter examines how the 
protagonist’s exposure to two particular characters, both of whom inhabit fugitive homes, 
eventually leads to his decision to hibernate.  
 In this chapter, I argue that Ellison’s text is itself a fugitive home for blackness 
within the white literary world of the 1950s. Writing amid the McCarthy-era push for 
conformity and allegiance to normative power structures, Ellison’s novel masks its 
subversion through the invocation of fugitive strategies. Those characters that map the 
path to the underground for the protagonist inhabit stereotypes or social roles that could 
potentially dilute their threat. By creating a protagonist indoctrinated into dominion but 
exposed to fugitivity and allowing the reader to only see the world through his eyes, 
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Ellison produces an indeterminacy that keeps open the possibility of a subversive reading 
of the text. In this way, the novel resonates with strategies of fugitivity later delineated by 
Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in The Undercommons (2013).  
 However, despite Ellison’s engagement with fugitive strategy, his novel remains 
ambivalent about the efficacy of such a strategy as a means of liberation, which accounts 
for the difficulty of understanding the novel’s argument and the continued debates about 
Ellison’s intentions and political alignments. The text characterizes the fugitive home as 
offering a reprieve from oppression rather than a path to complete liberation. While we 
find the protagonist at home in himself at the end of the novel, he remains outside of the 
social world and unaware of how or when to reintegrate. Ellison’s text suggests that in 
the absence of racial democracy, fugitivity produces isolation and alienation rather than 
social connection and liberation.  
 This chapter will examine the novel’s relationship to the fugitive home first by 
examining how Ellison’s text was itself a fugitive home for blackness in the white literary 
world of the 1950s. Assuming then that the novel contains subversive presentations of 
black life that might not be immediately apparent, the rest of the chapter will examine 
two characters—the vet and Mary Rambo—each of whom the novel explicitly ties to the 
protagonist’s underground home. I will conclude by describing how the novel as a whole 
holds dominion and fugitivity in tension, making no broad pronouncement about either’s 
ultimate efficacy but revealing the limitations inherent to both.  
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INVISIBLE MAN AS FUGITIVE HOME IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 
 Ellison, as much as his novels, has been read differently over the years, depending 
on the state of black political life and the current push in literary scholarship. Upon the 
first publication of the novel in 1952, the literary establishment and nascent “academic 
industry”144 overwhelmingly embraced Ellison as an important spokesman for black 
America. Most reviews of the book and most of the critical work on it since its 
publication have emphasized its complicated, prescient presentation of blackness,145 
viewing it as an important departure from the limiting picture of black life presented in 
texts like Richard Wrights’ Native Son (1940).  
 Certain critics and scholars, most famously Irving Howe, argued that Ellison’s 
text had abandoned the important social realist conventions that made “good” protest 
literature, however. These critics view his belief in integrationism and faith in the 
principle of democracy as points of weakness in his social critique. Further, Houston 
Baker, Jr. has argued that the white literary establishment’s embrace of Ellison actually 
stems from his failure to present an accurate picture of black dissent in the South. 
Evincing “failures of black critical memory,”146 Baker charges the book with presenting 
“an accommodationist black folk populace”147 rather than the rising “black southern 
public sphere” that would eventually produce the Civil Rights Movement and its 
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attendant social change. Although Baker’s earlier work on Ellison had been laudatory,148 
this later text views his “likability” among white critics as a mark of his political failure 
rather than his aesthetic success. 
 Kenneth W. Warren reminds us that Invisible Man, like many other important 
literary works, needs to be read as a product of its historical and cultural moment, 
however. He suggests that some of the inclination to critique Ellison grows out of a desire 
to see black experience as a “changing same,”149 meaning that novels describing 
blackness are expected to remain timeless despite the fact of historical change. Warren 
argues that “perpetually shifting nomenclature used to refer to African-descended 
populations in the United States”150 reflects the disappearance and emergence of social 
identities or the “social entity”151 attached to each one. Ellison himself noted that the 
“American Negroes” of which he saw himself a part were a “Vanished Tribe,”152 and 
Warren encourages scholars to read Ellison as “an extraordinary writer for the particular 
era in which he lived a good portion of his life.”153 Warren argues that the perceived 
possibilities for black aesthetics in Ellison’s historical moment mediate his relationship to 
the white literary modernists he often cited as the “ancestors” of his work and to the 
white literary establishment which embraced him. Any critique of Ellison that fails to 
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recognize the historical circumscription of the black experience from which he writes 
necessarily misunderstands the meaning and importance of the novel.  
 I take seriously Warren’s call to place Ellison in historical context. For one, 
Ellison’s novel is published during the well-documented post-war push for integration 
that would eventually lead to Brown v. Board of Eduction in 1954 and the growth of the 
Civil Rights Movement. The novel’s frustrated hope for the democratic inclusion of 
blackness within the national political imaginary reflects Ellison’s investment in this 
integrationist movement. Having not seen how racism would perpetuate with difference 
in the post-Civil Rights Era, Ellison, like other black thinkers of the time, remained 
optimistic about the possibility of true democratic inclusion.154 Secondly, Ellison writes 
this novel “during the harrowing days of McCarthyism,”155 when the social and political 
climate demanded the performance of allegiance and an acquiescence to conformity. 
Baker’s critique recognizes how this historical reality might have limited Ellison’s ability 
to be subversive, but Baker does not forgive Ellison this “decision to ‘hibernate’”156 
rather than to “praise, champion, or flesh out the revolutionary potential”157 of black 
publics in both the north and south. Regardless of Ellison’s success or failure in 
representing the potential of the black public, which I will take up later, the conformist 
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cultural climate of the era necessarily influenced how Ellison chose to write about black 
resistance to dominant, white-aligned power structures.  
 Third, Ellison’s relationship to the institution of slavery would have been 
profoundly different than the relationship of critics and scholars writing about the novel 
in the late-20th and early-21st century. For Ellison, as for his protagonist, slavery was not a 
cultural memory but a generational or familial one. It would have been possible, and 
perhaps likely, for many contemporary black readers of Invisible Man to have had 
grandparents who were slaves or who had experienced the hope and disappointment of 
the era of Reconstruction. The possibilities and impossibilities of black life within the 
system of slavery would have been differently understood by someone of Ellison’s 
generation, where the memory was more personal than cultural. This is not to undermine 
the ability of historiography or cultural memory to transmit information, but just to offer 
another lens which a careful reader ought to apply when analyzing the text’s 
representation of fugitive homes.  
 Because of Ellison’s generational or personal experience of slavery, 
Reconstruction, and the burgeoning mid-century Civil Right Movement, I question 
Baker’s contention that Ellison evinces a “failure of black critical memory.” I am more 
compelled by Warren’s contention that “what has made possible the contradictory 
appropriations of Ralph Ellison’s work is that his writing so effectively rings the changes 
on black political and social life”158 during the first half of the 20th century. Later scholars 
have made visible the long historical record of black public activism leading up to the 
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Civil Rights Movement, and Baker correctly points out that Ellison’s text does not depict 
this subversive public as a fully-apparent and well-appointed whole. However, subversive 
figures appear throughout the novel, and a number of them suggest the presence of a 
black public unseen by the narrator but no less real.  
 Ellison’s novel masks these characters, using symbols and social knowledge to 
communicate their disruptive potential to those who know what to look for while hiding 
them from those who might fear or resist this possibility of disruption. The author uses 
different strategies to hide different kinds of characters, wrapping many of them in the 
guise of stereotype or simplification to smuggle their subversive knowledge through. For 
all these subversive characters, however, Ellison’s adroit use of a protagonist who 
perceives the world through the limited lens of his indoctrination into dominion serves as 
the central means by which the novel produces a fugitive home. The reader, if as unaware 
as the protagonist of the hidden meanings these subversive characters mean to 
communicate, is given no key to decode hidden knowledge. Like the grandfather’s riddle 
which reappears throughout the text, the encrypted messages within Invisible Man fail to 
be fully or explicitly translated at any point. Rather, the novel just presents the riddle and 
leaves it to the reader to understand what the words might mean.  
 A few concrete examples from the scholarship on the novel will help illustrate 
this point. Larry Neal argues that Ellison’s novel, as well as his general legacy, presents a 
much more complex picture than scholars often assume. To support this argument, Neal 
cites the presence of zoot suiters in Invisible Man alongside Ellison’s own writing about 
the social function and symbolism of the zoot suit in American culture. Neal sees 
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Ellison’s invocation of the zoot suit as reflective of Ellison’s belief that in the 
“manipulation of cultural mechanisms [lies] the basis for black liberation.”159 The very 
presence of such fashion in Invisible Man, according to Neal, reveals that Ellison saw 
these clothes “mask[ing] deeper levels of social and symbolic activity”160 which could be 
harnessed by black leadership toward the goal of social change.  
 However, Invisible Man never explicitly states why the zoot suit holds radical 
potential or what that radical potential is, exactly. The pages devoted to the zoot suiters in 
the novel emphasizes their location “outside the groove of history”161 where the narrator 
envisions them “running and dodging the forces of history instead of making a 
dominating stand.”162 The protagonist comes to see himself in relation to them, as sharing 
their location beyond history: “Perhaps each hundred years or so men like them, like me, 
appeared in society, drifting through; and yet by all historical logic we, I, should have 
disappeared around the first part of the nineteenth century, rationalized out of 
existence.”163 History in the novel, via the rhetoric of the Brotherhood, becomes symbolic 
of a system of oppression that limits individual freedom. The zoot suiters’ refusal to 
comply with the rational progress of history, then, comprises fugitive behavior. Beyond 
the novel, Ellison also wrote of the zoot suit that black leadership would be well-served 
to “learn the meaning of the myths and symbols which abound among the Negro 
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masses,”164 of which this fashion is an example. However, neither in the novel nor in his 
other writing does Ellison ever name the meaning of the zoot suit nor call the zoot suit a 
source of liberation. Ellison knew the fashion masked something potentially liberatory, 
but he refused to define or describe exactly what that thing might be, leaving it to the 
reader to judge whether a position “outside the groove of history” helped or hurt the 
cause of black freedom.  
 A more complex and nuanced example comes from scholarship on Jim 
Trueblood, a sharecropper who appears early in the novel. While driving Mr. Norton, a 
wealthy white benefactor of his segregated Southern college, the protagonist ends up 
deciding to turn down a country road beyond the geographical boundary of the school. 
There, he and Norton come upon Trueblood’s cabin, and the protagonist ends up 
revealing to Norton that Trueblood has been accused of incest, at least within the flows of 
gossip at the school. Norton is shocked (or excited) by this revelation, and he demands an 
audience with the sharecropper, who tells a long version of the story of his sin at the 
behest of Norton. Scholars, particularly since the 1970s, have characterized Trueblood as 
a trickster figure within the novel who plays with Norton’s stereotypes of blackness and 
displaced incestuous desire to earn a $100 bill, to the chagrin of the protagonist.  
 However, these readings of Trueblood remain cautious, asserting the character’s 
potential for indeterminacy more than giving a definitive reading. For example, Gillian 
Johns’ 2007 article on Trueblood responds in large part to Houston Baker’s 1984 analysis 
of the Trueblood episode in Invisible Man, in which Baker never questions the validity of 
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Trueblood’s story of incest.165 Johns’ article raises the possibility that Trueblood is not 
just a good folk narrator but is actually fabricating the entire incident for the economic 
benefit of his family. Her reading bears quoting at length: “But isn’t it possible that a 
sharecropper with two women in his family pregnant has the motive to make up a 
racialized ‘dream’ story—indeed, a tall tale exaggerating whatever ‘polite’ stories about 
black family life white men already tell—for greenhorn listeners who would relish a 
sexually extravagant narrative? And isn’t it possible that he could—at least try to—turn 
the assumed abjection of his social location into aesthetic skill exploiting his listener’s 
propensity to think himself safely—or invisibly—carried away by the rhetoric of desire 
displaced onto him?"166 Johns argues that the trinary relationship of desire and shame 
created among the protagonist, Trueblood, and Norton serves to reveal the intraracial 
class-conflict between the elite or bourgeois black students and faculty at the school and 
the poor or working-class black farm families that surround them. Johns’ intervention 
here is to extrapolate the blindness produced through allegiances with white elites on the 
part of the protagonist onto the scholarship of the novel that always took Trueblood’s 
story as gospel. Neither does she definitively state that Trueblood’s story is not true, 
however. Rather, she frames her argument within a series of “if” statements, exploring 
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how it might alter a reading of the novel to presume Trueblood tells a tall tale without 
“offering a definitive truth.”167 
 Johns’ article raises reasonable doubts about the veracity of Trueblood’s 
narrative, and I am compelled by her suggestion that the novel-reader’s desire to accept 
the story as true is epistemologically aligned with Norton and the protagonist’s desire to 
see it as true as well. However, a number of subtle moments in the Trueblood section 
offer the possibility of an alternative reading. Johns points to the moment when the 
protagonist tries to interrupt the story, and Trueblood “seem[s] to smile at [him] behind 
his eyes”168 when Norton demands the story continue. Johns suggests that this is a 
“rhetorical ‘wink’”169 suggesting that the story might be fabricated. At the end of the long 
narrative, Trueblood describes what has happened to his family since the story got out, 
ending by saying, “The nigguhs up at the school don’t like me, but the white folks treats 
me fine.”170 This loaded line is followed in the text by a line break, after which the 
narrator’s voice returns to say, “He was some farmer.”171 If we read this moment in light 
of Johns’ argument, seeing Trueblood as con-man rather than fool, the narrator could be 
suggesting a parallel between the practice of cultivating a farm as a source of economic 
security and Trueblood’s narration. Although the protagonist remains confused about 
Trueblood’s intention and the veracity of his story, the narrator—writing years later from 
the underground—might be more aware in hindsight of the game or gamble which he 
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once witnessed.172 Trueblood’s tale might be a crop the character has cultivated, and 
Norton’s $100 bill his harvest.  
 Just as with the zoot suiters and the other indeterminate characters within the text, 
the novel never definitively tells us exactly how to read Trueblood’s tale. The 
indeterminacy created through Trueblood’s winks and the signifying content of his 
descriptions of all the help he has gotten provide room to read the character as more 
subversive than it might appear on the surface. Trueblood reveals how a cunning 
storyteller can trade on the displaced taboo sexual desires of a white man and his 
stereotypical beliefs about black people to improve the financial situation of his family in 
a time of dire need. Many scholars point to Trueblood’s note that in order not to sin when 
he wakes up sleeping with his daughter, he has to “move without movin’.”173 A perfect 
encapsulation of fugitivity as I theorize it in this dissertation, Trueblood here describes 
the fact that without being able to escape the heavy burden of racism, stereotype, and 
limited economic possibility, he had to find a way to support two new children who were 
due to arrive at the same time. So he digs in to the stereotype, monetizes it, performs it 
for the right (white) audiences, and his financial situation vastly improves. The 
protagonist hates Trueblood for perpetuating a stereotype because the protagonist feels 
beholden to white perceptions of blackness. Trueblood, however, builds his life beyond-
but-within the boundaries of white geography. Having no reason to interact with 
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structures of power that privilege whiteness, Trueblood can protect his family by 
wrapping them in stereotype, hiding his home through an intentional messiness. In this 
way, Trueblood registers as a fugitive character within the text, hidden not only from 
Norton and the protagonist, but hidden also from readers who share their epistemologies.  
 It is unlikely that Ellison would have viewed Trueblood as a resistant or liberated 
character, however. Ellison’s writing on the stereotype Shadow and Act argues that 
reductive cultural perceptions erase the humanity of those whom they reflect.174 In 
“Change the Yoke and Slip the Joke,” he also critiques black minstrels for performing, as 
Trueblood does in the novel, a damaging stereotype and thereby reifying it in the minds 
of a white audience.175 As I will discuss at more length later, Ellison’s novel remains 
ambivalent about its fugitive characters, critiquing them even as it describes their 
potential power. Trueblood’s ability to extract sustenance from a white man through 
cunning and a masterful manipulation of the ideologies of power locates subversive 
potential in a place few white or black middle-class readers, particularly at the time, 
might have expected to see it. However, his decision to sustain his family in this way 
alienates him from the wider black community, particularly the bourgeois black world of 
the campus. As with other fugitive characters in the novel, the price Trueblood pays for 
the limited security of the fugitive home is alienation from the larger social community.  
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 However, my purpose in this section is to argue that Ellison’s novel contains 
subversive characters that the novel masks through narrative strategies that mimic 
fugitivity, and the Trueblood episode is an excellent example of this. The subtle winks 
along with the potential for disagreement between the protagonist and the narrator all 
function to create confusion and indeterminacy around the veracity and purpose of 
Trueblood’s tale. A reader can see Trueblood as pure stereotype as easily as Norton does, 
but Ellison imbues the scene with the potential for a more complicated reading. In the 
conformist era in which he wrote, however, and writing to the mostly white literary elite 
who would receive and judge his novel, Ellison masks Trueblood so that readers who 
might be threatened by his ability to manipulate a rich white man can see him as a fool 
instead. This subtle masking appears multiple times over the course of the novel, 
indicating that, at least in part, Ellison’s project was to write a subversive novel that 
would not automatically be read that way.  
 The novel’s use of fugitive strategy to mask its subversive characters resonates 
with Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s writing on the role of the intellectual in The 
Undercommons. Although Moten and Harney focus on the neoliberal university, their 
assertion that “it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be 
accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment”176 seems equally applicable to 
other forms of intellectual life. At mid-century, the U.S. fought the Cold War on a 
cultural front as much as on a military or economic one. Investment in the arts and the 
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creation of a culture industry produced a space of refuge for a thinker and writer like 
Ellison, who was able to support himself through writing and speaking for the rest of his 
life. However, the notion that this culture industry could bear full depictions of all facets 
of social life in the U.S. seems fallacious. Faced with the possibility and limitation of 
producing intellectual and aesthetic work within this structure, Ellison found himself in a 
similar position to the fugitive intellectuals Moten and Harney describe. The question 
becomes, then, whether Ellison’s presence in the predominantly white literary world of 
the 1950s complied with their call to “abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission…to be in 
but not of.”177  
 Ellison’s legacy as a public figure occludes an easy assertion that the writer ran 
rouge through the systems that surrounded him. Early on, white literary scholars 
embraced the writer, and he wrote often about his own aesthetic inheritance from white 
literary modernists. In the 1970s, at the height of Afrocentrism and the Black Arts 
Movement, Ellison often found himself on the defensive about his investment in this 
legacy when speaking to college audiences.178 However, Moten and Harney insist that the 
black fugitivity they propose derives from “from the ‘runaway tongues’ and eloquent 
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vulgarities encrypted in works and days that turn out to be of the native or the slave only 
insofar as the fugitive is misrecognized.”179 This is to say that works that might appear to 
be “of the native or the slave” in reality encrypt a fugitive intellectual practice that 
persists by benefit of being hidden within misrecognition. Ellison, and particularly 
Invisible Man, fit more easily into this construction of the fugitive. So much of Ellison’s 
writing on literature, and even about his own literature, worked to suss out how both the 
“pre-individualistic black community”180 of the south which produced the blues and the 
power structures that serve as infrastructure for white literature interfere with a black 
individual’s ability to produce artistic work that is true to himself. Invisible Man, with its 
mixed depictions of both “folk” characters and all then-available paths to black 
liberation, exists “in” both of these worlds but refuses to be “of” either. This opens up 
space for an examination of how Ellison might have viewed what Moten and Harney call 
“the undercommons” and what possibilities and limitations he might have seen for it. 
 The strongest argument for Ellison’s investment in an intellectual “underground” 
stems from the fact that his novel both begins and ends literally below ground. The home 
the protagonist/narrator makes below the streets of Harlem actually makes the whole of 
the novel possible. From this room, the narrator tells the bildungsroman of the rest of the 
novel, and in this space, the protagonist “hibernates” at the end of his journey. It is also in 
this space that the narrator learns that he is invisible and comes to appreciate that fact as a 
source of power rather than a form of disempowerment. He writes that after years of 
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trying to “adopt the opinions of others…I finally rebelled. I am an invisible man.”181 This 
underground room provides the space for the existential questioning and creation 
necessary for the production of an individual humanity. Like Moten and Harney’s 
university, this space is also a space of theft. In what the narrator calls his “battle with 
Monopolated Light & Power,”182 he steals power from the electrical grid to run a 
turntable and to illuminate the 1,369 lightbulbs that line his underground home. He tells 
the reader this this fight “allows [him] to feel [his] vital aliveness.”183 His act of righteous 
theft, then, affirms his life. All of these aspects of the narrator’s underground home 
indicate that Ellison recognized some benefit to the kind of fugitive lifestyle it 
symbolizes. 
 However, as many scholars have noted, the underground functions as a space of 
alienation for the protagonist as well. Unlike the undercommons imagined by Moten and 
Harney, populated with other fugitives who sustain one another, Ellison imagines this 
fugitive home as a space of disconnection from community. This alienation forms the 
core of Ellison’s critique of fugitive strategy. While the narrator promises that he will one 
day emerge from his bunker, the bunker itself does not produce the means of broad 
liberation for black people, nor does it clarify to the protagonist what that path to 
liberation might be. Ellison’s text does not begin and end within a fugitive community, 
but rather within an isolated space of fugitivity inhabited by a single person.  
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 This anxiety about the impact of fugitive strategy differentiates Ellison’s 
relationship to the underground from that described in The Undercommons. While 
Ellison’s text resonates with the later theoretical work, he challenges their call to 
disobedience by asking what the costs might be. Moten and Harney recognize that risk 
persists in the fugitive space they imagine, as it is “open for refuge even though it may let 
in police agents and destruction.”184 The undercommons, they say, is “always an unsafe 
neighborhood,”185 under threat from cultural forces both within and without it. Ellison, 
due in part to his historical proximity to both the violence of Jim Crow and the 
ostracizing punishment of the Red Scare, seems less inclined to throw the door open, “no 
questions asked.”186 Because of the pre-Civil Rights historical position of Ellison’s novel, 
it remains both optimistic that black life might flourish within a racially-inclusive 
American democracy and ambivalent about the impact of fugitivity on black people. 
Unlike Moten, Harney, and other critics writing in the present era of persistent anti-black 
violence amid black social and political ascension, Ellison still believed that America 
would be capable of fulfilling its democratic promise for its black citizens and worried at 
how a rejection of dominant culture might negatively impact black individuals and the 
cause of black freedom writ large.  
 Ellison’s ambivalence about fugitivity in the novel, particularly with regard to 
how fugitive characters and their homes influence the protagonist on his journey, allows 
us to better understand the possibilities and limitations of fugitivity in Ellison’s historical 
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era. In the next section, I will discuss two fugitive characters I view as critically 
important to the development of the protagonist due to their influence on his decision to 
move underground.187 Ellison’s protagonist remains ambivalent about both, reflecting 
Ellison’s own ambivalence, as well as his desire to hide the sustaining potential of 
fugitive homes from a potentially unsafe audience. Ellison’s novel both describes their 
fugitivity and produces a fugitive home for them, imbuing his text with the potential for 
subversion that might emerge, like the narrator himself, when the “next phase”188 begins.  
THE VET AND RESTRICTIVE FREEDOM 
 One character who offers the protagonist an early glimpse into the subversive 
potential of fugitivity is a veteran he meets at the Golden Day. Following the episode 
with Trueblood discussed earlier in this chapter, Norton demands the protagonist take 
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him somewhere for a drink to help him deal with the shock of the sharecropper’s story. 
Being in the rural area beyond the boundaries of his college’s campus, the protagonist 
makes the forced choice to take the man to a local tavern and brothel called the Golden 
Day. As they drive closer to the establishment, the protagonist sees a line of 
“shellshocked”189 veterans from a nearby mental hospital also on their way to the bar. The 
narrator tells the reader that many of these men had been members of the professions 
prior to their institutionalization, and that even now he “could never believe that they 
were really patients.”190  
 Even upon first encountering them, these veterans are imbued with an 
indeterminacy that challenges the perception that they are simply mad. Rather, they are 
what Moten and Harney would call “unprofessional”191 men—once part of the 
professional organizational structure to which the protagonist aspires but now in violation 
of its social code. The narrator tells the reader that these men live in community with one 
another, “play[ing] some vast and complicated game with me and the rest of the school 
folk, a game whose goal was laughter and whose rules and subtleties I could never 
grasp.”192 For example, when two of the veterans come outside to help him carry Norton 
back into the bar, one of them says, “Look, Sylvester, it’s Thomas Jefferson!” and the 
other responds, “I was just about to say, I’ve long wanted to discourse with him!” The 
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protagonist “look[s] at them speechlessly; they were both crazy. Or were they joking?”193 
Although the two veterans share a reality in this moment—both of them either see 
Thomas Jefferson or understand the joke—the protagonist lacks the social grammar to 
interpret the meaning of their communication.  
 Both the fact that they could “pass” for something other than patients and the fact 
that the protagonist cannot discern the meaning of their communication point to the 
existence of a fugitive home practiced by these men. As discussed in the first chapter, 
narrative practices work in tandem with spatial or material arrangements to produce the 
structures of the fugitive home. Here, the veterans engage in fugitive speaking practices 
that confound the protagonist by refusing to be recognizable as either joke or madness. 
Indeed, the “jokes” here resonate with the heavily-studied practice of “signifying,” 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Signifying is a black American linguistic/rhetorical 
practice whose presence has been traced back to slavery. Drawing from Roger D. 
Abrahams’ definition, Henry Louis Gates describes signifying194 as a figurative, indirect 
form of communication that allows those engaging in the practice to name or play a joke 
on someone without addressing him/her directly. Gates usefully refers to signifying as 
“the slave’s trope, the trope of tropes,”195 noting that these kinds of linguistic and 
rhetorical practices emerge from the condition of enslavement. Although Gates does not 
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explicitly call signifying a fugitive practice, its ability to hide meaning in plain sight and 
its location “perpendicular”196 to the dominant/white linguistic universe aligns this 
discursive practice with the other forms of fugitivity that descend from the world of 
plantation slavery. In this moment, then, the veterans’ linguistic play evinces one 
function of fugitivity, which is to allow a critique of those in power that can be hidden in 
plain sight within a world structured by oppressive ideologies.197 
 The character I am calling “the vet,” engages in similar narrative strategies. The 
vet is an ex-doctor and patient at the asylum who helps the protagonist with Norton 
during his fainting spell at the Golden Day. After Norton has been carried upstairs into 
one of the brothel rooms, the vet appears to help bring the white man back to 
consciousness. However, the vet also takes advantage of this privileged position to 
communicate hidden knowledge to the protagonist perpendicularly, by having a 
conversation that appears to be with Norton. The protagonist, anxious about having 
brought Norton to the Golden Day, keeps encouraging him to leave. The vet suggests that 
the protagonist might go downstairs and wait for them, but then changes his mind, 
saying, “Perhaps if I had overheard some of what I’m about to tell you when I was a 
student up there on the hill, I wouldn’t be the casualty that I am.”198 Here, the vet clearly 
indicates that he does not intend to communicate directly with the protagonist, but rather 
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to show him something indirectly by allowing him to “overhear” his conversation with 
Norton.  
 However, the protagonist’s naiveté and ideological commitments undermine the 
usefulness of this perpendicular conversation. First, the vet describes the circumstances 
under which he finds himself in a mental institution. He tells Norton and the protagonist 
that he was driven out of the town in which he practiced medicine and beaten by a gang 
of whites “for saving a human life.”199 After telling this story, he then asks the protagonist 
if he understands what happened, and the protagonist responds that he doesn’t know if he 
understands or not. The vet explains to Norton that despite the protagonist’s “eyes and 
ears and…good distended African nose,”200 he cannot “understand the simple facts of 
life.”201 Here, the vet obliquely refers to what many scholars of the novel have called 
“folk knowledge,” or an ancestral or experiential way-of-knowing which Ellison 
differentiates from the sociological epistemologies he critiques throughout the text. 
Similarly, when Norton asks the vet how long he was in France, the vet tells him that he 
was there “long enough to forget some fundamentals which I should never have 
forgotten.”202 When Norton does not understand his meaning, he says the things he forgot 
were, “Such things as most peasants and folk peoples almost always know through 
experience, though seldom through conscious thought.”203 In both these cases, the vet 
explicitly links “folk peoples” with the kinds of knowledge that help black persons 
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navigate in and survive a world dominated by white supremacy and its attendant forms of 
power. Although derisively suggesting that these epistemologies do not descend from 
“conscious thought,” the vet here reiterates the assertion that folk characters hold 
knowledge that supports black survival and life.  
 The protagonist has lost his connection to these folk epistemologies, however, and 
the vet suggests that this is because he functions as a source of support for dominion 
through his allegiance with its ideologies, despite his low position within its hierarchies 
and his phenotypical blackness. As mentioned in the first chapter, dominion demands the 
acquiescence of those within its geography of power in order to function, and can be 
disrupted by the refusal of those who should be disempowered according to the logic of 
dominion to recognize the power that someone holds over them. When the vet asks the 
protagonist to understand the story of his trauma and the protagonist is unable to do so, 
the vet realizes that the protagonist has lost touch with or has never had the type of 
knowledge or experience that might lead to a disinvestment in the forms of power, such 
as dominion, attached to whiteness and to white men like Norton. The vet tells Norton 
that the protagonist is “invisible, a walking personification of the Negative, the most 
perfect achievement of your dreams, sir! The mechanical man!”204 By noting that the 
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protagonist is the “most perfect achievement” of Norton’s dreams, he references the fact 
that Norton enacts dominion over the black college that the protagonist attends, 
understanding the students there not as individual agents but as part of his “destiny.”205 
By causing the protagonist to repress his humanity, then, Norton has created the ideal 
subject to shore up his sense of power and has also restricted the protagonist’s ability to 
recognize and understand fugitive communication.  
 The vet’s “freedom” does stir something within the protagonist, however. When 
the vet begins talking to Norton upstairs at the Golden Day, the narrator tells the reader 
that “the vet was acting toward the white man with a freedom which could only bring on 
trouble.”206 First, the vet tells Norton that if the veterans downstairs at the Golden Day 
“suddenly realize that you are what you are…your life wouldn’t be worth a piece of 
bankrupt stock.”207 He goes on to describe how the other veterans “are beyond money, 
and with Supercargo [their attendant] down…they know nothing of value.”208 Here, the 
vet couches his criticisms of Norton in the guise of a warning—rather than directly 
confronting the white man, he makes it appear as though he is telling him a secret truth. 
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He also suggests the detachment of the veterans from the systems of belief with which 
both Norton and the protagonist align themselves. He tells Norton that these veterans are 
“beyond money,” which disconnects them from the values that shore up dominion. 
Rather than seeking wealth, property, or other forms of capitalist ownership, the veterans 
recognize neither money nor “value”—a play on words that asserts that they neither 
support a capitalist system of valuation nor align themselves with the “values” that 
someone like Norton or the protagonist might hold. He explains that the veterans 
downstairs might see Norton as anything from “the great white father” to “the lyncher of 
souls,”209 which both the protagonist and Norton protest.  
 When Norton and the protagonist take offense at the vet’s connection between 
Norton and a “lyncher,” the vet responds that this “is an issue which I can confront only 
by evading it.”210 As I described in the last chapter, antagonizing dominion by evading its 
agents and structures is one of the most prominent characteristics of the fugitive as I am 
theorizing it here.211 The vet follows this statement with his story about being “[driven] 
out of the city at midnight and beat[en] with whips”212 for practicing medicine. Having 
returned from France, the vet believed his “knowledge could bring [him] dignity”213—
that he could confront the ideologies that supported his oppression on their own terms 
and find himself liberated from them. He found that not to be the case, however. In this 
moment with Norton, therefore, he confronts the “issue”—white supremacy, the 
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limitations of racial liberalism, the influence of capitalism, and whatever other structures 
Norton might represent—by “evading” it. This statement makes explicit the fugitive 
communication strategies the vet employs throughout the rest of this exchange. He tries 
to share fugitive knowledge with the protagonist perpendicularly, hiding this potentially 
subversive conversation within his conversation with Norton. He also criticizes Norton 
obliquely, by offering a description of how the men downstairs would judge him rather 
than offering the judgment from his own perspective. In both cases, he employs the 
narrative practices of fugitivity to hide his meaning and its resistance to domination 
within another kind of speech.  
 The whole of this encounter between the vet and Norton makes the protagonist 
profoundly uncomfortable. However, he also “receive[s] a fearful satisfaction from 
hearing him talk as he had to a white man.”214 The protagonist uses the word “freedom” 
to describe how the vet comports himself around Norton and enjoys the experience of 
seeing a black man act with such freedom. However, that enjoyment comes tempered by 
a fear, and this ambivalence within the protagonist reflects the critiques the novel wishes 
to make about the possibilities for freedom within a fugitive home. Toward the end of the 
scene, the vet gives up his fugitive practice, directly confronting both the protagonist and 
Norton about their inability to see one another as anything other than objects. However, 
as the confrontation nearly turns violent, the protagonist ushers Norton out, leaving the 
vet in the room “making a sound that was a blending of laughter and tears.”215 Norton 
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says to the protagonist, “Hurry, the man is as insane as the rest,”216 attributing his 
statements to madness rather than deft perception of the structures of racial oppression.  
 This assignation of truth to madness resonates with the fugitive practice of 
manipulating expectations or stereotypes to the end of finding spaces of freedom. In the 
same way as slaves on a plantation might be fine with being perceived as unfit for certain 
domestic tasks if that lightened their workload, so the vet is fine with being seen as 
insane if that means he can speak with relative freedom to a powerful white man like 
Norton. To the protagonist, however, being marked as insane does not register as a source 
of freedom. Indoctrinated into the ideologies of dominion—as the vet says, “that great 
false wisdom taught sales and pragmatists alike, that white is right”—the protagonist 
takes “fearful satisfaction” in the vet’s antagonism of Norton. He enjoys bearing witness 
to black freedom, but he fears what reprisals such freedom might bring.  
 Indeed, the vet’s physical immobility or restriction functions as a central vehicle 
for Ellison’s critique of the possibilities of fugitivity. The veterans in the asylum have 
created a fugitive home for themselves as fallen professionals, unable to live within the 
structures of normalizing or normative society, but their presence in this home 
necessitates their alienation from a broader community. In the case of the vet, the 
“freedom” which the protagonist notes is paradoxical, as life in an asylum would have 
been almost constantly monitored. Despite his bodily unfreedom, however, the vet 
recognizes that he can seize a momentary freedom within the chaos ensuing at the Golden 
Day, in order to confront or confound a system of power and its attendant ideology. The 
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possibilities for his fugitive home are circumscribed by his physical immobility and 
restriction. Although he is “free,” Ellison suggests that his liberation is less than 
complete.  
 The vet and the protagonist meet again a few scenes later on a bus, after the 
protagonist’s confrontation with Bledsoe. The protagonist has been sent to New York in 
what he will come to find out was a punishment for his revealing both Trueblood and the 
veterans at the Golden Day to Norton. Similarly, after his own run-in with Norton, the vet 
has been transferred to St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. On their journeys 
north, the protagonist and the vet encounter one another in the “Jim Crow”217 section of 
their shared bus. During their conversation, the vet more explicitly directs the protagonist 
to shift his way of interacting with the world, although the protagonist still fails to 
understand what the vet communicates. For example, the vet tells the protagonist that he 
had been asking to be transferred away from the school for a year, but they kept refusing 
his request. He tells the protagonist that “the ways of authority are indeed mysterious,”218 
and says he “can’t help but wonder” if his transfer is related to his conversation with 
Norton and the potential threat he now presents against the interests of the school. His 
language here is obtuse and suggestive, feigning ignorance as to what changed his 
circumstances but implying that perhaps his manipulation of the system was 
intentional.219 The protagonist, still in his fog of naiveté, asks how Norton could have 
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anything to do with it, and the vet responds, “How could he have anything to do with 
your being on this bus?”220 The vet then winks at the protagonist, a subtle gesture like the 
smile behind Trueblood’s eyes that means to communicate something secret to the 
protagonist, but the wink falls flat. As in the conversation at the Golden Day and during 
his encounter with Trueblood, the protagonist misses the hidden message because he 
lacks the requisite “folk” knowledge to interpret what he witnesses. The protagonist lacks 
the grammar to understand what the vet wishes to communicate to him about how the 
world functions.  
 In response to the protagonist’s lack of understanding, the vet more explicitly 
directs the protagonist to “learn to look beneath the surface,”221 a piece of advice that 
foreshadows the protagonist’s eventual retreat to the underground spaces of New York. 
In the paragraph of advice that follows, the vet articulates a fugitive ideology that riffs on 
the advice the protagonist received from his grandfather on his deathbed:222 “Play the 
game, but don’t believe in it—that much you owe yourself. Even if it lands you in a strait 
jacket or a padded cell. Play the game, but play it your own way—part of the time at 
                                                                                                                                            
circumstances, but that perhaps he was an adroit gambler whose skill normally gets 
missed by readers of the novel. 
220 Ellison, Invisible Man, 153. 
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222 The grandfather’s riddle refers to the advice the protagonist received from his 
grandfather on the old man’s deathbed, which appears on page 16 of the novel: “Son, 
after I’m gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I never told you, but our life is a war 
and I have been a traitor all my born days, a spy in the enemy’s country ever since I give 
up my gun back in the Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion’s mouth. I want 
you to overcome ‘em with yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and 
destruction, let ‘em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open.” This advice returns 
with regularity in the narrative, meaning something slightly different each time to the 
developing protagonist. 
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least. Play the game, but raise the ante, my boy. Learn how it operates, learn how you 
operate—I wish I had time to tell you only a fragment…You’re hidden right out in the 
open—that is, you would be if you only realized it.” In this paragraph, the vet describes a 
form of fugitivity that might lead to less physical freedom of movement but which will 
enable the protagonist to seek and experience a freedom in selfhood. The vet 
communicates a fugitive ideology by using the figure of “the game” to stand in for the set 
of ideologies and social structures or “rules” that regulate the normative and gird power 
for those in positions of dominance. He suggests that the protagonist stop believing in the 
game, meaning that he needs to reject the ideologies that oppress him rather than 
supporting his disempowerment by shoring them up. The vet then tells the protagonist 
that “part of the time at least,” he should play the game his “own way.” The vet 
recognizes that living as a fugitive223 demands a recognition of one’s proximity and 
vulnerability to power, but he still suggests that when possible, the protagonist 
manipulate the structures around him to his own ends. He concludes by telling the 
protagonist that he needs to learn how the game operates, as well as learning how he as 
an individual operates, so that he might begin to recognize that he is “hidden right out in 
the open”—that his invisibility garners him a kind of power that might be mobilized to 
                                                
223 The vet later in this section compares the protagonist to earlier generations of men 
who escaped the south for the north, saying, “He’s going free, in the broad daylight and 
alone. I can remember when young fellows like him had first to commit a crime, or be 
accused of one, before they trie such a thing. Instead of leaving in the light of morning, 
they went in the dark of night.” When his attendant balks at the suggestion that he 
himself might have been a criminal when he fled north, the vet tells him, “There’s always 
an element of crime in freedom…” (155) See my discussion of this statement below. 
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the end of “beating the game,”224 or creating the ability to live as an individual beyond the 
oppressive ideologies that structure his world. 
 The vet’s advice in many ways resonates with the idea of freedom within systems 
described by Moten and Harney in The Undercommons. Beyond just his recognition that 
freedom can be had within oppressive structures, he also suggests to his keeper on the 
train that “there’s always an element of crime in freedom.”225 Moten and Harney 
recognize the inherent theft that defines the relationship between their fugitive subject 
and the structures that surround him or her. For them, as well as for the vet, this 
connection between criminality and freedom stems from the foundational black 
experience of enslavement. In a system wherein black persons seizing freedom were 
often literally stealing themselves from their master, freedom itself was necessarily a 
crime of theft. The vet aligns ideologically with this fugitive sense of what freedom 
demands and how freedom within an oppressive structure comes to pass.  
 Of course, the vet’s suggestion to “look beneath the surface” and his assertion that 
the protagonist could find power in his invisibility eventually materialize in the narrator’s 
underground home. However, the novel delineates the sacrifice such fugitivity entails, 
creating an ambivalence about the “freedom” the character appears to possess. His ability 
to speak freely with Norton—his fugitivity from the ideologies of white supremacy and 
capitalism that delimit the protagonist’s interactions with Norton—stems from his status 
as a patient at an asylum. When he advises the protagonist to try to alter his worldview, 
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he specifically states that such efforts might land you in an “strait jacket or a padded 
cell,” but that such a reality would be better than living within the oppressive system with 
which the protagonist currently aligns himself. This lack of physical autonomy is no 
small sacrifice, however, and the invocation of the strait jacket and padded cells implies 
that such a worldview might lead to one’s forced removal from the general population of 
society and into an institution meant to sequester non-normative elements away from the 
normative social world. While the vet endorses this choice, and while the narrator makes 
the eventual choice to follow a similar path, the social location of a “padded room” 
reflects the alienation that Ellison’s novel argues derives from such fugitive practice.226 
The vet might be free, but he must also be disconnected.  
MARY RAMBO’S FUGITIVE HOME 
 However, not all of the fugitive characters in the novel trade alienation for 
freedom. Mary Rambo, unlike the vet, remains connected to a social world of black 
people while also inhabiting a fugitive home. Many critiques of the novel, particularly 
since the 1970s, have pointed out the limited appearances and stereotypical presentation 
of women in the novel, with particular focus on Mary Rambo and Sybil. However, a 
handful of scholars have worked to expand intellectual understanding of the role of Mary 
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(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004) sees the vet as a figure of “African 
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critique. I am compelled by his thinking on the novel, but I also seek to root my own 
argument in Ellison’s historical location and worldview, which alters the liberatory 
potential of a character like the vet, regardless his relative social freedom. 
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Rambo in the text by using the excised portions of her narrative, published in 1963 under 
the title “Out of the Hospital and Under the Bar.” In this story, Mary is a nurse at the 
paint factory hospital and actually helps the protagonist escape his confinement there, 
rather than just nursing him back to health after he escapes to Harlem. Scholars have used 
this longer meditation on Mary, along with Ellison’s own suggestion that she deserved a 
bit more space in the novel, to push back against the idea that Ellison’s novel failed to 
include dynamic female characters. Mary in particular gets attached to the Mammy 
stereotype in much of the writing on the novel—a reading which the later publication of 
this story helped to complicated.  
 However, I argue that Mary’s characterization in the 1952 version of the text 
should not limit a reader’s understanding of her character as a fugitive within the system 
of the city nor reduce her to a simplified stereotype. While her portrayal in the novel does 
appear to owe much to stereotypes on the first pass, I want to suggest that this reading of 
the character borrows too much from the protagonist’s own limited worldview and 
ignores important but subtle moments of irony and critique in the scenes that take place 
in her home. In other words, reading Mary as a stereotype reflects Ellison’s desire to hide 
Mary’s subversive humanity within an unthreatening image more than it reveals an 
oversimplification of women on the part of the author.  
 Claudia Tate’s important essay on the women characters in Invisible Man 
suggests that not just Mary but most of the women in the novel have been misread in 
much of the dominant scholarship on the text. Her opening assertion that “we must not 
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neglect what lies hidden behind the mask and proclaim that the mask is the face”227 
informs my desire to read Mary and her home as more complicated narrative spaces that 
they might seem at first look. Tate roots her argument in Ellison’s own discussion of how 
stereotypes can “frequently hide complex aspects of human character,”228 pushing 
through the surface representations of the women in the text to better understand how 
they direct and instruct the protagonist in his development as an individual. She writes, 
“The possibility for his escape is directly related to his ability to distill meaning from his 
encounters with the women I have mentioned.”229 Although Tate makes a case for each of 
the major women characters in the novel communicating some existential truth to the 
protagonist, Mary Rambo in particular serves as a major source of discomfort, protection, 
and growth for the protagonist, making her narrative a particularly fruitful place to 
uncover “what lies hidden behind the mask” of Ellison’s satire.  
 The protagonist first meets Mary after arriving in Harlem via subway following 
his escape from the paint factory hospital. He faints as he emerges from the underground 
station, and Mary insists that he come home with her to recover, arguing that his room at 
Men’s House “ain’t no place for nobody in your condition what’s weak and needs a 
woman to keep an eye on you awhile.”230 She and another resident of the neighborhood 
take the protagonist back to her home where she puts him to bed and gives him a glass of 
water. When he sees her “worn brown fingers” holding the glass, he experiences an “old, 
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almost forgotten relief.”231 Even in this first moment with Mary, the sight of her hand 
elicits a remembered comfort from the protagonist. Later, the protagonist refers to her as 
“a force, a stable, familiar force like something out of my past which kept me from 
whirling off into some unknown which I dared not face.”232 The novel never names this 
relief or explicitly states the source of this familiarity. Nebulous language reflects the 
protagonist’s inability to locate Mary within his set of individual memories. While other 
markers of “folk,” such as the yams the protagonist eats on the street, connect directly to 
the protagonist’s individual memories of particular places and experiences, Mary does 
not remind the protagonist of a specific person, or even of the “people he knew down 
South,” as other characters do. Rather, Mary signifies something larger—an almost 
forgotten force that anchors and guards the protagonist. Mary conjures a cultural 
memory, rather than an individual one. 
 Shanna Greene Benjamin argues for Mary’s role as ancestral guide for the 
protagonist. Although Benjamin relies on the expanded narrative of Mary Rambo present 
in Ellison’s short story, her claim that “Mary is a physical link between contemporary 
thought and ancestral wisdom [that] facilitates the transmission of knowledge from the 
latter to the former”233 remains true for the character in the 1952 text of the novel as well. 
Borrowing from Toni Morrison’s writing on the role of the ancestor in fiction, Benjamin 
argues that Mary “affirm[s] the value of community and…uses her wisdom to maintain 
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conscious connections with history.”234 In Invisible Man, these ancestral characters—the 
protagonist’s grandfather, the old slave woman in the prologue, Miss Susie Gresham 
from the college, and even, to some extent, the vet he meets at the Golden Day—link the 
protagonist not just to older forms of knowledge but to the strategies of resistance and 
absence that inhere in fugitivity. The protagonist cannot name or locate the force which 
he feels stabilizing him within Mary’s home because his alignment with dominion makes 
her fugitive practice illegible to him, just as it did with the fugitive communication of the 
vet earlier in the novel. However, he recognizes the outcome of her home-making: a 
space of refuge and freedom within an oppressive geography, both familiar and 
uncomfortable for the novel’s protagonist.235  
 The novel also aligns Mary with fugitivity by describing her connections to 
informal social networks. Upon first meeting Mary, she introduces herself and says, 
“everybody know me round this part of Harlem.”236 The neighborhood resident she 
solicits to help with the protagonist says he knows her through his mother and calls her 
“Miss Mary,” signaling his respect for her position within the community. In response to 
his mother’s name, Mary launches into a recitation of his family tree: “Jenny Jackson, 
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why, I should say you do know me and I know you, you Ralston, and your mama got two 
more children, boy named Flint and gal named Laura-jean, I should say I know you.”237 
This scene marks Mary as both an important figure within the community networks and 
also as the keeper of social knowledge, particularly of kinship networks. Through this 
knowledge, she links herself to Ralston and performs for the protagonist her connection 
to the social space of Harlem.  
 However, her knowledge of the social networks does not translate into a position 
of dominance for Mary. Despite the fact that the protagonist refers to her care-taking 
behavior as “bossing,” Mary does not wish to control the protagonist through force or 
coercion. Rather, she demands he accept her care-taking but does not expect anything in 
exchange, even his respect. She says to him point blank that she “don’t care what you 
think about me”238 but that she wants to do something for him “like I hope you’d do 
something for ole Mary in case she needed it.”239 Mary sees herself as part of a 
community, a social world in which favors are given and received freely not for the sake 
of enlarging an ego or attaining control over others, but with the understanding that 
persons within the network might exchange positions of relative advantage and should 
therefore treat others as they would like to be treated when the tables are turned. Later, 
when the protagonist says he wanted to hide his sickness so that he would not be “trouble 
to anyone,” Mary responds, “Everybody has to be trouble to somebody.”240 While the 
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protagonist still maintains a faith in the idea of self-sufficiency or self-mastery, Mary 
recognizes this idea as a fiction and encourages him to understand himself as connected 
to a social world that will not resent nor take advantage of his position of need. This 
emphasis on social connections and a shared world of vulnerability over social mastery, 
both of oneself and others, aligns Mary with the ideologies of fugitivity.  
 Additionally, the novel connects Mary to fugitive practices by noting her ability 
to be simultaneously in and absent from oppressive spaces.241 During her first 
conversation with the protagonist, she suggests that leaders of any black movement 
would necessarily need to come from the south rather than the north because they “knows 
the fire and ain’t forgot how it burns,”242 unlike those who have moved north and 
accepted their relatively better social position. She then tells the protagonist to watch out 
for himself and do as she does, saying, “I’m in New York, but New York ain’t in me, 
understand what I mean?”243 Although Mary might be geographically located in New 
York, she suggests to the protagonist that its logics or culture have not permeated her 
being. This differentiation—between one’s physical presence in the geography one 
inhabits and one’s refusal of the logics of that geography—is one of the hallmarks of the 
fugitive home. This statement comes directly after Mary’s suggestion that the protagonist 
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ought to consider himself a potential leader in the fight against white supremacy, which 
Mary concludes by saying “it’s you young ones what has to remember and take the 
lead.”244 Throughout this conversation, Mary frames resistance as being related to the 
memory of something older than one’s transplanted life in New York. By locating these 
references to the importance of the southern black experience near the evocation of 
geographic identity, Mary’s character connects ancestral ways of knowing with the 
ability to resist the dominant logics of New York with their compelling promise of 
ascension without conflict.  
 The protagonist’s respect for Mary’s ability to be “in” the geography of the city 
without losing herself to it reflects his positive recognition of the effects of Mary’s 
fugitive home practices. Angered by Brother Jack’s reduction of the old evicted couple to 
the “dead-in-living,”245 and “incapable of rising to the necessity of the historical 
situation,”246 the protagonist finds himself angered by the controlling worldview of the 
Brotherhood which erases any humanity or individual value from the old couple, simply 
because their lives do not fit into the Brotherhood’s sociological, progress-focused 
ideology. When he leaves this meeting, he is comforted by thoughts of Mary and how she 
might disrupt Brother Jack’s perception of black life in Harlem: “She was far from dead, 
or of being ground to bits by New York. Hell, she knew very well how to live here, much 
better than I with my college training…And I was the one being ground up, not Mary…I 
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couldn’t imagine Mary being as helpless as the old woman at the eviction.”247 The 
narrator articulates a deep respect for Mary’s ability to live in New York without being 
“ground up”—without losing herself to the dominations of its geography, as the old 
woman at the eviction had248. Importantly, the protagonist does not understand how Mary 
accomplishes this task—he only knows that she knows how to live here and that he, 
despite his education, does not.  
 This inability of the protagonist to see the connection between Mary’s sustainable 
presence in the city and her fugitive character informs the inability of many scholarly 
readers to recognize Mary’s complicated power prior to the publication of “Out of the 
Hospital and Under the Bar.” The novel tells the reader how the protagonist/narrator feels 
about Mary and certain thoughts he has about her, but Ellison relies on his audience to 
decide what aspects of the protagonist’s judgement reflect his naiveté and which aspects 
should be trusted. This is to say, the reader has to parse which parts of the novel reflect 
the consciousness of the narrator, telling this story from the underground, and which parts 
of the novel reflect the consciousness and naiveté of the protagonist as he experiences 
these events. Predictably, the protagonist/narrator views Mary through multiple lenses 
over the course of the novel, which produces a primary ambivalence about the character 
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within the text. While this strategy allows Ellison to avoid making direct claims about the 
subversive possibility of the strategies for black freedom she asserts, it also necessarily 
provides the opportunity for readers to misunderstand the nuanced presentation of a 
character like Mary.  
 Indeed, the novel emphasizes the protagonist’s inability to read or understand 
Mary, despite the scholarly perception of the character as an easily dismissed stereotype. 
For example, upon returning back to Mary’s after his meeting with Brother Jack, the 
smell of cooking cabbage causes him to realize that perhaps Mary has been having 
financial trouble of which he had been unaware. He thinks to himself, “What were 
Mary’s problems anyway; who ‘articulated her grievances’…? She had kept me going for 
months, yet I had no idea.”249 He recognizes that though he has lived in her house and 
though she has sustained him for months, he knows nothing about her problems, her 
grievances, or her inner life more generally. In response to these guilty thoughts, he feels 
“an urge to go look at her, perhaps I had really never seen her.”250 Just as the Invisible 
Man is metaphorically unseen by those he encounters throughout the novel, his own set 
of cultural or social assumptions prevent him from really seeing the woman who takes 
care of him. Here, Ellison’s language draws an explicit parallel between the forms of 
invisibility the narrator encounters throughout the text and Mary’s invisibility in his own 
eyes.  
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 Melvin Dixon’s contribution to the 1980 special issue of Carleton Miscellany 
devoted to Invisible Man supports the idea that Mary’s stereotypical presentation reflects 
the protagonist’s perception of her, rather than the actual nuance of her written character. 
He argues that the protagonist’s perception of Mary as a “stereotypical matriarch”251 
reflects how his vision has been “marred by the values he has acquired in a pretentious 
upward mobility.”252 In particular, Dixon notes the “sexism, immaturity, and propensity 
for racial prejudgment”253 on the part of the narrator. The values Dixon notes, as well as 
his association of these values with upward mobility, suggests how the protagonist’s 
early desire for dominion colors his perception of Mary and, via the novel’s mode of 
narration, the reader’s perception as well.254 As with the vet, who recognizes that 
indoctrination to the ideologies of the campus impacts the protagonist’s access to fugitive 
epistemology, here Dixon argues that the protagonist’s ideological alignments make him 
blind to Mary’s humanity and sagacity.  
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other stereotypical or folk characters like Jim Trueblood and Leroy with the blueprints. 
Each of these characters arrives to the reader colored by the lens of the protagonist’s 
beliefs about racial uplift, white supremacy, and the best path to the good life for black 
Americans. As I will argue more broadly later, one of Ellison’s narrative strategies seems 
to be a masking of fugitive practice even within the novel through the strategic 
deployment of stereotype. See Johns, “Jim Trueblood and His Critic Readers”; Isiah 
Lavender, III, “Invisible Women in Invisible Man,” ANQ: A Quarterly Journal of Short 
Articles, Notes, and Reviews 27:3 (2014): 146-151; Myka Tucker Abramson, “Blueprints: 
Invisible Man and the Housing Act of 1949,” American Studies 54:3 (2015): 9-21. 
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 However, the reader receives little direct information about Mary’s internal 
relationship to the stereotype which attaches to her because the novel only presents the 
world through the eyes of the protagonist. Rather than seeing this as an inability on 
Ellison’s part to produce female characters with full inner lives, I argue that this is a 
moment in the novel that evinces Ellison’s invocation of fugitive strategies to protect 
those characters who serve as instruments of the protagonist’s development into an agent 
with a radical recognition of the structural or social limitations to his freedom. For 
example, Mary advocates that the protagonist become a “race leader,” and her language 
here resonates with racial uplift movements and the strategies for black freedom which 
invested in respectability politics. However, as discussed earlier, her conversation with 
the protagonist about this points to her potential awareness of the geographical location 
of a new radical movement that was, in Ellison’s historical reality, actively growing at the 
time. Her emphasis on southern leadership in the “fight” to “make the changes” gestures 
toward the persistent presence of radical movements among black women in the South 
which were, in the 1940s and 1950s, laying the groundwork for what would become the 
Civil Rights Movement.255 However, Ellison intentionally masks Mary within a safe, non-
threatening stereotype in order to also mask her perhaps more radical hopes for the 
protagonist. If Mary can be read as a Mammy figure still invested in racial uplift 
                                                
255 See Angela Davis, Blues Legacies and Black Feminism: Gertrude "Ma" Rainey, 
Bessie Smith, and Billie Holiday (New York: Vintage, 1999) for a discussion of 
feminism’s roots in Southern blues culture. See Danielle McGuire, At the Dark End of the 
Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance—A New History of the Civil Rights 
Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power (New York: Knopf, 2010) for a 
re-periodization of the Civil Rights Movement which emphasizes the importance of 
women’s anti-violence movements its creation, strength, and survival. 
 122 
ideologies, she is less likely to be read as a character suggesting the protagonist join a 
growing radical movement for black rights by those readers who might be threatened by 
such radicalism. 
 Ellison’s complicated invocation of the stereotype reveals itself particularly 
through the protagonist’s discovery of a racist bank in his room at Mary’s. After going to 
the Brotherhood’s party, the protagonist awakes to the sound of another tenant of his 
building banging on the radiator because there is no heat in the building. Looking for 
something heavy with which to bang back, the protagonist sees that his room contains a 
piece of racist Americana that he had never before noticed: “the cast-iron figure of a very 
black, red-lipped and wide-mouthed Negro…It was a bank…the kind of bank which, if a 
coin is placed in the hand and a lever pressed upon he back, will raise its arm and flip the 
coin into the grinning mouth.”256 He grabs the bank, “enraged by the tolerance or lack of 
discrimination, or whatever, that allowed Mary to keep such a self-mocking image 
around.”257  
 The phrasing here bears close-reading. The protagonist finds himself angry at “the 
tolerance or lack of discrimination,” which I argue can be read two ways. In one reading, 
the protagonist uses “lack of discrimination” to describe Mary’s personal lack of taste or 
discernment, indicating that Mary’s placement of this object in his room betrays her bad 
judgement, or her ignorance of how the bank represents and perpetuates racial 
oppression. Her “tolerance” for the offensive object, in this reading, reflects her 
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disinterest in fighting the structures of racism, and this passivity on Mary’s part angers 
the protagonist. However, Ellison leaves the phrasing ambiguous here, never directly 
stating that it is Mary’s tolerance or lack of discrimination that angers the protagonist. 
This opens the possibility of reading this phrase as reflective of the world Mary 
inhabits—a world somehow more tolerant or filled with less discrimination than his own. 
Mary’s house can contain this object, despite the racism it represents, because Mary’s 
house exists within but beyond the logics that give such an object its power. In a fugitive 
home, the meaning of such an object changes. What angers the protagonist in this 
reading, then, is not the object itself nor Mary’s ignorance, but the fact that she can bear 
the possession of this “self-mocking” object—without shame, without losing herself in its 
oppressive image—whereas he cannot.258  
 In fact, when the protagonist picks up the bank, Ellison writes in a two-sentence 
paragraph, “In my hand its expression seemed more of a strangulation than a grin. It was 
choking, filled to the throat with coins.”259 Here, Ellison indicates that the meaning of the 
object changes depending on whose hand holds it. In the hand of the protagonist, the 
stereotype strangles while the figure chokes on coins. This scene comes immediately 
after he has accepted a job with the Brotherhood, ostensibly in order to pay Mary, despite 
the fact that he has already sensed that the Brotherhood views him as a tool for black 
mobilization and indoctrination into their ideology, rather than as an individual. When he 
                                                
258 This reading is strengthened by the fact that he adds, “or whatever” after the phrase I 
mention. Once again, he is not sure what Mary is doing because he does not have access 
to her fugitive epistemology, but he senses and reacts to the world she creates, often 
ambivalently. 
259 Ellison, Invisible Man, 319. 
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picks up the bank, it reflects back to him a caricature of how the Brotherhood sees him: a 
use-object whose usefulness stems in part from its simplified reflection of blackness.260 
The bank’s choking countenance parallels how the material comfort of the Brotherhood 
has lured the protagonist away from Mary’s home—how he has become an object for the 
sake of monetary gain and the promise of power and importance. He cannot bear the 
presence of the racist object because he continues to understand himself according to the 
same logics that lend the stereotype its power. The object, in his view, indicts his 
alignment with oppressive ideologies. Mary, on the other hand, seems to suffer no such 
oppression.261  
                                                
260 Certain parallels between the Brotherhood and the Communist Party in the U.S. 
(CPUSA) can be read in the novel, which informed a bit of the ire Invisible Man received 
from critics like Irving Howe whose politics invested them in communism and its 
attendant literary style of social realism. Critical conversations about how to read the 
Brotherhood in light of Ellison’s involvement with the CPUSA—parody? critique?—
began almost immediately upon the book’s publication. More recently, Danielle Allen 
has suggested that the novel’s emphasis on individuals within the structure of the 
Brotherhood rather than on describing the Brotherhood as a coherent system indicates 
that Ellison did not wish to critique the CPUSA so much as to discuss the role of 
individualism within a democratic system. For more on this and on the scholarship 
relevant to Ellison’s critique of communism, see Danielle Allen, “Ralph Ellison on the 
Tragicomedy of Citizenship,” in Ralph Ellison and the Raft of Hope: A Political 
Companion to Invisible Man, Lucas E. Morel, ed. (Lexington, KY: University of 
Kentucky Press, 2004). 
261 The attachment of the stereotype to the protagonist is similarly figured as he tries to 
get rid of it while he walks down the street. When he puts it in a stranger’s trash can, she 
yells at him about his southernness and refuses to share her trash can with him. When he 
tries just dropping it on the street, someone runs up to him and gives it to him, angered 
that he won’t admit it was his. In each case, his relationship to the rest of the black 
community is impacted by his desire to shed himself of this stereotype, which can be read 
as a metaphor for the process of distancing himself from blackness as a member of the 
brotherhood. He cannot shed the stereotype no matter how he tries—but neither does he 
want to bear possessing it. 
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 This ambiguous use of a racist object is a means through which Ellison suggests a 
more complicated reading of Mary than most critical response to the novel allows. Just as 
the bank changes meaning depending on its context and whose hand holds it, so does the 
protagonist/narrator’s depiction of Mary change depending on context. At times, he sees 
her as a source of comfort and support—a strong character whose home provides him 
with material and psychic support during a period of ideological transition. At other 
times, however, he presents her as a simple and backwards nag who fails to recognize his 
individuality and contributes to his invisibility as much as any other character. This 
equivocation demands attention because if Mary attaches to fugitivity in the novel, as I 
have argued she does, then the narrator’s shifting view of her reveals his vacillation 
between desires for fugitivity and dominion and can shed light on how scholars might 
read his eventual underground home within the theoretical framework described in the 
previous chapter.  
 Although Mary does not exact economic payment from the protagonist, he speaks 
often of the “silent pressure”262 he feels when listening to Mary speak about “leadership 
and responsibility.”263 As mentioned above, Mary’s worldview reveals her recognition of 
social networks predicated on a shared sense of vulnerability and potential need. Rather 
than demand monetary payment from the protagonist, then, Mary emphasizes that he 
must use this time in her care to prepare for when he can eventually “git to be 
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somebody.”264 The protagonist recognizes that Mary does not view his “debt” of 
responsibility as one which she personally is owed, but rather she simply “remind[s] him 
constantly that something was expected of [him]”265 by a subject erased through the 
passive construction of the sentence.266 The rest of Mary’s dialogue and the protagonist’s 
perception of her desires for him indicate that the subject that would fill in this blank is a 
racial community—the black social world to which Mary wants him to understand that he 
belongs and which will be responsible for him as he ought to be responsible to it. He later 
says, “I was torn between resenting her for [the reminder] and loving her for the nebulous 
hope she kept alive.”267 A mutual responsibility shared between the protagonist and the 
black social world to which Mary connects him serves as a source of hope for him, but he 
also resents that he must be responsible to it. 
 The protagonist’s ambivalence about Mary reflects the novel’s larger ambivalence 
or tension between individual identity and the wider social world. Home, as I theorize it 
in this dissertation, mediates this relationship through the production and protection of a 
threshold between self and society, and also reproduces the social world that makes 
possible certain kinds of individuals. In the sociality attached to the fugitive home, 
individuals exist in loose collectivity, bound through a sense of responsibility to one 
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266 Here, Mary’s conception of debt resonates with Moten and Harney’s theorization of 
debt in The Undercommons. They refer to debt as “social,” arguing that the “fugitive 
public” is a place of “bad debt,” meaning debt that will never be repaid. In other words, 
they imagine the fugitive public as a space in which everyone owes everyone else, and no 
one holds the unidirectional position of creditor, creating a space of freedom and mutual 
obligation. I see Mary’s home functioning in a similar way within Invisible Man. 
267 Ellison, Invisible Man, 258. 
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another and a recognition of the instrumentality of the community to one’s individual 
survival. In the sociality attached to dominion, individuals exist on a hierarchy and those 
at the top of the hierarchy feel a sense of responsibility to those within their spheres of 
power, but only in so much as it confirms their power and not in a way that recognizes 
the individuality of those whom they control. As the protagonist equivocates between his 
investment in Mary’s home and his investment in the home he finds in the Brotherhood, 
Ellison reveals the central character’s struggle over the possibilities for individuality 
within each of these opposing forms of home. After deciding to join the Brotherhood but 
before he leaves Mary’s house, the narrator describes this struggle: “I might as well admit 
right now, I thought, that there are many things about people like Mary that I dislike. For 
one thing, they seldom know where their personalities end and yours begins; they usually 
think in terms of ‘we’ while I have always tended to think in terms of ‘me’…Brother Jack 
and the others talked in terms of ‘we,’ but it was a different, bigger ‘we.’”268 His struggle 
to think through which ‘we’ provides more space for the ‘me’ he wishes to cultivate 
illustrates a central tension of the novel: how can individuality and social engagement be 
brought into balance?  
 Although the novel never resolves this tension, the protagonist’s renewed desire 
to return to Mary’s following his fall-out with the Brotherhood and his run-in with Ras 
the Exhorter eventually leads him into the underground home where he comes to know 
himself. He comes to an awareness of this desire for her fugitive home suddenly, as he 
tries to escape Ras and his gang: “So I ran expecting death between the shoulder blades 
                                                
268 Ibid., 316. 
 128 
or through the back of my head, and as I ran I was trying to get to Mary’s.”269 The 
narrator tells us that his turn toward Mary was “not a decision of thought but something I 
realized suddenly while running,”270 a choice stemming from an alternative epistemology 
than the rational or scientific one the protagonist had relied on for most of the novel. 
Later, having fallen into a manhole and becoming trapped underground, he thinks again 
of Mary: “In the morning I’ll remove the lid…Mary, I should have gone to Mary’s. I 
would go now to Mary’s in the only way that I could,”271 which the novel suggests is by 
falling asleep. In this moment, “Mary’s” ceases to be a solely a place and instead 
becomes a state of being, one which the narrator can “go to” in sleep in he cannot get 
there physically. By seeking a return to Mary, the protagonist motivates the action that 
will eventually lead to his recognition of himself as an individual, circumscribed by a 
restrictive social world, but not without agency.  
 However, after a line break, the novel tells us that the protagonist/narrator was 
“never to reach Mary’s,” and the narrative section of the novel ends with his recognition 
that “I couldn’t return to Mary’s or to any part of my old life…I had been as invisible to 
Mary as I had been to the Brotherhood. No, I couldn’t return to Mary’s, or to the campus, 
or to the Brotherhood, or home. I could only move ahead or stay here, underground. So I 
                                                
269 Ibid., 560. 
270 Ibid.; It is worth noting as well that his desire for Mary’s fugitive home springs up as 
he himself becomes a runaway from Ras’ dominion over Harlem. He is himself a fugitive 
of sorts in this moment, but he lacks the stability of the fugitive home he had at Mary’s. 
More theoretical work is needed on the relationship between escape, mobility, and 
fugitivity than can be borne out by this footnote, but this moment suggests that perhaps it 
is not the fleeing that makes one fugitive so much as the being-gone. 
271 Ibid., 567. 
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would try to stay here until I was chased out.”272 Mary’s home, then, does not figure 
individual freedom for the protagonist, as he felt invisible there as much as he did within 
the dominion of the Brotherhood. However, the protagonist’s desire to return to Mary 
draws him toward the underground, attaching his desire for Mary’s fugitive home to his 
eventual inhabitation of the underground. Like with the vet, the protagonist/narrator is 
attracted to the freedom found in the fugitive homes of the novel, but cannot fully accept 
the terms under which that freedom is offered. While the vet trades physical immobility 
for a freedom of thought and speech, Mary’s social world does not extend beyond the 
black geography of Harlem. Torn between the limitations of both fugitivity and 
dominion, and perceiving an inability in each kind of home to produce individual 
selfhood, the narrator makes a decision to “hibernate” below ground until the proper time 
to emerge presents itself.  
ELLISON’S UNDERGROUND 
 For Ellison, the underground home in the novel does not figure a fugitive home, 
so much as it figures a fugitive space disconnected from a larger social world in which an 
individual might come to know him or herself. However, neither does this space reject 
the practice of the fugitive home. Its invisibility, its theft of “power,” and its usefulness as 
a space of self-cultivation all tie it to the fugitive home as I theorize it in this dissertation. 
Its alienation, however, differentiates it from the fugitive homes seen in plantation 
slavery. Where the ideal form of the fugitive home maintains the connection between 
individuals and a broader social world, the protagonist’s underground home separates 
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him from all forms of sociality, both white and black. He comes to understand much 
about himself, but he is not yet able to hold on to that sense of self while engaging with a 
larger social world.  
 Baker draws a parallel between Ellison’s approach to the novel and the narrator’s 
“hibernation,” suggesting that Ellison hid out during a hot political moment in order to be 
more “likable” and less threatening. Ellison’s text, however, is not an alienated thing—
rather, both the text and Ellison himself circulated throughout the world of literature and 
culture for the remainder of the 20th century. Unlike the narrator or his underground 
home, Ellison’s novel serves to connect readers to broader social worlds, although 
perhaps not using the most obvious methods. Indeed, both of the characters I discussed at 
length in this chapter are “hidden” within the text, allowing them to be dismissed by 
certain kinds of readers, even as they communicate subversive knowledge to others. In 
this way, Ellison’s novel resembles a fugitive home itself, providing space for the subtle 
subversions of the vet and Mary to exist while also hiding them in plain sight.  
 For his part, Baker sees extensive promise in Ellison’s characters, including Mary 
Rambo. He writes that a set of “potentially activist and engaged Fanonian native 
intellectuals…offer potential for effective black leadership”273 in the novel, and he 
includes Mary Rambo among their number. While he agrees that these characters are 
often too readily dismissed in scholarship, he suggests the reason for this dismissal is that 
“Ellison’s fear of McCarthyism—and an obsessive phobia of not being liked—kept him 
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from fleshing [them] out.”274 In other words, it is not a failing of scholarship but a failure 
of the author that limits the radical possibilities of the characters. However, if Invisible 
Man is itself a fugitive home for subversive blackness, perhaps Ellison intended to keep 
these characters “cartoonlike”275 in order to communicate more subtly with a variety of 
audiences. Rather than failing to confront those individuals and social structures that 
sought dominion at mid-century, then, the novel chose to exist among and within in them, 
subtly communicating secret knowledge. Dismissing the vet as insane and Mary as a 
Mammy, readers that would be threatened by their emphasis on fugitive paths to freedom 
could ignore their potential. 
 However, the novel’s ambivalence about these characters and the concluding 
alienation that stems from the protagonist’s desire to return to Mary’s must also be taken 
into account. Although Invisible Man’s underground room, as well as the vet’s 
recognition of the criminality inherent to freedom, resonate with the ideas about fugitivity 
and freedom presented in The Undercommons, the sacrifices one must make in order to 
attain that freedom seem much larger in the novel than they do in the later theoretical 
text. I see this as a reflection of Ellison’s historical positioning prior to the Civil Rights 
Movement, and his more personal and less historiographical connections with the lived 
experiences of the enslaved. As will become apparent in later chapters, artists and 
scholars working post-Civil Rights have been able to return to the structures of life that 
grow out of plantation slavery to find liberation in them. Ellison, however, still invests in 
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the promise of black integration into the national democratic community as the path to 
black liberation. The novel’s ambivalence about the promise and limitations of fugitive 
homes reflect the author’s desire to “affirm while resisting”276—to suggest ancestral ways 
to resist power while also affirming the promise of racially-equal democracy made by the 
U.S. Neither wholly willing to seek the path to the master’s house, nor wholly willing to 
escape as a fugitive into its hinterlands, Ellison’s novel holds the two in tension, waiting 
for a moment when perhaps one or the other might seem like the best choice.  
 
  
                                                
276 Ralph Ellison, qtd in Timothy Parrish, Ralph Ellison and the Genius of America 
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). 
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Chapter Three ⎯Fugitive Domestic: Toni Morrison’s Pedagogy for 
Freedom 
 
 Toni Morrison came into prominence during the rise of black feminism in the 
1970s and 1980s. Her critical acclaim grew throughout the 1980s, earning her the Pulitzer 
Prize for fiction and the American Book Award in 1988 for Beloved (1987), and 
culminated in her winning the Nobel Prize for literature in 1993. Her historical location, 
as well as her scholarly and journalistic contributions to debates about the role of black 
women in “women’s liberation,” place her in conversation with the womanist tradition of 
Alice Walker and the black feminism of Angela Davis, bell hooks, and Audre Lorde. 
However, Morrison’s fiction defies easy categorization as her central preoccupation 
seems to be a thickly-descriptive conjuring of “the elaborately socialized world of black 
people.”277 Each of her 11 novels explores multiple facets of black and white experience 
in the diaspora, allowing multiple voices and subject positions to exist, speak, and be 
heard simultaneously and, remarkably, without consistently privileging any one particular 
viewpoint. Morrison’s fiction evinces a deep empathy for nearly every character, 
revealing how structures of oppression disfigure and deform even those who ostensibly 
possess power within a given system. Like Ellison’s Invisible Man, discussed in the 
previous chapter, her novels describe how faith in oppressive social structures hinders the 
ability of subjects to grow into selfhood and freedom. 
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 However, Morrison’s fiction also maps paths to thriving and liberation more 
explicitly than does Invisible Man. Through her invocation of the analytical ground 
Katherine McKittrick describes as “plot-in-plantation,”278 Morrison’s fiction locates 
within the violent histories and systems that subjugate black individual and cultural life 
“a knowledge system, produced outside the realms of normalcy, thus rejecting the very 
rules of the system.”279 In other words, rather than offering a narrative in opposition to 
dominant social structures that reifies the totality of white supremacist, capitalist, or 
patriarchal ideologies, Morrison asserts the extant humanity already running rouge within 
these old and powerful systems. By providing examples of historically-grounded 
fugitivity in the marginal or peripheral worlds that so often get emptied of presence or 
meaning, Morrison describes forms of freedom that have always been possible and 
remain possible, and these forms of freedom more often than not demand the selective 
taking-up of useful ideological, intellectual, and spiritual objects from both dominant and 
resistant ways of life.  
 This chapter focuses on how Morrison uses descriptions of home to map a path to 
thriving in her fiction. While every novel in her canon offers some insight in support of 
my argument, I have chosen to focus on three of her novels: Song of Solomon (1977), 
Beloved (1987), and Home (2012). Each of these novels draws on the history and practice 
of fugitive homes in the 19th century, as well as the corollary engagement of oppressed 
persons in aspirational dominion, to describe and imagine the forms and limitations of 
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black freedom in the 20th century. The same ghosts that animate Afro-pessimist 
scholarship—the inescapability of violent history, perpetual racial antagonism, and the 
residue of impossible choice—haunt these novels, but Morrison’s fiction remains more 
ambivalent about their inescapability or impact. Primarily, I assert that Morrison’s 
writing has always focused on practical, livable politics that would allow for survival, 
thriving, or fully-fledged freedom depending on a person’s access to social, economic, or 
spiritual resources. Morrison’s oeuvre as a whole, and particularly the three novels I look 
at here, indicates a writerly project of human affirmation if not optimism—280locating a 
set of tools that draw on wily practices of black life in various eras of oppression and 
liberation to articulate a means of living through or living beyond whatever violent, 
frightening, or precarious past or present might attempt to delimit the possibility of life. 
Morrison’s concern, beyond literary prose and high-level historical and ideological 
engagement, seems to be a pedagogy of life, an instruction on how to not only survive but 
thrive, developed over many years through many novels, all of which locate a root in the 
oppressive past but find possibility there, rather than either despair or promise. Through 
her engagements with home-spaces, Morrison maps the tools that have always existed in 
black life-ways in the Americas in order to point her readers toward the ways that they 
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provide the possibility of its escape from power. In other words, the subversive potential 
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might make themselves free, without declaring that path to be easy, readily apparent, or 
universal.  
SONG OF SOLOMON AND FUGITIVE ANTAGONISM 
 Much of the scholarship on Song of Solomon—particularly the early readings of 
the novel in the 1980s and 1990s—centers on the novel’s male characters. Morrison 
herself has said that this book is “about men,”281 and Rolland Murray locates the text as a 
response to the Moynihan report’s indictment of black manhood. However, the focus on 
the masculine aspects of the novel belies the importance of the character of Pilate to its 
narrative. The male characters in the novel all invest in one or more of the ideologies that 
structured the patriarchal dominion of the slave master.282 The trope of patriarchy 
appears, of course, but additionally, many of the male characters justify their role in the 
                                                
281 Judy Pocock, “‘Through a Glass Darkly: Typology in Toni Morrison’s Song of 
Solomon,” Canadian Review of American Studies 35:3 (2005): 294. 
282 For example, the character of Guitar evinces thought patterns informed (and limited) 
by the plantation’s economic logic. Valérie Loichot in her book Orphan Narratives: The 
Postplantation Literature of Faulkner, Glissant, Morrison, and Saint-John Perse 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007) argues that Guitar invests in 
what she calls the “thinking of the Ledger,”  evoking the slave owner’s tool of 
objectification to describe Guitar’s sense of social justice through score-keeping. Rather 
than working against the logic that made/makes black people fungible to begin with, 
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economic logic descended from the social violence of the slave owner. Further, Dr. 
Foster, Ruth’s father, lives in a house sits away from the rest of the black homes in town 
in a white neighborhood, and from that privileged position, he cares for, profits from, and 
holds in contempt the black people living in the segregated Southside. Although he 
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“cannibals,”  evincing his allegiance with the racial logic of white supremacy, his 
economic success relies on the black townspeople who have no other options for medical 
care due to the strictures of Northern segregation. His social and financial position relies 
on the disenfranchisement of black people, aligning him as well with the economic logic 
of dominion. 
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black community using the economic or social logics—what Katherine McKittrick calls 
“plantation logic”283—that rationalized the oppressive power of the slave master and 
informed his sense of home. However, by locating these characters in particular historical 
moments and clearly delineating the sources of their sense of precarity, Morrison makes 
clear that this “desire to erect patriarchal dominion”284 using the techniques of the master 
results from the threat of violence and disenfranchisement against black people even as it 
enables and profits from that same violence and disenfranchisement. With a deep 
empathy and care for black men, Morrison offers that the desire for patriarchal dominion 
is a response to the systemic emasculation, disenfranchisement, and dispossession they 
have experienced since slavery. However, her novel still asserts that each form of 
patriarchal dominion has failed as a strategy for black freedom, both individual and 
collective. Through the character of Pilate, however, Morrison offers a map to another 
form of liberation.  
 Song of Solomon produces its central tension through the struggle between Macon 
and his sister Pilate, a character marked as being in almost every way antithetical to the 
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character of Macon, for influence over Macon’s son Milkman.285 Macon is a black man 
who, the novel tells us, remains invested in the interlocking ideologies—primarily white 
supremacy,286 patriarchy, and property—that structured dominion on the plantation and 
continue to structure dominion into the present day. Macon is an “oppressive patriarchal 
presence”287 in the Dead home, an “overwhelming patriarchal authority”288 who “kept 
each member of his family awkward with fear.”289 The novel describes Macon’s constant 
disappointment with the home-making abilities of his wife and daughters, and his 
inability to speak to his son Milkman without barking a command or criticism at him. 
Further, Macon’s sense of power—and tragically, his understanding of freedom—also 
grows out of a faith in ownership to protect his selfhood, both in the sense of his physical 
body and in the sense of his psyche. Macon’s obsession with ownership functions to 
alienate him from the black community of Southside and also from his own family. 
Macon feels comfortable and secure when in possession of his “ring of keys,”290 rather 
than through the bonds of affection or kinship that might otherwise affirm a sense of 
                                                
285 Although I do not go into it here, the battle over Milkman reflects the nature of home 
as a space of social reproduction. Born into Macon’s home, the seduction of Pilate’s 
intimate sphere draws Milkman toward a different social world that that into which his 
father hopes to raise him. See the introduction to this dissertation. 
286 For example, Loichot argues that Macon’s fetishization of Ruth’s white underwear 
serves as a compensation for the sense of “amputation” of whiteness that Fanon locates in 
the black psyche. His obsession with the “whitest,” “snowy,” underwear that Ruth wore 
stands in contrast to her skin like “unbleached sugar.” (16) Loichot states that the 
“underwear’s fabric gains the properties of human skin, is human skin,” (170) allowing 
Macon to attach the whiteness he values to his non-white wife. 
287 Jennifer Terry, “Buried Perspectives: Narratives of Landscape in Toni Morrison’s 
Song of Solomon,” Narrative Inquiry 17:1 (2007): 100. 
288 Murray, “The Long Strut,” 128. 
289 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 10. 
290 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 17. 
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belonging.291 In an overt endorsement of the capitalist faith in ownership, Macon tells his 
son Milkman just before his odyssey through the South that he should not travel but 
should rather invest in his father’s business and landholdings. He tells Milkman, “You’ll 
own it all. All of it. You’ll be free. Money is freedom, Macon. The only real freedom 
there is.”292 Here, Macon explicitly links wealth and freedom, evincing his unquestioning 
belief that the path to freedom lies in ownership.  
   Where Macon invests in the ideologies of dominion, which have girded the 
homes of those who seek to power and control since the concurrent development of 
capitalism and racialized slavery in the U.S., Pilate, on the other hand, explicitly seeks a 
way of being and sense of self that eschews such ideologies. In the character of Pilate and 
through descriptions of her home, Morrison draws on historically-grounded fugitivity in 
order to offer a map to freedom that is alternative to the controlling, policing, and power-
seeking path Macon advocates. Pilate does not fill the juridical category of fugitive,293 but 
rather calls to mind the fugitive as I theorize it in this dissertation. Existing both within 
the segregated geography of Southside and somehow beyond the logics that structure its 
class, gender, and race oppressions, Pilate figures the fugitive slave who would slip in 
and out of the plantation geography, within its physical space but beyond its control, 
                                                
291 Terry’s essay argues that Macon’s obsession with property accumulation “illustrates 
familial and communal dislocation” and “is clearly formative in his estranged relation to 
others” (100). 
292 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 163. 
293 One might be able to argue that because Pilate witnessed the murder of the transient at 
the hands of her brother, she does exist on the wrong side of the law, but the text never 
tells us that anyone much cared about that murder, nor that anyone came looking for 
Macon or Pilate after they had fled. 
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listed on its ledgers but not fungible property. While Macon’s home drips with patriarchal 
domesticity, indoctrinating his family into its associated ideologies, Pilate’s home 
remains unencumbered by the prescriptive rules that bind up normative domesticity.294 
Serving as antagonist to Macon’s home, then, Pilate’s home recalls the fugitive homes 
found on the planation and offers their lifeways as a means of emancipation.  
 The first description of Pilate’s home comes in the first chapter of the novel, as 
Macon Dead takes a shortcut through Southside on his way home. The text describes the 
home as a “narrow single-story house whose basement seemed to be rising from rather 
than settling into the ground.”295 The novels tells us that Pilate has chosen not to have 
electricity or gas run into the house, opting instead to rely on wood, coal, and candles for 
heat and cooking. The house also lacks indoor plumbing, and the women rely on a dry 
sink to pump water into their kitchen. Already, Pilate’s home evinces a type of fugitivity 
characterized by a disconnection from capital as represented by the utility company, a 
business that commodifies common goods and sells them.296 In the novel, this description 
of Pilate’s home leads into Macon’s memory of her lack of navel, another detail that 
scholars argue figures Pilate’s disconnection from traditional forms of the social like the 
                                                
294 The openness of Pilate’s home also calls to mind Moten and Harney’s idea of the 
undercommons as a place that is “open for refuge even though it may let in police agents 
and destruction.” See Moten and Harney, The Undercommons: 38. 
295 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 27. 
296 Pilate’s disconnection here differs significantly from the “theft” that marks the 
fugitivity of the protagonist in Invisible Man. Where Pilate chooses to disconnect from 
power, the protagonist chooses to steal it. Pilate retains some aspect of the “criminality” 
inherent in freedom, as Moten and Harney theorize it, as she has witnessed a crime and 
carries its material residue with her. However, she doesn’t seek to amass “power” in the 
underground as Ellison’s protagonist does. I suspect gender is at play in this difference, 
but due to the scope of this project, I leave such an interrogation to future work. 
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“blood ties” and “blood lines” that have supported the building of generational wealth 
through capitalist accumulation.297 However, despite the disconnection of this place, 
Macon feels strangely drawn to it, as his sister, her daughter, and her granddaughter are 
singing inside and he remembers when he and Pilate were children and were close, 
calling her “his first caring for.”298 The home in this scene, then, lies disconnected from 
particular forms of the dominant social world, like capitalism and municipality. However, 
the novel suggests that the community of song emanating from the home is so strong that 
it draws Macon in, countering a disconnection from the mainstream with the magnetic 
attraction of the intimate.  
 The fugitivity of Pilate’s home is borne out in Milkman’s visit later in the novel 
as well. As a boy, Milkman’s friend Guitar takes him to visit his aunt’s home, and 
Milkman is surprised to find his experience of Pilate a disruption to his idea both about 
the order of the world and to his imagination of Pilate herself. First, Milkman comments 
on his aunt’s countenance and physical appearance: “And while she looked as poor as 
everyone said she was, something was missing from her eyes that should have confirmed 
it. Nor was she dirty; unkempt, yes, but not dirty. The whites of her fingernails were like 
ivory.”299 In Pilate’s body, Milkman finds the physical markers of poverty but a lack of 
shame or deference that he assumes should accompany them. He also finds her 
“unkempt” but not dirty—something about her is out of order, but the lack of order 
                                                
297 Dana Medoro, “Justice and Citizenship in Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon,” 
Canadian Review of American Studies, 32:1 (2002): 12. 
298 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 28. 
299 Ibid., 38. 
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doesn’t signal “dirty” to Milkman. These contradictions continue when Milkman enters 
the home’s living room, which Morrison describes as “a large sunny room that looked 
both barren and cluttered.”300 Milkman notes the sparseness of the furniture—the room 
contains only “a rocking chair, two straight-backed chairs, a large table, [and] a sink and 
stove.”301 Pilate dumps her orange peel into a crock which “like most everything in the 
house had been made for some other purpose”302 and proceeds to cook a soft-boiled egg 
in “a blue-and-white wash basin which she used for a saucepan.”303 Pilate’s home rejects 
traditional domesticity and the ordering of objects that demands certain things fulfill 
certain purposes without exception. Rather, Pilate repurposes available objects to her 
needs at a given moment, and possesses only objects that can fulfill multiple needs. 
However, the novel does not register this as a lack in Pilate’s home, instead describing 
the space as a way of being that is both acceptable and appealing to Milkman, even as it 
stands in stark contrast to the boy’s own home. Each of the surprising things about Pilate 
that Milkman marks further link her to the fugitive homes of enslavement. Her 
“unkempt” but “not dirty” appearance resonates with the “unkempt” or “messy” homes 
black slaves created in order to hide their importance from white observers.304 Her lack of 
deference and shame reveals her disregard for the ideologies that structure Milkman’s 
world, indicating her alignment with some other system of meaning and value. Similarly, 
her ties to domestic objects emphasize use value over the symbolic value or prescriptive 
                                                
300 Ibid., 39. 
301 Ibid. 
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304 See “Fugitive Homes” in Chapter One of this dissertation. 
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function that might regulate the use of such objects in the normative domesticity linked to 
dominion. The physical space of Pilate’s home as well as her own countenance further 
link her to fugitivity.  
 In these scenes, as well as throughout the text, the novel intentionally sets up 
Pilate’s home in an antagonistic relationship with the traditional, black bourgeois home 
of Macon Dead and his family, which underscores the antagonistic relationship between 
Pilate and Macon as characters. In the first scene described above, Macon begins to 
imagine his own home as he moves further away from the song coming from Pilate’s 
house, and the description is bleak: “his wife’s narrow unyielding back; his daughters, 
boiled dry from years of yearning; his son, to whom he could speak only if his words held 
some command or criticism.”305 This stands in stark contrast to the “effortless beauty of 
the women singing in the candlelight,”306 emanating from Pilate’s house, which reminds 
Mason of “fields and wild turkey and calico”307 and which allows him to feel “the 
irritability of the day drain from him.”308 When Mason chooses to turn back toward 
Pilate’s house to hear more of the singing, the novel punctuates the antagonism between 
the two spaces by describing Mason’s desire for something he cannot get in his own 
carefully constructed domestic space: “There was no music there, and tonight he wanted 
just a bit of music.”309  
                                                
305 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 28; Jennifer Terry describes this image of domestic life as 
one of “sterility, alienation, and disappointment.” See Terry, “Buried Perspectives,” 100. 
306 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 29. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 28. 
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 For Milkman, the feelings of joy he experiences in Pilate’s house come from 
being “surrounded by women who seemed to enjoy him and who laughed out loud,”310 in 
contrast to his own mother who Milkman imagines as “too insubstantial, too shadowy for 
love” and as “a pale but complicated woman given to deviousness and ultra-fine 
manners.”311 Milkman finds himself  “in love” with Hagar, Pilate’s granddaughter, and 
realizes that this moment in Pilate’s house is “the first time in his life that he remembered 
being completely happy.”312 He thinks that it is “no wonder his father was afraid of 
them,”313 implying that Pilate’s home is dangerous not because it openly opposes the 
Dead home, but rather because it offers a seductive and fulfilling alternative to the forms 
of bourgeois domesticity the inhabitants of the Dead home enact. The Dead home is a 
space of dominion. Where the Dead home is about ownership and control, both of oneself 
and of ones surroundings, Pilate’s home is characterized as uncontrolled, indeterminate, 
and open.  
 However, the novel does not frame Pilate as poised in opposition to her brother. 
Rather, her presence, her home, and her way of being antagonize Macon because they 
interfere in his ability to enact dominion over all the spaces and bodies he considers 
himself to own, including those of his wife and son.314 Pilate is unwilling to submit to 
                                                
310 Ibid., 47. 
311 Ibid., 75. 
312 Ibid., 47. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Both Ruth and Milkman at different points in the novel seek refuge in Pilate’s house. 
Ruth seeks out Pilate to help her get pregnant and to protect the unborn Milkman when 
Macon is trying to get her to miscarry. Milkman seeks refuge in Pilate’s house not so 
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Macon’s control—unwilling even to ascribe to the ideologies that structure Macon’s 
worldview—and because of this, she becomes an antagonist to his bourgeois aspirations. 
I draw here from Wilderson’s use of antagonism to describe the structural relation 
between whiteness and blackness315 in Western culture. Wilderson defines antagonism as 
“an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positions, the resolution of which is not 
dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions,”316 which he marks as 
inherently different than conflictual relations that could ostensibly lead to some kind of 
dialectical resolution or synthesis. In the simplest terms, conflictual relations permit the 
hope of resolution; antagonisms persist hopelessly until one of the opposing parties 
ceases to exist. However, because Wilderson notes that this antagonism between white 
and black is ontological and foundational to western culture, such deep antagonisms must 
be able to persist without the obliteration of either side for a long section of historical 
time. Moments of violent confrontation between whiteness and blackness arise 
throughout Western history, but neither side has, as of yet, ceased to exist.  
 Antagonism then describes a state of being more than a moment of crisis, which 
makes it a more useful rubric through which to understand the relationship between Pilate 
and Macon in Song of Solomon, and between the fugitivity and dominion each character 
                                                                                                                                            
pointedly, but as a place where he can experience the “peace,” “energy,” and “comfort” 
(301) derived from her ability to make a warm home that stands in contrast to his own. 
315 I use the terms whiteness and blackness, where Wilderson more often uses 
“Master/Settler” and “Slave.” He attaches these categories to whiteness and blackness, 
however, so for the congruity of my own writing and argument, I have chosen not to 
introduce these new terms here. For more information on the categories Wilderson uses, 
see the introduction of this dissertation and Wilderson, Red, White, and Black. 
316 Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, 5. 
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figures. These two characters do not come into “conflict” with one another, meaning they 
do not argue and come to a dialectical resolution. In the only direct confrontation 
between these two characters in the novel,317 Macon attempts to shame Pilate for her 
appearance and her lack of domestic skills, and Pilate refuses to engage. Made uneasy by 
the fact that Pilate has “cut the last thread of propriety”318 Macon tells her “not to come 
again until she could show some respect for herself.”319 Macon yells at her about her 
dress, which he considers to be unfeminine, and “trembles”320 at the thought of losing the 
white capital that supports his business because of his association with a sister, niece, and 
grandniece who act like “common street women.”321 Pilate responds to Macon’s rant by 
saying, “I been worried sick about you too, Macon.” Pilate refuses Macon’s fury, opting 
to read it as concern, and Macon demands that she leave his house in response to this 
(intentional) misrecognition. Pilate leaves without argument and does not return. This 
scene reveals that Pilate’s very existence produces a sense of precarity in Macon—he 
fears the loss of his respectability and, along with it, the investments of white capital that 
sustain his bourgeois position—and his direct confrontation with Pilate about this 
precarity leads not to the obliteration of Pilate but simply to her disappearance from his 
home and her return to her own home in Southside.  
                                                
317 The two characters do argue as children, but at that point in their lives, their paths had 
not yet diverged so significantly. 
318 Morrison, Song of Solomon, 20. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Ibid. 
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 Pilate’s behavior in this scene is exemplary of the way fugitivity antagonizes 
dominion without engaging its confrontations. Macon is driven to anger by Pilate’s 
unwillingness to invest in the ideologies that structure his world, particularly when she is 
within the walls of his home. Pilate is out of place in Macon’s home, and his inability to 
control her dress and comportment, primarily due to her lack of requisite shame and 
deference to his patriarchal positioning, reminds him of the inescapable precarity of his 
position. However, this disagreement holds no hope of resolution because the two 
positions are irreconcilable. Macon invests in patriarchy, ownership, and white 
supremacy, and Pilate simply does not. Just as the master’s sense of home demanded the 
complicity of the plantation community in order to function, so too does Macon’s home, 
descended from dominion and structured by its logics, demand outward compliance from 
all bodies within it. Pilate’s recalcitrant existence threatens Macon’s tenuous hold on the 
sense of control necessary to his sustain his ease in dominion, particularly when she is 
present in his home. Pilate responds to his anger by allowing him control of his space 
without relinquishing control of herself. The antagonism continues, even as Pilate 
removes herself from Macon’s house and returns to Southside, and the novel tells us that 
Macon remains anxious over her existence there and her potential influence on his son. 
He cannot destroy her, and so his anxiety persists as long as she exists within—yet 
somehow beyond—the geography of his domination.  
 In Song of Solomon, through the antagonism between Macon and Pilate, home 
becomes a stage for the confrontation between the internalized oppressions that plague 
black patriarchal socialities and the form(s) of black freedom that grow(s) out of an 
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embrace of fugitivity—a story about how whiteness/white supremacy and investments in 
patriarchy terrorize the black home, even in the absence of antagonistic white people. 
While the novel explains that Macon’s attachment to property and ownership stems from 
his deep love for his murdered father, Morrison also emphasizes the anxieties and 
emptiness associated with his embrace of a set of ideals founded in the violence of 
slavery. Pilate, on the other hand, deals with this loss and its ensuing isolation by 
“[throwing] away every assumption she had learned and began at zero.”322 Rather than 
doubling down on an investment in dominion in order to ward off precarity, she instead 
seeks to create or learn a mode of being that might allow her to be at peace with 
contingency. Her existence and ethos, then, stand almost diametrically opposed to that of 
Macon and the other male characters of the novel: where Macon invests in ordering 
ideologies, Pilate intentionally divests herself from them; where Macon stands apart from 
both individual intimate connections and community ties, Pilate makes human 
relationships of all sorts her first priority. Where Macon enacts dominion, Pilate enacts 
fugitivity.  
 This reading of Pilate is borne out by a later scene in the novel, when Pilate goes 
down to the jail to get Milkman and Guitar released. Milkman and Guitar, spurred on by 
Macon’s tales of gold in Pilate’s house, steal the green bag she keeps hanging from her 
rafters that she calls her “inheritance.” On their drive home, they are pulled over and 
found to be carrying the sack which it turns out is full of human bones. The police learn 
the bag belongs to Pilate, and she is called down to the station to explain its contents. In 
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front of Milkman and Guitar, Pilate gives a deferential performance to the police officers 
which Milkman later calls “her Aunt Jemima act.”323 Milkman recalls that she fully 
embodied the part, somehow making herself physically shorter and changing her voice to 
better suit what the police wanted to hear. When he hears the story from Milkman, 
Macon is “humiliated” by the thought of having to “depend on Pilate to get his son out of 
jail.”324 He tells Milkman that he should have told the police his name, and that he should 
be thankful for Macon’s wallet, which he sees as the true source of Milkman’s freedom.  
 Simultaneously, Macon is perplexed by his sister’s motivations in keeping the 
bones, which belonged to the white man he murdered in self-defense when they were 
hiding in a cave as children. He says to Milkman, “Who knows what Pilate knows?…I’ll 
never understand that woman. I’m seventy-two years old and I’m going to die not 
understanding one thing about her.”325 Here Macon expresses his inability to recognize 
his sister’s worldview. He assumed that the contents of her valued bag would be gold, as 
that is an object that has value to Macon. However, he finds that she values the bones of 
the white man they killed, and he cannot fathom the logic that underlies the rationality of 
that act. Like the fugitive homes in plantation slavery, Pilate’s home befuddles Macon 
because he lacks the grammar that structures her attachments. The space is illegible to 
Macon as he is blinded by his own attachment to the ideologies of dominion.  
 However, while Macon finds Pilate’s logic confusing, Pilate seems well-versed in 
the logic of Macon’s world, even as she disregards it. Her performance in the police 
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station is particularly revealing of her fugitive practice within the geographies of power. 
In order to save herself as well as Milkman and Guitar, she tells the police that the bones 
in the bag belong to her dead husband, “lynched in Mississippi fifteen years ago,”326 and 
that she keeps the bones with her because she could not afford to bury them when he 
died. She then quotes the bible to them: “Bible say what so e’er the Lord hath brought 
together, let no man put asunder—Matthew Twenty-one: Two.”327 However, as scholars 
have noted,328 the verse she quotes here is not Matthew 21:2. The actual content of that 
bible verse is, “Go into the village over against you, and straightaway ye shall find an ass 
tied, and a colt with her: loose them and bring them unto me.”329 Brenda Marshall argues 
that Pilate’s misquote here is intentional and serves to help Pilate retain her dignity even 
as she enacts the role of the supplicant for the benefit of her nephew and herself. Pilate is 
making a joke at the expense of Milkman and Guitar—as Marshall states, “Guitar and 
Milkman are the ass and colt tied, and Pilate is the one who goes to the station to loose 
them.”330 Marshall contends that this word-play on the part of Pilate allows her to “keep 
her sense of self”331 in the midst of her performance of deference.  
 Pilate here “signifies” on her nephew and friend, as well as on the police officers, 
a practice in which both the vet and Mary engage to similar ends in Invisible Man. In this 
moment, Pilate’s linguistic play evinces one function of fugitivity, which is to provide 
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space for not only survival but freedom, play, and enjoyment within a world structured by 
oppressive ideologies. Pilate’s fugitive act of language in the police station asserts her 
presence—the presence of her interior self—despite her physical disappearance into the 
deferential embodiment and obsequious behavior required by this contact with power.332 
Similar to the arrangement of the fugitive home that protects it from interference through 
intentional illegibility, Pilate here produces a physical and linguistic hiding place within 
which her free self can not only exist but assert itself to her own amusement. The police 
officers and Milkman make assumptions about Pilate’s ignorance, and Pilate, aware of 
these perceptions, skillfully mobilizes them to crack a self-affirming joke and gently 
reprimand her nephew for landing himself in jail without anyone—even Milkman—
seeing her do it. Pilate’s understanding of how the interlocking oppressive ideologies of 
white supremacy, patriarchy, and class discrimination structure the world and produce 
stereotypes that attach to her body allows her to hide in plain sight. Unlike Macon’s 
inability to understand Pilate’s logic, then, Pilate deftly grasps Macon’s logic, even as she 
refuses its power.   
 Milkman—instructed and indoctrinated in dominion but not fully given over to its 
ideological constraints—understands the function of Pilate’s performance better than his 
father, but not quite so fully as does Pilate herself. Thinking over the events at the police 
station the next day, Milkman feels shame about Pilate’s performance, but not just 
because of how it positioned Pilate in relation to the police and all the forms of power 
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and oppression they represent. Rather, Milkman is ashamed that Pilate is “both adept at 
[this deferential performance] and willing to do it—for him.”333 Milkman’s discomfort 
grows not from shame as his association with Pilate, as his father’s does, but instead from 
the knowledge that this woman respected her tie to Milkman and his family so wholly 
that she was willing to enact a debased role in exchange for Milkman’s freedom. The 
selflessness of her act, along with her mode of performance, shames Milkman.  
 However, Milkman’s inability to see how Pilate remained present even when 
strategically enacting a deferential performance indicates that he is still too blinded by the 
structure of dominion’s social world—particularly its emphasis on power and control—to 
fully see the fugitivity at work within his aunt’s apparent obsequiousness. At this 
moment, he has an inchoate sense of her fugitivity, however, which he reveals when he 
describes the nature of his aunt’s performance at length: “It was this woman…who 
shuffled into the police station and did a little number for the cops—opening herself up 
wide for their amusement, their pity, their scorn, their mockery, their disbelief, their 
meanness, their whimsy, their annoyance, their power, their anger, their boredom—
whatever would be useful to her and to himself.”334 He recognizes here that his aunt is not 
debased but rather has performed debasement strategically—that her vulnerability to the 
various reactions he imagines her “little number” might evoke was “useful” and intended 
to serve her purposes, rather than “theirs.” Milkman still wrestles with shame, however, 
because he does not yet recognize that Pilate’s freedom comes not from combating the 
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police on their terms but existing as herself, even when that self needs to be hidden by the 
act of signifying in order to stay safe.335  
 The antagonism between Pilate and Macon, then, dialectally produces the path on 
which Milkman finds himself in the bildungsroman of the novel. As he grows older, 
Milkman, raised in a home structured by the ideologies of dominion and instructed by 
that home in how to enact dominion himself, finds no freedom in the capitalistic 
ownership or patriarchal domesticity that his father says will make him free. Rather, he 
finds freedom by embracing an ancestral history of fugitivity and reconnecting himself 
with both the men and women of the black social world in which that fugitivity can be 
cultivated. Over the course of the novel, he comes to understand the function of dominion 
for his father more fully, but he still blends this paternal example of dominion and control 
with the fugitive tools provided to him by Pilate and the communities that formed her to 
create his own way of being.336  
 Morrison, informed by a black feminism that demands love for black men even in 
its critique of patriarchy, uses the character of Milkman to map a path to black freedom 
                                                
335 Here again, the relationship between Pilate and Milkman mirrors the relationship 
between Mary and the protagonist in Invisible Man. Both young men grapple with how 
the protection of these women impacts their selfhood. Both young men feel ashamed of 
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abandon and self-interest” in order to shore up black life and work toward black freedom. 
See Toni Morrison, “Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro American Presence in 
Literature,” Michigan Quarterly Review 28:1 (Winter 1989):1-34. 
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through the intentional cultivation of black communal ties and embrace of fugitive 
practices that have their historical root in forms of black life that existed in enslavement. 
Pilate is not a slave—she retains a mobility and self-possession not available to those 
black men and women who built their homes within the oppressive geography of the 
plantation. However, the fugitive practice that provided escape, survival, and nurturance 
in the homes of the enslaved still informs the multi-scalar home she builds for herself—
that of her own body, her family, her house, and her community. Understanding that the 
master’s tools cannot dismantle the master’s house, Pilate accepts the freedoms of 
emancipation without forgoing the wily set of tools forged by her enslaved ancestors. She 
is not in the slave world but she is of the slave world, and her embrace of this history 
allows her to use an already existing set of practices to make herself free.  
BELOVED AND THE TRAGEDY OF DOMINION 
 Beloved, published 10 years after Song of Solomon, offers a critique of black 
people’s aspirations toward dominion which is similar to that of the earlier novel, but it 
alters both the temporal setting of the aspiration and its characters’ relationship to the 
ideologies that shore up dominion. This text is set years before most of the action of Song 
of Solomon, overlapping only a bit during the period of Reconstruction. Morrison’s 
historically specific novels necessarily frame characters differently depending on the 
limitations and possibilities of the time period in which they would have lived. However, 
it is analytically limiting to assume that the characters in Morrison’s novels solely reflect 
the time period in which the novels are set and do not offer any insight into the historical 
or cultural changes that might have altered the present in which Morrison wrote. In Song 
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of Solomon, the black characters who traffic in dominion engage in its spatial practices as 
well as ascribing to its underlying ideologies to greater or lesser extent. Baby Suggs, on 
the other hand, physically alters a space of dominion in order to undermine its ideological 
demands. However, she also learns that in the absence of protection from the social 
structures that undergird true dominion, her home remains violable. Baby Suggs’ 
structural engagement with the house at 124 Bluestone then figures Morrison’s larger 
argument about the limitations of dominion as a strategy for black safety. Although Baby 
Suggs might change the shape of the house, in the absence of whiteness, maleness, or 
legal ownership, her home only exists at the pleasure of a white man and therefore risks 
violation at almost any time.  
 Baby Suggs’ has a general preoccupation with the space of 124 Bluestone in the 
novel—the physical shape of the house, the location of tasks within the space, and the 
creation, maintenance, and manipulation of boundaries through the demarcation of the 
yard and the location of doors to the house. She has turned the outdoor kitchen “into a 
woodshed and toolroom”337 and had “boarded up the back door that led to it because she 
said she didn’t want to make that journey no more,”338 evoking and rejecting the path a 
domestic like herself would have had to walk repeatedly in slavery. Instead, Baby Suggs 
moves the kitchen inside, making it more like “a cabin”339 and ensuring no division 
between cook and guest. By altering the shape of the house and the landscape of its yard, 
                                                
337 Toni Morrison, Beloved (1987; repr., New York: Vintage, 2004), 244. Citations are to 
the Vintage edition. 
338 Morrison, Beloved, 244. 
339 Ibid. 
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Baby Suggs spatially undermines the aspect of dominion that demands not only 
ownership of property but also ownership of or power over persons within a particular 
geography. She removes the walk from kitchen to house, denying the possibility that she 
or anyone else will have to engage in the embodied practice of a domestic slave or 
servant. 
 However, Baby Suggs also uses spatial practices to reinforce her control over the 
boundaries of her home in a way that resonates with the dominion of slave-masters.340 
Baby Suggs also builds up a storeroom around the former backdoor “so if you want to get 
in 124 you have to come by her.”341 Her elimination of the backdoor allows her to serve 
as guardian of the access points to her home. In dominion, the structure of the landscape 
ensured the perpetuation and functioning of a master’s ostensibly total power over the 
plantation world and all its inhabitants by controlling the visibility and motion of bodies 
within its geography. For Baby Suggs, the goal of her policing is to keep danger out in 
order to create a space of safety for fugitives of slavery and free black people within the 
still dangerous world of the pre-Civil War North.342 However, Baby Suggs’ home blends 
these practices of dominion with aspects of fugitivity as well. Within the temporal setting 
of the novel, the Fugitive Slave Act had extended the boundary of slavery beyond the 
                                                
340 See “Fugitive Homes” in Chapter One of this dissertation. 
341 Morrison, Beloved, 244. 
342 Note that in both of these cases, the purpose of dominion is to push against the sources 
of precarity for different groups. Both the slave-master and Baby Suggs see danger 
encroaching, but for the slave-master that danger is a likely justified undermining of his 
total power, and for Baby Suggs it is a continued violation of her body and freedom. In 
both cases, dominion seeks to control external sources of danger through an embodied 
enactment of power, but what dominion protects can differ. 
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edge of the slave states, and the black population of Cincinnati still relied on fugitive 
practices like the creation of gossip networks and an embodied sensation of danger to 
make and sustain homes in the “free” geography of the North.343 Baby Suggs’ home 
blends the spatial practices of dominion with the embodied or verbal practices of the 
fugitive home to create this hybrid space—her home nurtures and protects the social 
networks the resonate with conceptions of the fugitive home, but it also exists plain sight. 
Baby Suggs builds her home out of symbols of ownership, access, and claim that would 
be legible to power, like fences and doors, rather than creating one of the illegible or 
“messy” homes of fugitivity.344 
 The apocalyptic arrival of Schoolteacher, however, which occurs because both 
Stamp Paid and Baby Suggs are “looking the wrong way”345 belies the ability of 
                                                
343 The best example of this kind of practice is the scene where Stamp Paid pretends not 
to know Judy, a woman who lives down the street, when a white man comes looking for 
her. Paul D assumes that Stamp actually does not know the woman, but later Stamp 
reveals to Paul that he “knows everybody.” In this moment, however, he obscures his 
knowledge in the presence of power to keep both himself and Judy hidden. See Morrison, 
Beloved, 274. 
344 A note on the use of “fugitive” in this section: Most of the novels and images 
discussed in this dissertation take place beyond the end of slavery. Since Beloved does 
not, the use of “fugitive” to describe these homes becomes a bit trickier, as characters in 
the novel can fulfill the juridical category of “fugitive slave” without necessarily enacting 
a fugitive home as I theorize it. For example, the Fugitive Slave Act referred to slaves 
who had stolen themselves away from the plantation, but does not reflect the kinds of 
home-practice in which a fugitive might engage. Because dominion and fugitivity align 
with but are not attached to historically-grounded identities, fugitive slaves did not 
necessarily make fugitive homes, as Beloved to some extent reveals. The scope of this 
chapter limits my ability to fully theorize the distinction between juridical fugitivity and 
the practice of the fugitive home, however, so I will attempt to indicate and clarify points 
where this language may get messy and will leave the theorizing to future work. 
345 Morrison, Beloved, 184. Morrison uses this phrase to indicate that Baby Suggs and 
Stamp Paid were distracted by the revelry of the day before and the resentment that hung 
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dominion to protect homes not also legitimated by its attendant ideologies. As I discussed 
in the first chapter, even the ostensibly total dominion of the slave master could be 
disrupted by slaves, paid labor, or family members failing to defer to his power, despite 
the fact that the interlocking ideologies of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalist 
ownership supported his claim to it. For Baby Suggs, then, who lacks whiteness, 
maleness, or legal recognition of her ownership, such a disruption of control or power 
occurs much more easily. The practice of dominion, divorced from its ideological 
underpinnings, is insufficient to protect Baby Suggs or her family from disruption, 
violence, or enslavement. The white slave catchers, slave owner, and sheriff that arrive at 
her home do not recognize her fence as a boundary they must not cross because they do 
not recognize her power over space as legitimate. Here, the ideologies that structure 
dominion on the plantation serve to undermine Baby Suggs’ attempt to retain dominion 
over her home—white supremacy delegitimates her home’s boundary. Despite the fact 
that she had “done everything right…they came in her yard anyway.”346  
 Baby Suggs’ refrain—“They came in my yard”—replaces language she might use 
to describe her sense of violation at the arrival of Schoolteacher. Here, Baby Suggs’ sense 
                                                                                                                                            
in the air following the party. They could neither pick up on the subtle worry in the air, 
nor did anyone send a warning about the white people riding into town. Both these 
fugitive ways of knowing—through a secret and communal early warning system or 
through the embodied knowledge of danger—fail in this moment to shore up and 
supplement Baby Suggs’ dominion, which leads to its violation. Interestingly, it is Baby 
Suggs’ generosity—her positioning of herself as benevolent giver—which, at least in 
part, keeps the others in the town from warning her of the danger that will soon arrive. 
This too might be read as exemplary of the risk of engaging in practices of dominion 
among members of a social world structured by the ideological investments of fugitivity. 
346 Ibid. 247. 
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of betrayal and resignation resonates with Saidiya Hartman’s articulation of the 
“precarious autonomy”347 or “burdened individuality”348 offered to newly freed slaves in 
the U.S. following the end of the Civil War. Hartman argues that following 
Emancipation, the forms of overt domination that characterized slavery morphed into a 
disciplinary domination that perpetuated black subordination through a rhetoric of rights 
and responsibility. Self-possession characterized black autonomy, encouraging the newly 
freed to understand themselves and their social position through a rhetoric founded in and 
imbued with the racialized conceptions of property and liberty that developed in tandem 
with plantation slavery. Hartman argues that rather than providing freedom, then, this 
form of autonomy or individuality merely provided the apparatus through which the 
racist (white supremacist) social and economic structures that produced and sustained the 
wealth of the nation could continue to exist despite the legal emancipation of slaves.  
 Although Baby Suggs gains her freedom prior to the Civil War, her experience 
and articulation of that freedom very much resembles Hartman’s description of post-
Emancipation rhetoric. The novel describes Baby Suggs’ first experience of freedom as 
the sense that she owns her own hands and the recognition of her own heart beating.349 
This “great heart,” now in her possession, leads Baby Suggs to become an “unchurched 
preacher”350 who “opened her great heart to those who could use it.”351 Her message is 
one of self-love—she tells the newly free and fugitive persons who come to see her speak 
                                                
347 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 117. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Morrison, Beloved, 166. 
350 Ibid., 102. 
351 Ibid. 
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that although “yonder they do not love your flesh,” they must love their own flesh, all of 
it, and particularly “the beat and beating heart…For this is the prize.”352 The novel 
explicitly separates this kind of preaching from disciplinary religion that would have told 
them to “clean up their lives or to go and sin no more.”353 Baby Suggs preaches grace and 
self-love to the end of helping the newly freed take possession of themselves. Sethe 
describes how Baby Suggs’ preaching had allowed her to “claim herself,”354 stating that 
“freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that freed self was another.” For 
both Sethe and Baby Suggs, then, freedom meant not just loving oneself but owning 
oneself, rather than being owned by anyone else.  
 However, these “proprietorial conceptions of the self”355 are a central object of 
Hartman’s critique of post-Emancipation forms of black freedom and personhood. For 
Hartman, the idea of self-ownership reflects how “the long-standing and intimate 
affiliation of liberty and bondage made it impossible to envision…personhood and 
autonomy separate from the sanctity of property,”356 creating what Hartman, borrowing 
from Marx, refers to as the “double bind of freedom.” Newly freed black persons had 
obtained possession of themselves and their labor, but were also “free of material 
resources,”357 significantly altering their relationship to the category of the citizen in a 
nation where the ownership of private property underscored conceptions of liberty. 
                                                
352 Ibid., 104. 
353 Ibid., 103. 
354 Ibid., 111. 
355 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 115. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Ibid. 
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Hartman argues that the rhetoric of self-ownership, rather than describing a form of 
liberty, served more effectively as a means of making free black people “blameworthy”358 
and providing a justification for perpetuating the subordinate position of black persons 
despite legal emancipation. Hartman marks the concept of self-ownership as something 
which provided “freedom” without radically altering the structure of domination, 
subjugation, and disenfranchisement of blackness on which the nation’s economic and 
social systems depended.  
 This realization—that the structure of oppression and exposure to violence is 
carried forward in Emancipation and that self-possession alone offers insufficient 
protection—finally “tires out” Baby Suggs.  It is her resignation to this truth that she tries 
to communicate to Stamp Paid through the metaphor of her yard: 
 “You saying the whitefolks won? That what you saying?” 
 “I’m saying they came in my yard.” 
 “You saying nothing counts.” 
 “I’m saying they came in my yard.” 
 “Sethe’s the one did it.” 
 “And if she hadn’t?” 
 “You saying God give up? Nothing left for us but pour out our own blood?” 
 “I’m saying they came in my yard.” (Morrison, Beloved, 211) 
Baby Suggs does not answer affirm or deny any of Stamp’s accusations or questions, but 
rather states over and over again that her experience of freedom is now circumscribed by 
                                                
358 Ibid, 125. 
 162 
the knowledge that “they”—in this case white representatives and beneficiaries of 
slavery—can enter her yard at will, no matter what sense of protection her self-ownership 
might offer. Although at the time of this conversation Stamp does not understand Baby 
Suggs’ point, he later comes to recognize her “marrow weariness”359 as the unsurprising 
outcome of her realization that “the heart that pumped out love, the mouth that spoke the 
Word, didn’t count.”360 Although she might possess herself, she did not possess the 
“material resources”—property in whiteness and/or property in general—necessary to 
attain the protections of personhood within the dominant system of power. Denver’s 
conception of her grandmother further cements this connection between Baby Suggs and 
the limited efficacy of respectability politics: “…what she thought about what the heart 
and the body could do was wrong…She had done everything right and they came in her 
yard anyway…All she had left was her heart and they busted it so even the War couldn’t 
rouse her.”361 Despite obtaining freedom legally and taking responsibility for that freed 
self, her selfhood still existed only at the pleasure of whiteness and could be violated or 
rescinded at any time.  
 Baby Suggs’ repeated invocation of the violation of her yard as rationale for her 
disappointment and giving-up following what she comes to call “The Misery”—the 
moment when Schoolteacher arrives at 124 Bluestone and Sethe chooses to kill her child 
rather than return her to slavery—articulates Morrison’s argument about the limited 
power of dominion as a practice divorced from its supporting ideologies. Much of the 
                                                
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid., 247, my emphasis. 
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scholarship on Beloved sees The Misery as a turning point in the narrative, but most of 
that critical attention centers on Sethe’s non-choice and the inability of the both the 
reader and the characters within the novel to sufficiently judge Sethe’s action as either 
forgivable or condemnable. I agree that this discomfort with Sethe’s choice is central to 
Morrison’s project, but the afterlife of the choice and its impact on the various characters 
in the novel gives a picture of another layer in Morrison’s pedagogical project. In 
particular, Denver’s ability to live through and beyond this choice—her ability to live in a 
world created in part by the choice her mother made but not completely defined or 
delimited by that choice—by “go[ing] out the yard” draws on Baby Suggs’ metaphor to 
encourage the next generation to move beyond the limitations of dominion. Baby Suggs’ 
yard, over which she attempts to enact dominion, exists in the novel as both a violable 
space of potential and an area of confinement. Through this metaphor, Morrison argues 
that dominion—in particular, its emphasis on control, policing, and self-mastery—risks 
alienating black persons from the black social world, as it did for Macon Dead in the 
earlier novel. Only by re-connecting to that black social world and abandoning the 
“safety” Sethe seeks to create within 124 Bluestone can Denver find a path to thriving.   
 One common theme among the characters in Beloved is their awareness or 
realization that the limited freedoms they enjoy rest on the permission and protection of a 
white man to exist. An example of this often cited in the scholarship on Beloved is the 
moment when Sixo justifies his stealing and eating of a shoat as “improving 
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[Schoolteacher’s] property.”362 This leads Schoolteacher to beat Sixo in order to “show 
him that definitions belong to the definers—not to the defined.”363 This idea haunts Paul 
D when he begins to think about his own manhood, which only existed on Sweet Home 
when Mr. Garner was alive. Early in the novel, Paul D marks a difference between the 
treatment of slaves by Mr. Garner and Schoolteacher, thinking that “in their relationship 
with Garner was true metal”364 because he believed, trusted, and listened to the “Sweet 
Home Men,” as he called his enslaved workers. However, the arrival of Schoolteacher to 
Sweet Home teaches Paul D that their manhood and corollary humanity only existed 
within a particular geography: “One step off that ground and they were trespassers among 
the human race.”365 On the other hand, Paul D remembers Sixo walking 17 hours each 
way to see the “Thirty-Mile Woman,” called that because she lived on a plantation 30 
miles away. Remembering the story, Paul D thinks, “Now there was a man.”366 Unlike 
the Sweet Home Men whose manhood only exists within the boundaries of Garner’s 
plantation and power, Sixo’s manhood can carry him to a plantation 30 miles away to see 
a woman he desires. His manhood is not circumscribed by the geography of Sweet Home 
or Garner’s dominion within it, but rather exists independently of this power structure.  
 Later in the novel, Paul D begins to reconsider his respect for Mr. Garner and to 
rethink whether Mr. Garner was really so different from Schoolteacher. Thinking again 
about how Garner “called and announced them men,” Paul D adds the idea that they were 
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men “only on Sweet Home, and by [Garner’s] leave.” Once again, Paul compares himself 
to Sixo, thinking, “That was the wonder of Sixo, and even Halle; it was always clear to 
Paul D that those two were men whether Garner said so or not.”367 Paul questions his own 
manhood, wondering whether his ability to do “manly things” was “Garner’s gift or his 
own will.”368 He goes on: “What would he have been anyway—before Sweet Home—
without Garner?…Did a whiteman saying it make it so? Suppose Garner woke up one 
morning and changed his mind? Took the word away. Would they have run then?”369 
Confronted at this point with knowledge about Sethe’s “rough choice,” he can no longer 
be so sure that Garner gave the Sweet Home Men much more than Schoolteacher did, 
since he retained control of them both in spite of and through his ostensibly benevolent 
bestowal of manhood. Paul D locates within his desire to believe in Garner’s version of 
himself a denial of the wide reality of slavery—a willful disbelief of Baby Suggs and 
Sixo’s stories of other plantations—combined with a willingness to put up “with anything 
and everything, just to stay alive in a place where a moon he had no right to was 
nevertheless there.”370 Garner’s version of slavery allows the Sweet Home Men371 to see 
                                                
367 Ibid., 260. 
368 Ibid. 
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371 Sethe also evinces a similar sense of attachment to Sweet Home that allows her to put 
up with the institution of slavery in exchange for the benefits to her personally—her 
ability to marry Halle, her protection from sexual violence, her permission to put flowers 
in the kitchen while she worked. In both cases, the enjoyment of these privileges limits 
the slaves’ access to other more permanent or sustainable forms of liberation. Sethe, like 
the Sweet Home Men, trusts the white slaveowner and white mistress to protect their 
autonomy, only to find that in the absence of the master or in the weakness of the 
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themselves as “protected and…special,”372 which gives them the ability to ignore the 
sweeping scope of the institution of slavery or the dehumanization of blackness 
fundamental to its functioning and perpetuation. After Garner’s death, the slaves on 
Sweet Home, Paul D included, come to learn that the kind of “freedom” Garner offered—
a liberty and selfhood “only at his leave” and within the boundaries of his dominion—
becomes worthless without a white man protecting it.  
  In the novel’s depiction of the Sweet Home Men and Paul D’s later grappling 
with the nature of their selfhood, Hartman’s description of the circumscribed nature of 
black freedom post-Emancipation once again resonates. Morrison’s text encourages the 
reader to see “freedom” named such by the “definers” rather than the “defined” as 
inherently precarious and necessarily limited. This pessimism aligns with Hartman’s, 
aptly illustrating the frustration, disappointment, and “marrow weariness” produced by a 
lack of real autonomy for certain kinds of bodies within the American structure of liberty. 
By focusing on “the Misery” and its aftermath, much of the scholarship on Beloved 
perpetuates this line of thought and risks limiting the message of the novel to only its 
warning and not its pedagogy for life.  
 If Baby Suggs’ last words—that “there was no bad luck in the world but 
whitepeople…[because] they don’t know when to stop”373—had been her final speaking 
in the novel, a pessimistic reading of Beloved might prove the best fit. However, Baby 
                                                                                                                                            
mistress, that autonomy disappears. Perhaps her attachment to the protections of their 
dominion also underscores her own later attachment to dominion’s promises. 
372 Morrison, Beloved, 260. 
373 Ibid., 122. 
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Suggs returns as a spirit or imagination later in the novel to encourage Denver to leave 
her yard in order to find someone to help her battle Beloved so she might save her 
mother. Denver, poised at the edge of the porch, remembers her grandmother speaking to 
her mother about the danger and trouble of whitepeople, punctuated by Baby Suggs’ 
defeated statement that “this ain’t a battle; it’s a rout.”374 However, when Denver finds 
herself paralyzed with fear of the world beyond the yard, she hears Baby Suggs’ laughter 
and her voice wondering why Denver cannot remember the history of her family and 
their suffering in slavery: “You mean I never told you nothing about Carolina? About 
your daddy? You don’t remember nothing about how come I walk the way I do and about 
your mother’s feet, not to speak of her back? I never told you all that? Is that why you 
can’t walk down the steps?”375 Baby Suggs voice carries the ancestral knowledge of life 
in slavery, which she mobilizes in this moment to impress upon Denver that her people 
had already survived horrors and violence, and certainly no worse horrors than those 
encountered in slavery existed within the black social world beyond the yard. 
Recognizing the continuities between pre- and post-Emancipation vulnerability, Denver 
responds to her grandmother’s questions by thinking, “But you said there was no 
defense,” to which Baby Suggs responds, “There ain’t.” When Denver asks Baby Suggs, 
“Then what do I do?” Baby offers a key piece of instruction: “Know it, and go on out the 
yard.”376 
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 In this scene, Morrison actively unties the intractable knot of ubiquitous and 
inalterable vulnerability she had created earlier in the novel. Once again, the yard 
represents the relationship between safety and self, this time for Denver. For Sethe and 
Denver, following Sethe’s rough choice and their expulsion from the black social world 
in Cincinnati, dominion’s promises of privacy and sustenance for the self paradoxically 
serve to cut the women in 124 off from the resources that would in fact sustain them. 
Sethe’s actions throughout the novel, including her “rough choice,” resonate more with 
the structures of dominion than the structures of the fugitive home. Sethe seeks control 
over precarity rather than producing a life that can bear contingency. I am not interested 
in judging this desire in Sethe, as it is born out of precipitous and unending losses and 
violations of self over the course of a lifetime377 and seems profoundly rational. However, 
the novel suggests, both through the resentment of Baby Suggs by her neighbors 
following the feast she throws and through Sethe’s debilitating attachment to one child 
and one space, that dominion’s promise of control and protection can become detrimental 
to one’s thriving.  
 As Sethe wastes away, Denver must leave her yard, which had been, up to that 
point, her “whole world.” Baby Suggs, recognizing that she has painted the world as so 
dangerous and destructive that Denver should never leave the yard, attempts to correct 
this mistake by telling Denver not necessarily to forget the danger—“Know it”—but to 
leave the yard anyway. She offers this advice explicitly to contradict her earlier equation 
                                                
377 In this way, Sethe’s attachment to dominion descends from a similar root as Macon 
Dead’s. In both cases, Morrison seems less interested in judging the attachment and more 
interested in describing how it interferes with individual thriving and freedom. 
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of life pre- and post-Emancipation as equally fraught, evidenced by her invocation of 
history and Denver’s lack of knowledge about it as a surprise and as the likely cause of 
Denver’s paralysis. Through the character of Denver, Morrison asserts that the 
generations that did not personally suffer the horrors of slavery but which remain aware 
of their lasting impact on the possibilities for black life must be able to venture beyond 
the bounds of the haunted house that incubates this troubled history. By venturing beyond 
the boundaries of the yard—a legible home which in the novel exists only with 
permission from white power structures—and into the black social world, Denver and the 
generations she represents can mediate the precarity inherent to the history of violence by 
inhabiting a fugitive home. 
 Beloved is not an optimistic novel.378 In comparison with Song of Solomon, for 
example, the text appears cynical about the practical possibilities of fugitivity as a means 
of liberation.379 However, the novel still encourages an incorporation of fugitive practices 
into post-Emancipation life as a means of mediating the impact and effects of a violent 
history on life in the present. In her advice to Denver, Baby Suggs reverses the direction 
of movement, encouraging her granddaughter to “go on out the yard” rather than 
worrying about what might come in the yard. In other words, rather than engaging in 
practices of dominion that emphasize personal power and control as a means of limiting 
precarity, Denver must seek the social networks of the fugitive home in order to bear 
                                                
378 See note 280 for more on the nature of optimism. 
379 For example, Sixo, the character most closely aligned with ideal fugitivity in the 
novel, dies a violent death at the hands of Schoolteacher, and although he is able to pass 
on his genetic material to a son or daughter, he will not be present in the home that 
cultivates that next generation. 
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life’s contingency. Life in a house or home that exists only at the “leave” of whiteness 
does not offer protection to the black self at the same level as a connection to the fugitive 
public—anything can come in the yard at any time. By going out the yard, however, 
Denver can alter how her home produces a threshold between self and the social world, 
allowing her access to the social world that will save her mother which will continue to 
sustain her home.380  
 While Beloved does resonate with Hartman’s critique of the possibility of black 
freedom in a system of liberty structured by the antagonism between slave and free, 
Morrison works against the pessimism that could be engendered by such a critique by 
offering the character of Denver as a counterpoint to her depictions of the inescapable 
degradations of slavery. Stephen Best, in his article “On Failing to Make the Past 
Present,” marks Beloved as a text that contributed to the watershed moment in black 
studies when slavery became integral to discussions of the present and when the 
“collective condition” of living post-enslavement became a guiding framework for black 
politics. Best wants to critique these foundational concepts, using A Mercy to argue that 
Morrison herself revised her stance on the perpetual loss ensuing from the history of 
slavery in a later novel. I agree with Best’s assertion that Morrison as an author maintains 
a more complicated relationship to the slave past than scholarship on her novels might 
indicate. However, I think the complications in her stance exist within Beloved itself as 
much as they do in other novels. Morrison has said that Beloved depicts the fruitlessness 
                                                
380 Sethe is saved by a group of women who come to 124 in order to exorcise Beloved, 
further supporting the notion that the social world or fugitive public in Cinncinnati is the 
true source of safety and salvation for the characters in the novel. 
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of the kind of forgetting necessary to survival,381 but “knowing” the historical memory of 
enslavement does not necessarily precipitate a melancholic relationship with slavery. 
Denver presents a futurity founded in the knowledge of a violent past but living beyond 
the limitations prescribed by the violent system it produced. As with Milkman in Song of 
Solomon, generational descent provides the possibility of selective retention and 
deployment of historical knowledge for the purposes of black thriving in the present. 
Encouraging neither freedom through ignorance of danger nor paralysis in the face of that 
danger, Morrison’s pedagogical project in Beloved is an encouragement of cautious 
exploration, bolstered by communal practices that have protected black life since the time 
of slavery, while also enjoying the freedoms permitted by historical change.  
 The figure of the yard at 124 Bluestone, then, exists throughout the novel as a 
metaphor for the inefficacy of dominion as a means of cultivating, nurturing, and 
protecting black selves post-Emancipation and into the present. Before The Misery, Baby 
Suggs creates safety in her home by restructuring its geography to destroy the pathways 
familiar to the enslaved and to create defensible routes into and out of the home. She 
preaches deep love and self-possession to undermine the oppressive logics and ideologies 
of slavery. Following The Misery, however, the boundaries of the home become 
confining and limiting, first through Baby Suggs’ surrender to her bed where she can 
contemplate colors, and second through the figure of Beloved, who completely controls 
the space of the home by using Sethe’s desire to protect her to manipulate her, which 
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eventually threatens to destroy Sethe completely. These ambivalent depictions of the role 
of the house and yard at 124 Bluestone underscore the idea that dominion as a strategy 
can be both useful and harmful, but in the absence of black communal support or the 
legitimation of dominant ideologies, dominion can do as much harm as good.  
HYBRIDITY IN HOME 
 In Home, Morrison moves beyond Song of Solomon’s optimistic embrace of 
fugitivity and antagonism and Beloved’s critique of black dominion to imagine a 
lifeworld in which black persons can find rest, nurturance, and love through a blending of 
techniques. As I argued above, both of the earlier books point toward a blending of 
fugitivity and dominion that links the black home with both the fugitive tradition that 
sustained black life during slavery and the new privileges and possibilities for black life 
post-Emancipation. This later book, however, describes a set of nurturing homes that are 
spaces of salvation, protection, and defense that simultaneously traffic in the communal 
practices of fugitivity and its forms of knowledge, and the demarcation, claiming, and 
defense of space and property attached to dominion. These nurturing homes resonate with 
Katherine McKittrick’s description of the “plot” as a space that sustained and sustains 
black life and freedom both on the plantation in the “post-plantation” world structured by 
the ideologies of slavery and its necropolitics.382 By refusing to put perpetual racial 
violence or antagonism at the center of the narrative, Morrison engages in the kind of 
project McKittrick locates as a genealogical descendent of strategies for survival and 
thriving on the plantation. These strategies are not inherently fugitive, as they must 
                                                
382 McKittrick, “Plantation Futures,” 4. 
 173 
remain in place and resist antagonizing white domination, but they create a black home 
that incubates, nurtures, sustains, and produces a particular kind of self. These are not 
wholly fugitive homes, but they produce selves that are fugitive to structures of power.  
 The text uses Ethel Fordham’s garden to assert its world-view, similar to the way 
Beloved used Baby Suggs’ yard. The novel never offers a description of the interior of 
Ethel’s house, but Morrison spends a lengthy paragraph describing in detail the garden 
she keeps in her backyard. According to the text, Ethel is an “aggressive gardener” who 
“blocked or destroyed enemies and nurtured plants”383 through a set of defensive and 
boundary-marking practices Morrison describes at length: “Slugs curled and died under 
vinegar-seasoned water. Bold, confident raccoons cried and ran away when their tender 
feet touched crushed newspaper or chicken wire placed around plants. Cornstalks safe 
from skunks slept in peace under paper bags.” By benefit of these defenses, the plants in 
her garden can grow and thrive without worry. The novel describes this garden as “so 
much more than” Eden, because “for her the whole predatory world threatened her 
garden, competing with its nourishment, its beauty, its benefits, and its demands. And she 
loved it.”384 Ethel’s garden is beloved not because it exists free from danger but because it 
is a space that needs fierce protection from a predatory world. In the absence of Ethel’s 
policing, the garden does not survive, and the garden’s need for protection serves as the 
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source of Ethel’s love for it. Ethel’s garden, then, represents a fugitive space descended 
from enslavement—the plot—as well as a space over which she practices dominion.385 
 Just as the “whole predatory world” threatens Ethel’s garden, Home describes a 
“whole predatory world” that works to undermine, disenfranchise, physically harm, and 
shame black life and black persons. However, black communal knowledge also populates 
this predatory world, providing spaces of respite and protection where selves can be 
nurtured and grow. From the first moment of the novel when Frank wakes up in a mental 
hospital having done something he cannot remember, the characters in the novel lead the 
reader through the gauntlet of dangers black persons must navigate in order to survive in 
segregated America. During Frank’s sojourn from the Pacific Northwest back to rural 
Georgia, he relies on the knowledge and generosity of the black people he encounters to 
help him navigate the unfamiliar spaces through which he moves. Cee, too, relies on the 
support and assistance of neighbors to find work in Atlanta after her husband leaves her. 
Frank is able to save Cee with relatively little interference because of the support of the 
doctor’s maid. In each of these scenes, the bonds of affection and mutual reliance 
between black people, even strangers, create spaces of escape and rest where black life 
can thrive despite the threatening world of white supremacy and power. In this way, 
Ethel’s garden serves as a microcosm of the whole world that Home describes—a space 
                                                
385 The reference to the garden of Eden in the text reminds the reader of the Christian 
ideology in which humankind has dominion over the earth. The idea of dominion 
theorized in this dissertation also resonates with this idea, as in both cases there is a sense 
of simultaneous obligation to and power over a particular space and all the bodies within 
it. 
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of nurturance and thriving within a predatory world dead-set on throttling and thieving 
benevolent life.386  
 Ethel’s fierce protection of her garden also mirrors the temperaments of the 
“country women who loved mean”387 that take care of Cee at Ethel’s house. When Frank 
rescues Cee from the doctor’s house in Atlanta, his experimentation on the girl has 
caused grave injury to her womb and she is on the verge of death.388 Frank takes her to 
Ethel’s house where she sets about healing what the doctor has hurt. When her treatments 
fail to work, she calls in the neighbor women to help her cure the illness. The language 
used to describe the women’s approach to treatment parallels the language with which 
Morrison describes Ethel’s gardening. The text states that these women “handled sickness 
as though it were an affront, an illegal, invading braggart who needed whipping.”389 
Strongly worded demands accompany Cee’s treatment—“Spread your legs. This is going 
                                                
386 The garden as metaphor for black life appears both within McKittrick’s article, which 
girds many of the claims made in this dissertation, as well as in Alice Walker’s seminal 
In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens: Womanist Prose (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1983). Walker uses “our mother’s gardens” to represent the strategies of 
world-making passed down through generations of black women, which has always been 
black feminism and which helps to articulate its claims in the 1980s and into the present. 
387 Morrison, Home, 121. 
388 Cee’s interactions with the doctor she works for parallel the history of medical abuse 
against black and enslaved women, particularly during the early days of medical 
experimentation and practice in the U.S. For example, J. Marion Sims, widely considered 
the father of gynecology, make many of his revolutionary surgical discovered by 
performing painful and repeated surgeries on his un-anesthetized slaves. For more on this 
history see Harriet A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical 
Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2008). 
389 Morrison, Home, 121. 
 176 
to hurt”390—illustrating the overlap between the banishment of bad things and the 
nurturing of good in the culture of Lotus. The women respond to her suffering with 
“resigned contempt,” and they berate her for allowing a doctor to make her sick in the 
first place: “‘Men know a slop jar when they see one.’ ‘You ain’t a mule to be pulling 
some evil doctor’s wagon.’ ‘You a privy or a woman?’ ‘Who told you you was trash?’” 
These harsh criticisms serve not to undermine Cee but rather to encourage her growth and 
strength by reminding her that she deserves better and was foolish to accept the treatment 
she received.  
 In Ethel’s garden, predator and plant are two different objects. In Cee’s case, 
however, the boundary between predator and prey exists both within and outside of her 
body and self. Through their “demanding love,”391 the women attempt to rout the 
dangerous thing within Cee—her inability to see herself without filtering the image 
through the dominant ideologies which undermined her humanity. While the doctor is 
responsible for the damage to her physical body, the women are keenly aware that Cee’s 
internalization of harmful ideologies, as much as anything else, put her physical body at 
risk. Here fugitive practices reveal themselves. Rather than confronting power—in this 
case, the white doctor for whom Cee worked—the women choose to cultivate in Cee the 
ability to exist beyond the ideologies that created his power in the first place.  
 The garden then also serves as a figure through which Morrison describes the 
social cultivation necessary to resist the emotional or psychological degradations possible 
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in the predatory world of the novel. After Cee has healed, Ethel sits with her on the 
porch, and the novel tells us that with “eyes fixed on her garden,”392 the woman tells Cee 
that she cannot let Lenore or anyone else define her to herself. Bringing up the farmer 
who killed the goose that laid the golden eggs, Ethel asserts that Lenore loved gold too 
much and took her wealth as a sign that she was better than others in the community. 
Ethel wonders why the farmer killed the goose rather than “plow[ing] his land, seed[ing] 
it, and grow[ing] something to eat.” Here Ethel asserts that the accumulation of gold 
matters far less than the seeding of land that can bear food, invoking the image of the 
garden again to assert the primacy of cultivation in matters of survival or thriving. When 
Cee laughs at Ethel’s discussion of the farmer, she responds with a speech that bears 
quoting at length: “Look to yourself. You free. Nothing and nobody is obliged to save 
you but you. Seed your own land. You young and a woman and there’s serious limitation 
in both, but you a person too. Don’t let Lenore or some trifling boyfriend and certainly no 
devil doctor decide who you are. That’s slavery. Somewhere inside you is that free 
person I’m talking about. Locate her and let her do some good in the world.”393 Here, 
Ethel explicitly links the metaphor of seeding land with the concept of self-definition 
which which Morrison imbues her fugitive characters. In both Song of Solomon, where 
Pilate comes to define her values beyond those prescribed by the wider world, and in 
Beloved, when Sixo is beaten for defining himself to Schoolteacher, Morrison’s fugitive 
characters gain and assert their freedom through the cultivation of self-definition against 
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and beyond the definitions offered by those with social power. In Home, Morrison 
reiterates this argument in no uncertain terms: allowing anyone else to define you is 
slavery. Ethel suggests that in order to stay free from the definitions of others, Cee must 
“seed her own land”—must cultivate a sense of selfhood that might allow her to thrive in 
the predatory world.   
 In all three of the novels discussed in this chapter, self-definition and black 
communal knowledge are facets of fugitive home that create freedom within geographies 
of oppression. The homes that provide respite to Frank and Cee in Home, however, do 
not embody the fugitive to the same extent as Pilate’s or Sixo’s homes. Rather, like Baby 
Suggs’ house before The Misery, these homes blend the knowledge practices that 
characterize the fugitive home with a control over the landscape and the spatial 
defensibility associated with dominion.394 In Ethel’s garden in particular, the strict 
demarcation of boundaries through spatial means and her “aggressive” policing of them 
aligns more closely to dominion than the fugitive home. However, the cultivation that 
goes on within the garden owes more to the garden plots of the enslaved than to a power-
seeking sense of dominion. The novel also critiques accumulation and leisure at the 
expense of others, which are both attributes of dominion rather than fugitivity. Lenore, 
for example, loves gold and privacy, and the novel paints her as destructive to Cee’s 
sense of self and distanced from the supportive community of black women in Lotus. 
Ethel and her neighbors, on the other hand, had “no excess in their gardens because they 
                                                
394 Both the Reverend’s house that Frank visits very early in the novel and the home he 
stays in when he is in Chicago that allows its son to grow “deep” also share the 
characteristics of Ethel’s nurturing garden. 
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shared everything. There was no trash or garbage in their homes because they had a use 
for everything.”395 Ethel’s garden does not exist to create capitalist surplus that can be 
traded for wealth, and any excess created benefits the town’s community. Lotus lacks the 
capitalist drive of the plantation home, exhibiting instead a fugitive desire for the creation 
and support of collective life.396 Ethel’s thriving home in Home is a hybrid space—in-
place, bounded, and policed, but populated by persons who support rather than control 
one another, and who socialize one another through demanding love rather than just 
demand.397  
 The figure of the garden in Home calls to mind Baby Suggs’ invocation of her 
yard in Beloved, in that both novels offer a bounded outdoor space near the home, 
produced by an ancestor figure, through which Morrison deals with questions of violation 
and protection for black lives. Beloved’s yard evinces the inefficacy of dominion for 
black women in a world still defined by the perpetual violence of slavery, resonating with 
Hartman’s Afro-pessimist vision of the temporal bleeding of practices of enslavement out 
                                                
395 Morrison, Home, 123. 
396 References to communism in the 1950s pepper Home. Communist writers, often on 
the blacklist, wrote most of the media mentioned in the text—particularly the plays and 
movies that the characters work on or see. While Morrison doesn’t make any explicit 
arguments about the relationship between blackness and the blacklist, the number of 
references to persecution of communists and her description of a communistic approach 
by the women in Lotus is not likely an accident. Future research could explore this 
connection in more depth. 
397 The women in Lotus also resonate with Mary from Invisible Man, as Pilate did. Mary, 
too, offers up “demanding love,” and it is interesting that in the absence of the 
masculinist desires of the protagonist or Milkman, the “discomfort” of these demands has 
less purchase in the narrative. 
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of the past and into the present. In Beloved, “there is no defense”398 for spaces of self-
making, and the only way to be free is to leave the yard, abandoning dominion for 
engagement with the wider black community. Home, however, offers a counterpoint to 
this idea, arguing that the fierce policing of space can be fused with fugitive knowledge 
and black communal bonds to allow the cultivation of selves and spaces free from 
external definition and interference. In Home, Morrison troubles the boundary between 
fugitivity and dominion, asserting a hybridity between the two as the best means of 
cultivating free black selves.  
 Katherine McKittrick’s theoretical work on the plot-in-plantation helps to frame 
Morrison’s project as a specific kind of counter-narrative to the dominations of the 
plantation and the subsequent perpetuation of its logic. McKittrick argues that the plot—
both as a lived practice that cultivated space in plantation geography and as a 
characteristic part of the novel as a form—has a long history. Drawing from the work of 
Sylvia Wynter, McKittrick argues that the plot “illustrates a social order that is developed 
within the context of a dehumanizing system as it spatializes what would be considered 
impossible under slavery: the actual growth of narratives, food, and cultural practices that 
materialize the deep connections between blackness and the earth and foster values that 
challenge systemic violence.”399 The plot and plantation neither fully work together to 
constitute a world, nor do they exist in antagonism. Rather, McKittrick argues that both 
spaces, or perhaps the space of the plantation and the space-within-a-space of the plot, are 
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“locations through which blackness becomes rooted in the Americas.”400 Although much 
scholarly and literary attention has been paid to the violence and dispossession of the 
space of the plantation in recent years, McKittrick urges her readers to understand that 
the garden plot that sustained black life and supplemented the rations of the plantation 
also serves as a foundational experience of black life in the Americas. By giving space, 
breath, and thought to the plot as well as the plantation, scholars and writers can break 
out of the cycle of plantation logic that naturalizes the “unending black death”401 that 
stretches from slavery into the present. Remembering the plot disrupts the repetition of 
the rhetoric of the plantation as solely violent, offering a “new analytical ground that puts 
forth a knowledge system”402 not locked in an endless antagonism with the dominations 
of the plantation but already existing and perhaps thriving within and despite the 
dominations of that geography. 
 Morrison’s emphasis on Ethel’s garden resonates with McKittrick’s call to 
remember the history of black life that grows out of the practices and geography of the 
plantation, rather than becoming so mired in its oppressions and degradations that they 
seem like a “natural, inevitable, and normal way of life.”403 Through the figure of Ethel’s 
garden, McKittrick’s implicit critique of Afro-pessimist thought tracks onto Morrison’s 
novel, revealing the author’s move to a more blatant invocation of black life-ways in 
service of finding a way to live through and beyond a violent history. Within the space of 
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Ethel’s home, mirrored in the figure of her garden, Cee comes to realize that she must 
“seed her own land”—must define herself beyond the confines of dominant ideologies—
in order to ameliorate the risk of abuse at the hands of individuals who exist above her on 
oppressive social hierarchies. All three novels discussed here use the figure of the home 
to assert something about the possibility of resistance, but Ethel’s home is not Pilate’s 
idle, disorganized living room nor Baby Suggs’ indefensible yard. Ethel’s home is a 
bounded and policed piece of property that successfully mobilizes some select practices 
of dominion in the service of producing black selves that might be fugitive to structures 
of dominant power. This radical staying-put connects Ethel’s home genealogically to the 
“secretive histories”404 of extant black plantation life McKittrick locates in the figure of 
the plot. While the women of Lotus do build fugitive homes, they allow those homes to 
attach to place and police their boundaries in a way that resonates with the practices of 
dominion.  
 The staying-put of this home, however, does not negate its fugitive nature. As I 
wrote in the first chapter, my thinking about fugitivity and the fugitive home stems not 
from the image of the fugitive slave escaping slavery by moving to the North or to 
Canada, but rather from the fugitive slave that lived on or near the plantation, retaining 
familial and social ties while subtly undermining the power of the slave-master through 
absence and theft. Ethel’s garden does not move away from or reject its geographical 
location in a Southern state—it does not flee north—but at the same time, its rootedness, 
order, and boundaries do not surrender to or align themselves with dominant ideologies 
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of power. Ethel’s practice in the garden—the creation and protection of boundaries, the 
separation of good or sustaining forms of life from their bad or predatory enemies—
mimics the spatial practice of plantation mastery. However, Ethel’s garden exists to 
support communal rather than individual power and does not demand the subjugation or 
disciplining of human bodies to shore up its existence and importance. At a different 
point in the novel, Morrison describes hard labor as the kind of work which “broke the 
body but freed up the mind for dreams of vengeance, images of illegal pleasure—even 
ambitious schemes of escape.”405 Similarly, Ethel’s home anchors her body to a physical 
space but frees her up to imagine ways to know herself unfettered by white supremacist 
and patriarchal ideologies that could disrupt her self-definition. By sustaining and 
nurturing physical life, this rooted geography supports the production of selves that do 
not rely on dominant structures of power to survive and therefore can remain fugitive to 
those systems of power. Ethel’s home is not fugitive of all normative structures of life, 
but it selectively invests in those that sustain her and her community without abandoning 
the fugitive definitions of self that help her, and Cee as well, resist domination.  
MORRISON’S PEDAGOGY 
 By looking at both the changes and similarities between the homes in her novels 
across a wide time-span, it becomes clear that Morrison always advocates a blended 
approach, centered around the practice of self-definition and only embracing the aspects 
of either dominion or the fugitive home that function to make stronger, more proactive, 
and more nurturing spaces for black selves. Even in Song of Solomon, where Morrison is 
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arguably most critical of normative domesticity and its impact on black selfhood and 
liberation, neither Pilate nor Macon emerges from their entrenched antagonism as the 
victor—rather, in the character of Milkman, the author offers that socialization in both 
fugitivity and dominion creates descendants that can best embrace both the history and 
tradition of black life in America and the possibilities and power available to black 
people post-Civil Rights. In Beloved also, Denver, a descendant figure, finds a way to 
live more freely by keeping a house at 124 Bluestone but also being willing to rely on the 
black community beyond its walls. She is saved not by the privacy of dominion but by 
the forms of communal knowledge and protection that exist in fugitive communities. The 
novel, however, does not demand that she give up her household to be part of the wider 
community. By the time Morrison published Home in 2012, the ancestor figure herself 
would engage in a blended home practice, which Cee could learn directly rather than 
creating from various inputs as a descendent. Ethel Fordham’s home is not a departure 
for Morrison, however, but is simply a more direct and stringent articulation of 
Morrison’s assertion that nurturing spaces for blackness in the 20th century must reject the 
ideologies of dominion while retaining its useful spatial practices, and must embrace the 
communalism and self-definition of fugitivity’s socialization practice while rejecting its 
demands for invisibility and perpetual rootlessness.  
 Over the course of her career as a writer and thinker, Morrison has consistently 
side-stepped a revolutionary politics, choosing instead to imagine ways of living through 
and living with the structure of racial antagonism through the embrace of fugitive 
practices and the recognition of what kind of life is worth living. Through her 
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complicated engagements with home-space and her invocation of the historical forms of 
home that existed in plantation slavery, Morrison pushes back against Wilderson’s 
conception of the inescapability of racial antagonism and Hartman’s assertion that the 
violences of slavery did not end so much as change forms, using the figure of the plot-in-
plantation to evince the extant forms of black life and thriving that neither antagonize 
whiteness nor suffer under its oppression. Morrison’s fiction seeks to locate, describe, 
inhabit, and reproduce existing spaces and forms of black thriving within oppressive 
histories in order to articulate a livable politics that works toward black freedom on both 
an individual and social level. Morrison’s fiction understands the particular precarity of 
black life in America while communicating means of ameliorating that precarity that do 
not demand further violence, dispossession, or loss for black Americans. Locating the 
secretive histories within the narrative of domination, Morrison’s engagement with home 
undermines the totality of plantation logic and offers a vision of black freedom rooted in 
historical practices in the U.S.   
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Chapter Four ⎯Subtle Subversion and Fugitive Threat: Carrie Mae 
Weems’ American Icons 
 
 The scene is ordinary: A kitchen sink, flanked by a drying rack full of dishes and 
a glass jar holding a bouquet of wooden spoons, anchors the bottom of the image. To the 
upper right and left, two wooden cabinets hang from the wall with their doors closed, and 
a clock indicating that it is a few minutes past nine sits equidistant between them. All 
objects exist in the same plane with a limited depth of field and no human form among 
them. The careful placement of the objects signals the constructed-ness of the still life. At 
the center of the image, a ceramic Aunt Jemima smiles, kerchief wrapped around her 
head, at what would be eye-level if someone stood at the sink. This racist caricature grins 
out of the scene, disrupting the ordinary with a reminder of the real and symbolic 
violence perpetrated against women of color who have worked in and created domestic 
spaces such as this one. Or perhaps the presence of this figure within an ordinary scene 
speaks to the ordinariness of that violence, rather than disrupting anything. Or yet more 
subversively: maybe Aunt Jemima returns the gaze of the viewer, looking directly in his 
or her eyes, and the smile is a bit more ominous than obsequious, hiding a quiet 
resistance or threat beneath her happy countenance. 
 In Untitled (With Kitchen Clock), as in all of the images from Carrie Mae Weems’ 
American Icons series (1988-1989), racist objects—ashtrays, salt-and-pepper shakers, 
thermometers, figurines—appear in mundane domestic still-life scenes. Unlike the direct 
confrontation of the gaze offered by her most famous set of photographs The Kitchen 
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Table Series (1990) or the incendiary language displayed on the images in Ain’t Jokin 
(1987-1988), American Icons’ small but loaded objects within mundane scenes offer a 
more subtle cultural critique. Invoking the tropes of the still life genre while using playful 
compositional techniques to resist definitive readings, the photographs in this series 
animate overdetermined racist objects in order to encourage the viewer to inhabit the 
uncanny space created by the repressed history of the violences and vulnerabilities of 
domestic slavery. The photographs themselves work on multiple levels, drawing on lived 
history, a history of objects, and the history of still life to engage a variety of viewers in 
different ways depending on the lexicon they use to make the images legible. At core, 
however, the series pushes back against the image of domestic servants as docile human-
objects existing within a scene of total power on the part of the master by implying 
resistance, mischief, absence, and threat—at core, a fundamental indeterminacy—through 
the composition and execution of the photographs and the racist objects they depict.  
 Through this indeterminacy, Weems’ American Icons make visual both a 
historical reality of black life in white domestic space and the attendant Afro-pessimist 
theorizations of blackness that arise from that historical truth. In particular, the presence 
of objects that reflect a deadened or objectified blackness but threaten to animate invokes 
the “paradox of the resisting object”406 fundamental to theories of black social death and 
its relation to black life. Drawing from Jared Sexton’s thinking about the impossibility of 
black life in “The Social Life of Social Death” and Darieck Scott’s work on abjection, 
this chapter argues that the American Icons series indexes the iconography of American 
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racism while suggesting that, via the invisibility produced through such overdetermined 
stereotypes, black subjects might be able to find power or freedom. Weems makes visible 
the presence of black life in spaces of abjection, imbuing her images with a fugitive 
indeterminacy that refuses the overdetermination of the objects they depict.  
AMERICAN ICONS AND THE STILL LIFE GENRE 
 Although Weems’ work has received much critical attention since her first gallery 
shows in the 1980s, few critics and scholars have written about the American Icons 
series. Even her retrospective and the museum exhibit guides dedicated to her solo shows 
devote precious few pages to this series of images. While part of this dearth of attention 
might be owed to American Icons being an earlier series in the course of her career, the 
resonance between these images and the art historical genre of still life certainly also 
contributes to the status of these images within Weems’ wider oeuvre. Her most famous 
work, The Kitchen Table Series, exists somewhere between portraiture and staged 
photography, and her other more notable projects often blend portraiture with installation 
or the production and display of art-objects. American Icons, on the other hand, aligns 
most closely with the genre of still life in that its photographs depict mundane scenes in 
the absence of people or narrative. Still life emerged as a genre meant to be domestic 
adornment or a study to refine technique, and since its inception, it has been considered a 
“lower” form of art—one meant more for personal collecting than for art historical 
debate.  
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 Norman Bryson attributes this disinterest in still life to both its “remove from 
narrative,”407 due to its lack of human figures or depiction of events, and its investment in 
the mundane. One of Bryson’s central contentions is that because still life depicts 
everyday objects created collectively by generations of humans rather than individually 
by one identifiable human actor, high valuation of still life threatens those who invest in 
the individuality of human invention or genius: “All such objects are tied to actions 
repeated by every user in the same way, across generational time; they present the life of 
everyman as far more a matter of repetition than of personal originality or invention.”408 
Still life gives primacy to the “sleep of culture,”409 valorizing a world produced and 
sustained through habit rather than historical action. This reorientation undermines the 
role of art to mark and give import to individual human achievement and importance, 
which Bryson argues makes those in power uncomfortable. Critics and commenters in the 
art world value still life less highly both because of and in service to hegemonic notions 
of the centrality of human individuals to both art and history. Weems’ series of still life 
photographs, then, make less of a critical splash than her other works because they call 
upon a genre with ostensibly less art historical importance than portraiture, installation, or 
sculpture. Still life traffics in objects that might normally go unnoticed—objects that 
might be invisible in the context of a larger work.  
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 However, Weems’ American Icons strategically engages still life in service of her 
larger purpose—to question assumptions about the privacy/sanctity of domesticity and to 
evoke the uncanny memory of the historical violence that underlies it. The genre of still 
life categorically does not include human figures, and Weems’ images are no exception. 
However, by including racist objects intended to mimic and mock human beings, Weems 
forces a consideration on the part of the viewer about what exactly the racist figures 
elicit. Certainly a Mammy and Uncle Mose salt-and-pepper shaker set are not human 
figures in the way that the living bodies featured in Weems’ Kitchen Table Series are, but 
despite all their function as kitchen objects, the salt-and-pepper shaker were still designed 
to look like people, even if the people they depict are wholly fictional stereotypes. There 
is no human subject in the image, then, but the viewer’s eye finds the subject of the 
image in the racist figurine, blurring the line between object and human and pointing to a 
history in which that line was also profoundly difficult to draw.  
 Weems’ later work supports this reading. Particularly in From Here I Saw What 
Happened and I Cried, a well-represented collection in the scholarship on the artist, 
Weems directly confronts the genre of portraiture and its use in the field of anthropology 
to turn human subjects into objectified types and to strip them of their individual identity. 
Here too Weems signifies on410 a genre (in this case, eugenist or early anthropological 
portraits) to the end of pointing out how differently racialized subjects necessarily 
                                                
410 I use the term “signify” here, as in previous chapters, to reference Gates’ canonical 
text The Signifying Monkey. For a description of this concept see pages 108-109. For 
more on the relationship between signifying and fugitive homes in plantation slavery, see 
Chapter One. 
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experienced the creation and use of this genre in a different way than those in positions of 
power or cultural domination. In The Kitchen Table Series, Weems plays with the genre 
of staged photography made popular in the 1970s and 1980s, making herself central as 
both photographer and photographic subject. In both of these collections, as well as in 
other moments throughout her work, Weems plays with the line between photographer 
and photographic subject, and between subject and object, in order to point to the 
historical messiness between these binary categories, particularly in the realm of 
photography, and to make the line even more messy in her contemporary moment. 
American Icons evinces the same desire to point out a violent history that dehumanized 
persons and made them into objects of property, although perhaps more playfully and less 
explicitly than in her later work.  
 Still life is fertile ground for this kind of discussion. Bryson argues that still life 
exists at the nexus of three “cultural zones”: an everyday world of domesticity and habit, 
or “life of the table,” as discussed above; the semiotics that code that world; and the 
material practice of painting.411 The three zones function dialectically to create the 
moment of a still life, and Bryson states that none can be separated from the others except 
in analysis, as “the symbolism followed by painting interacts with cultural symbolism 
                                                
411 Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked, 14. Weems of course is not painting her images, 
but there is still a material practice involved in the production of a photographic print. 
Particularly in the case of these images, Weems is also taking domestic objects, not 
traditionally or easily included in archives, and turning them into photographs, and art 
photographs at that, which will more easily fit in the archive and which are more likely to 
be valued and retained. For more on photography as a practice that changes the archival 
state of objects, see Ann Cvetkovich, “Photographing Objects as Queer Archival 
Practice,” in Feeling Photography, Elspeth H. Brown and Thy Phu, eds. (Durham: Duke 
UP, 2014), 281. 
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outside painting, the economics of the studio interact with wider economic life, [and] the 
culture of the domestic interior is woven at every point into the public world which 
surrounds it.”412 In other words, the nature of still life is to both reflect and inform 
material practices of mundane domesticity and human necessity through an artistic 
technique informed by broader economics and culture. Weems employs photographic 
technique to this end, working with the genre of still life to point to the overlap between 
the domestic realm and larger systems of cultural structure and meaning—particularly 
those systems that reproduce and perpetuate racialization and racism. Still life then is an 
art historical genre that reinforces the idea, widely discussed in cultural studies and 
literary criticism, that the mundane, everyday, and domestic spaces and practices of a 
given culture both respond to and inform broader cultural practices, and that through an 
artistic or analytical engagement with the everyday, cultural systems reveal themselves.413 
Weems selects this genre for American Icons to underscore the mundane forms of racism 
that underlie domesticity, both in the past and in the present, as well as to connect the 
indeterminacy of her compositions with the uncertainty of power in real domestic spaces.  
 The composition of Weems’ still lifes also supports this reading. Often in still life, 
the artist carefully selects and arranges objects before capturing or painting the image. In 
                                                
412 Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked, 14. 
413 While my analysis here relies most heavily on Bryson, I also found the following texts 
on still-life to be useful in support of this point: Charles Sterling, Still Life Painting from 
Antiquity to the Twentieth Century, trans. James Emmons (1959; New York: Harper & 
Row, 1981); Ingvar Bergström, Dutch Still-Life Painting in the Seventeenth Century 
(London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1956); Jochen Sander, ed. The Magic of Things: Still-Life 
Painting 1500-1800. (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2008). For more on the 
everyday and its relationship to dominant cultural formations please see Ben Highmore, 
Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
 193 
the sub-genre of vanitas paintings, which seek to communicate a moral lesson about the 
hollowness of worldly pleasures, the objects selected serve both aesthetic and symbolic 
purposes within the composition of the scene. Vanitas paintings were particularly popular 
among the 16th and 17th century Dutch elite, a group growing increasingly wealthy at that 
time due to colonization and international trade, including that of slaves. In these 
paintings, clocks, hourglasses, skulls, snuffed candles, and other objects that mark the 
passing of time or the mortality of humans sit among signs of opulence—food, jewelry, 
flowers—to indicate the hollowness of worldly pleasures and to remind the viewer that 
life is fleeting.414 Bryson notes the irony that these paintings both condemned the 
consumption and valorization of worldly pleasures and were themselves worldly 
pleasures in the form of aesthetic objects, existing in a paradoxical limbo between 
critique and embrace of a rising capitalist culture. At times, these images also engage 
Christian iconography, where objects or animals stand in for religious figures and events 
in a visual lexicon that codes text as image in a way that might not be legible to a person 
who had not learned the lexicon. Both the title of Weems’ series, which invokes 
iconography, and her use of racially-charged objects that encode cultural beliefs link her 
to the genre of vanitas and the long history of symbolically-loaded still lifes.  
 Where vanitas drew on Christian iconography, Weems’ photographs draw on the 
visual lexicon of racist stereotypes that have permeated representations of blackness since 
                                                
414 Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked; Sander, The Magic of Things; Bergstrom, Dutch 
Still-Life Painting in the Seventeenth Century. 
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the time of slavery.415 Since the 1980s, a large body of scholarship has committed itself to 
unpacking, labeling, and categorizing these stereotypes, as well as uncovering their 
historical and cultural roots in an effort to undo them or to better understand the source 
and form of their power.416 Perhaps stickiest among these constructions is the Mammy 
figure, the dark-skinned, maternal, asexual, obsequious domestic servant or slave that 
acted as helper to the mistress and mother-figure to the children of the master. Rooted in 
the patriarchal domestic ideologies of slavery, the figure of Mammy first appears in 
Antebellum and abolitionist writings from the mid-19th century.417 The figure gained 
prominence in broader culture in the years following the end of the Civil War, as both a 
minstrel character and as an object of Old South nostalgia for white Southerners living 
amid the social upheaval of Reconstruction.418 By creating a character who was both 
content in her slave status and who posed no sexual threat to white women, Southern 
                                                
415 Weems’ use of racist stereotype within her art places her within a burgeoning tradition 
among black visual artists. Kara Walker, discussed in more depth below, along with Glen 
Lignon and Michael Ray Charles, produce works of art that invoke the history of racist 
stereotype and racist imagery to produce an indeterminacy similar to that which I see 
Weems creating in American Icons. See Christina Sharpe, Monstrous Intimacies: Making 
Post-Slavery Subjects (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010); Rachael Ziade Delue, “Dreadful 
Beauty and the Undoing of Adulation in the Work of Kara Walker and Michael Ray 
Charles,” in Idol Anxiety, Josh Ellenbogen and Aaron Tugendhaft, eds. (Stanford: 
Standford UP, 2011); Kimberly Juanita Brown, The Repeating Body: Slavery’s Visual 
Resonance in the Contemporary (Durham: Duke UP, 2015). 
416 Seminal among these works is Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby/Papa’s Maybe: An 
American Grammar,” Diacritics 17:2 (Summer 1987): 64-81. However, much Afro-
pessimist scholarship arises from an examination of the persistence of racist images and 
representations rooted in the Antebellum and Reconstruction eras. See in particular 
Wilderson, Red, White, and Black; Hartman, Scenes of Subjection. 
417 For more on this, see Turner, Ceramic Uncles and Celluloid Mammies and Roberts, 
The Myth of Aunt Jemima. 
418 Turner, Ceramic Uncles and Celluloid Mammies; Roberts, The Myth of Aunt Jemima. 
For the root of Mammy in slavery, see White, Ar’n’t I A Woman?. 
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writers could elide the violence required to control domestic slaves, erase the history of 
sexual violence and miscegenation that accompanied that control and undermined racial 
boundaries, and affirm themselves in the fiction that things had been better for both white 
and black Southerners before the war. Mammy, like Sambo, Uncle Tom, and other 
stereotypes that appear most often in racist collectibles like those in Weems’ still lifes, 
functions to shore up racial hierarchies and ameliorate white fear by presenting slaves as 
content, stupid, and loyal. Patricia A. Turner writes that the cardinal rule of racist 
memorabilia, or “contemptible collectibles” as she calls them, is to “exploit only those 
stereotypes that assuage white fears and never those that aggravate them.”419  
 Black figurines that represent these stereotypes objectify blackness both literally 
and figuratively, turning discursive constructions of racist archetypes into physical 
objects and reinforcing or reinscribing stereotypes that symbolically undermine black 
individuality and personhood. However, while these objects do encode blackness within 
the visual lexicon of racism, their meaning is not so stable as it might initially appear. 
Many historians of racist collectibles note that since the late 1980s, the majority of 
collectors of this kind of object are in fact black Americans, indicating that while 
originally intended to ease white fear, these objects now serve some other as-yet-
unnamed function for their black American owners. Turner’s text also describes 
reproductions of original pieces created and sold by a black-owned company. While the 
objects still reference a particular history and the stereotypes it produced and perpetuated, 
their meaning becomes more complicated as historical distance from slavery grows and 
                                                
419 Turner, Ceramic Uncles and Celluloid Mammies, 22. 
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the relationship of black Americans to histories of violence and the economic forces of 
capitalism changes.  
 Weems’ photographs mobilize the unstable meaning of these overdetermined 
objects to provoke a panoply of audience responses and to call into complication the 
relationship between blackness and objecthood. In the monograph released to accompany 
Carrie Mae Weems: Three Decades of Photography and Video, a 2012 retrospective put 
on at the Frist Center for the Visual Arts in Nashville, editor Kathryn E. Delmez asserts 
that Weems’ intention in American Icons is to “force the audience to acknowledge the 
persistence of an undercurrent of racism within a culture that officially claims to frown 
on it and consider their own responses to the works, in both private and public 
environments, and their potential role as accomplice, be it as participant, consumer, or 
silent witness.”420 In other words, Weems’ project is two-fold: one, to confront a viewer 
with the history and presence of racism and two, to elicit an internal reaction or response 
to the image that upsets an easy understanding of the viewer’s individual relationship to 
that history. This kind of cultural work is done less within the frame and more in the 
space of the gallery, between viewer and image or perhaps even within the viewer him or 
herself.  
THE OBJECT THAT COMES TO LIFE 
 One limitation to much of the journalistic and critical writing about this series, 
however, is that it appears to presume an audience aligned with whiteness. Delmez’ 
                                                
420 Kathryn E. Delmez, ed. Carrie Mae Weems: Three Decades of Photography and 
Video. (New Haven: Yale UP, 2012), 14. 
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assertion that the images provoke a consideration of one’s complicity with anti-black 
racism indicates an assumption that all viewers—white, non-white/non-black, and 
black—will come to the images burdened with a hidden knowledge of their own 
investment in white supremacy. Philip Kennicott even further white-washes the imagined 
audience: “Without inserting any actual human beings into the images, Weems constructs 
an all-too-human trope of racist thinking: These images are too nice to be about race. The 
lamp and end table, the kitchen counter with its whisk and ladles and half a cantaloupe, 
become like people, soothing, full of smiles and grace, harboring bigotry almost 
undetectable among their finer manners and gentility.”421 While certainly one could find 
both non-black and black viewers of these images who might presume that an image 
could be “too nice to be about race,” I question whether Weems, a politically-conscious 
collector of black folklore and invested critic of the whiteness of high art, would have 
created a photograph series that intended solely to offer moralistic instruction to 
predominantly white or whiteness-aligned audiences. By imagining, in addition, a black 
or blackness-aligned audience—a set of viewers whose relationship to racism, racist 
memorabilia, and the history of black domestic labor would not be solely complicit but 
also potentially melancholic, resistant, or subversive—the ways of reading the images 
multiply and Weems’ engagement with history becomes less didactic and more 
suggestive, indeterminate, and potentially liberating. Images that might on the surface 
                                                
421 Philip Kennicott, “In Weems’ Photographs, Revelation and Resistance” Washington 
Post, April 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/in-carrie-
mae-weemss-photographs-revelation-and-resistance/2014/04/04/b35795fc-b9b9-11e3-
9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html (accessed June 17, 2015). 
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appear simple—“don’t invite a second look” as Holland Cotter phrased it in the New York 
Times422—come to signify multiple meanings simultaneously, evoking the complicated 
web of sociocultural relationships, historical structures, and directional flows of power 
that underlie their still life composition.  
 Leah Dilworth understands the multiple significations possible for these images 
and for the racist objects they depict. Untitled (With Kitchen Clock), the image with 
which I began this chapter, as well as Untitled (Salt and Pepper) (fig. 1) both offer 
visions of miniature servants—an Aunt Jemima figure in the former and a Mammy and 
Uncle Mose salt-and-pepper set in the second—that Dilworth reminds us “suggest how 
domestic labor, and domesticity itself, are racialized.”423 Where domestic labor might be 
invisible in the traditional bourgeois home, the domestic images in American Icons 
reverse this trope, making the “service objects” visible and erasing the (predominantly 
white) bodies that would benefit from that help. Dilworth notes that in the absence of a 
white employer/owner, “the miniature figures spring to life like toys in a fairy tale.”424 By 
making these racist objects the only humanistic part of the still life, Weems ensures that 
they become a focal point and the location of potential locomotion. For instance, in 
Untitled (Salt and Pepper) (fig. 1), Mammy and Uncle Mose sit on a kitchen counter, 
surrounded by the oversized (by their scale) kitchen utensils and electrical outlet one 
                                                
422 Holland Cotter, “PHOTOGRAPHY VIEW: In Sharp Anecdotal Relief, a Regional 
Tale” New York Times, December 4, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/04/arts/photography-view-in-sharp-anecdotal-relief-a-
regional-tale.html (accessed August 9, 2015) 
423 Leah Dilworth, ed. Acts of Possession: Collecting in America, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers UP, 2003), 256. 
424 Ibid. 
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finds in a typical kitchen. Their eyes are painted and the image is lit such that the 
figurines appear to be glancing warily at a cut cantaloupe to the left of the frame, perhaps 
ready to make a break for it. There is no confusing these objects for natural humans, but, 
as Dilworth notes, Weems’ composition has “imbued these objects with a subversive 
subjectivity.”425 The salt and pepper shakers are clearly objects, and yet in within the 
image, they threaten to come to life.  
 The ability to read these images and the objects they contain in multiple ways 
depends on a more fluid understanding of object-hood and animation than might spring to 
mind at first thought. Susan Stewart’s work on the miniature as cultural form is useful 
here. As discussed above, Weems’ still lifes are unique in that they include miniature 
humanistic figures, rather than just objects of consumption. The inclusion of these 
miniatures troubles the line between still life and tableau, as miniatures threaten to 
transition from “hesitation to action, from the inanimate to the animate”426 as in children’s 
stories about toys that come to life. As Dilworth also argued, the presence of humanistic 
miniatures in the scenes and the choice on Weems’ part to frame the images to their 
miniature scale imbues these still lifes with a potentiality for motion and narrative that 
can be read as subversive, agentive, or perhaps even fugitive. While this threat of 
animation has served a neutral narrative function in fiction and folklore, Stewart 
recognizes that the story of an object coming to life can be a “terror”427 as well, 
                                                
425 Dilworth, Acts of Possesion, 256. 
426 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, 
the Collection, (1984; repr. Durham: Duke UP, 1993), 55. 
427 Ibid., 172. 
 200 
particularly in that one of the comforts of the miniature is that it allows the viewer to take 
in the world from a panoptic perspective without having to engage any of the messiness 
of real human experience. This is why, Stewart notes, miniature scenes or objects so 
often depict nostalgic visions of “the lower classes, peasant life, or the cultural other 
within a timeless and uncontaminable miniature form.”428 For those who take comfort in 
the remove and stillness of a cultural other subjugated into miniature object-hood, the 
threat of the inanimate figure becoming animate produces more fear and anxiety than 
wonder and amusement. Stewart argues that the threat of animation inheres in the 
miniature, however, regardless its affective impact on the viewer. 
 In the 19th century, enslaved persons were also viewed as objects that held the 
potential to animate. William Goodell’s widely cited 1853 pronouncement that “slaves, 
though moveable by their nature, are considered as immovable by the operation of law”429 
illustrates how the legal and natural status of slaves conflicted, dialectically producing a 
form of “immoveable” property that constantly threatened to become animated and take 
flight. Drawing from Antebellum legal history, Stephen M. Best describes one legacy of 
slavery as the creation of “a unique species of ‘living property’—an everyday animism 
that cuts across the founding difference between persons and property.”430 The miniature 
                                                
428 Ibid., 66. 
429 William Goodell, The American slave code in theory and practice: its distinctive 
features shown by its statutes, judicial decisions, and illustrative facts, (New York: 
American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1853). 
430 Stephen Best, The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 2. My emphasis. Best cites this legacy as impacting 
the nature of copyright law and the understanding of legal personhood into the present. 
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mirrors the everyday animism of the slave, in that one is a self-animating object and the 
other is an object that threatens animation, and both can and do exist in the everyday 
sphere of the domestic.  
 Weems draws on the terror/wonder of the miniature’s threat of animation in 
American Icons to complicate a reductive understanding of the history of domestic 
slavery. The miniatures she chooses for her photographs depict racist caricatures 
popularized through minstrelsy and mass-produced in the years following the Civil War 
and into the early 20th century. As discussed above, her staging of these still lifes uses the 
threat of animation to produce the potential for subversive narrative in an otherwise still 
image and to call into question the static nature of object-hood. Most critical responses to 
American Icons understand that Weems wants to point to the history of domestic 
slavery/servitude and to the racialized nature of domestic labor. Often this criticism 
interprets the presence of racist objects as indicative of Weems’ desire to show how black 
persons became “service objects” via the machination of enslavement, which leads to the 
accusations of pure didacticism and moralizing on Weems’ part that I noted above. A 
nuanced reading of these images, however, demands a engagement with the scholarship 
on slavery that treats the slave’s paradoxical status as both person and property and 
analyzes historical affective interactions between domestic slaves and their slaveowners. 
Putting Weems into conversation with this history imbues the images with potential 
subversion or threat, creating space for the possibility that Weems is mapping paths to 
                                                                                                                                            
For my purposes here, I am more interested in his meditations on the legal/natural 
characteristics of the slave. 
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resistance and liberation, rather than just illustrating and condemning a totalizing 
historical formation.431  
 A close reading of an image from the series might clarify this point. In Untitled 
(Salt and Pepper) (fig. 1), Weems’ composition encourages a reading of the image in 
which overdetermined, racist objects threaten to come to life. The objects around the salt-
and-pepper shaker in this photograph further a reading of danger in this image beyond 
just the threat of coming to life. The viewer can see that the cantaloupe has been cut 
cleanly, implying the use of a knife, and yet the kitchen counter holds only spoons, 
ladles, spatulas, and a whisk. The knife itself is a present absence whose effects the 
viewer can see but whose actual form he or she cannot. This imbues the image with a 
sense of mystery: where did the knife go? Does it still exist in this scene but beyond our 
view, or has it truly disappeared?432 This small detail of composition opens up the still-
life image to a panoply of narrative readings, which will differ depending on the set of 
assumptions or understanding of history the viewer brings with him or her to the image.  
 For example, one could read the absence of the knife alongside the inherent threat 
of the miniature as indicative of the idea that the miniatures have hidden the knife or 
know its whereabouts and are masking their plot through the invisibility produced by 
                                                
431 The history of racialized domestic labor extends well beyond the historical end of 
slavery, and even past the end of the Civil Rights Movement. However, because this 
dissertation grounds itself in the historiography of the plantation and the domestic 
relations within the social structures of slavery, I choose here to focus on the relationship 
between these images and this limited historical frame. Future work could certainly 
extend this analysis into the domestic relations of the 20th century. 
432 All credit for bringing this detail to my attention belongs with my seminar group at the 
Futures of American Studies Institute at Dartmouth in June of 2015, in particular Paul 
Fess and Kyessa Moore. 
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stereotype. This reading presents the subversive subjectivity Dilworth describes. 
Alternatively, however, one could also read the look of shock on the faces of the salt and 
pepper in this image as indicative of another subject or force beyond the visual field of 
the photograph who wields the knife. In this reading, their wary glances at the cantaloupe 
might indicate a fear of bodily harm, like the harm done to the cantaloupe itself. Perhaps 
beyond the field of vision the ostensibly absent white domestic inhabitant wields the 
knife to counter the threat of life that inheres in the miniatures. Other readings also 
precipitate from the absent knife—an object of both domestic production and bodily 
violence—and the actual intervention of the image exists in its compositional 
indeterminacy within an equally complicated historical power arrangement.  
 A similar kind of indeterminate threat appears in Untitled (Porter Letter Holder) 
(fig. 2). In this photograph, a letter holder painted to look like a caricatured black luggage 
porter pushing a trunk sits on a desk, backlit by a desk lamp and holding a bus or train 
ticket from the Metropolitan Transit Authority. Because the only light in the scene comes 
from the desk lamp situated behind the letter holder, its square “trunk” creates a long 
shadow in front of the porter. This trick of lighting, combined with the porter’s at least 
temporary possession of a ticket to ride, suggests mobility even in a still scene containing 
only inanimate objects. A different viewer might read this image differently, however. In 
the context of the history of black train porters, mobility does not necessarily equate 
flight or subversion. Train porters moved around, but only with the permission of 
whoever oversaw their work. However, the position of porter still suggests a power—the 
power to move around physically as well as the opportunity to advance socially or 
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economically—that exists equally in both the image and in the history of Pullman 
porters.433 If the sleeper car is a mobile domestic space, the types of power and 
vulnerability that characterize the relationship between black domestic slaves or servants 
and white masters or employers share a likeness to kind of power relationship found 
between the Pullman porters and those upon whom they waited.434 Weems’ image 
provides space for multiple readings—either readings in which the porter performs 
according to racialized expectations or in which he is stealing away with a ticket out. 
Again, the indeterminate composition is where the image does its cultural work. 
 By mobilizing history to animate objects in a still life composition, Weems’ 
images offer a counter-argument to a totalizing narrative that shores up the myth of 
perfect white mastery and overdetermines blackness as a kind of perpetual death or 
objecthood. Her sense of history—that slavery as an institution sought to make persons 
into property and humans into objects, and that it was on some level successful in this 
goal—aligns with the dominant narrative of black or African American studies at the 
present, and her recognition both in American Icons and throughout her oeuvre that the 
                                                
433 The figure of a porter might also be inherently subversive, if seen as a figuration for 
the labor struggles led by A. Phillip Randolph in the early 20th century. Part of the reason 
porters were able to advance economically was because they had already confronted 
capitalist power structures to advocate for better wages and working conditions. For more 
on this see William Harris, Keeping the Faith: A. Phillip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, 
and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-1937, (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1977). 
434 Other professions post-Emancipation engaged in similar power relations. See Douglas 
Walter Bristol, Jr., Knights of the Razor: Black Barbers in Slavery and Freedom 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2009) for a discussion of how black barbers discursively 
rejected the white supremacist logic that intended to belittle them while still performing 
their appropriate racial role. This too is an example of the fugitive indeterminacy I see 
descending from the structure of plantation slavery. 
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violences of the past reverberate into the present aligns her ideologically with the bulk of 
Afro-pessimist thought (and perhaps the bulk of black studies thought writ large as well). 
However, the potential to read these images as subversive suggests that Weems wants to 
raise questions about a narrative of social death that reifies the slave as a totalized 
identity and reifies the power of the master as absolute. Even when blackness is literally 
made into an object—a wall hanging, a letter holder—Weems is able to make that object 
threaten movement, which implies that blackness in human form, even under an 
oppressive system which sought above all else to reduce flesh to body,435 certainly retains 
as much or more agency than a literally inanimate object. Engaging the iconography of 
anti-black racism to stimulate a multiplicity of audience reactions/responses, Weems’ 
photographs explore the possibilities and limitations of seeing the “afterlife of slavery” as 
a condition for life as well as death.  
 However, these images do not have to be read as subversive. In fact, as I 
mentioned above, most critics did not read them as such. In this way, Weems’ images 
prefigure the interpellation of the viewer Sharpe sees at play in the silhouettes of Kara 
Walker. Walker’s provocative silhouettes have been the subject of much writing and 
criticism, both positive and negative, and her installations seem to elicit the ire and 
discomfort of both white and black viewers in equal measure. Sharpe argues that the root 
of this viewer unease is the presence in Walker’s art of a “monstrosity that black and 
                                                
435 Here I use Hortense Spillers’ distinction between flesh (slave as human) and body 
(slave as object) that she lays out in “Mama’s Baby/Papa’s Maybe: An American 
Grammar.” 
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white viewers alike find themselves, perhaps in different ways, participants in.”436 Like 
Weems, Walker conjures the ghost of the monstrous intimacies of enslavement—what 
Sharpe calls the “disfigurations of black survival”437—in which black bodies and persons 
cared for and were violated by white bodies and persons in a network of sociality and 
affect wherein the lines of consent and the boundaries of agency are hard to draw.438 
Sharpe describes Walker’s images as “allegories” for racial violence both in slavery and 
in the present, indicating a project similar to the iconography of racism Weems’ 
photographs accomplish. In both cases, the artists demand audience engagement with the 
image, leaving enough ambiguity in the scene to provoke senses of complicity, revulsion, 
embarrassment, guilt, pleasure, or some combination thereof, in order to call up a cultural 
memory of the messy affective tangle created through the intimate violence of 
enslavement. Both Weems’ and Walker’s images toe the line between pleasure and fear, 
humor and horror, intimating the fraught history of relations between white and black in 
familial, domestic, and otherwise intimate scenes.  
 However, the role of a black female artist in the creation and installation of these 
images and scenes within the predominantly white art world necessarily complicates the 
kind of cultural work they do. Sharpe points out that Walker’s art cannot be read without 
taking into account the way it “circulates among, adorns the walls of, and is in 
conversation most often with the (largely white and largely nonblack) art 
establishment…[and the way] these images traffic in different spaces and produce a 
                                                
436 Sharpe, Monstrous Intimacies, 175. 
437 Ibid., 156. 
438 Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection also makes this point. 
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variety of responses (not to mention subjects).”439 Sharpe imagines both white and black 
audiences for Walker’s work and presumes that each one might feel different sorts of 
vulnerability or shame, or that they both might find themselves complicit in or excited by 
the stereotypical representations of blackness on display.  
 However, Sharpe points out that when white art critics compare Walker’s art to 
the “cakewalk,” they reveal the continuity between historical misrecognition of black 
cultural production by white slave-owners and the present-day misunderstanding of the 
profound and varied work done by Walker’s silhouettes at the hands of white art critics. 
The cakewalk was a form of dance that emerged from slave plantations and eventually 
became part of minstrel shows post-Emancipation. Sharpe notes that the cakewalk carried 
multiple meanings for its varied audiences throughout its history. In its original form, it 
was often compelled by the master, but slaves used the opportunity of these dances to 
mock the lifestyle of their owners. White masters and mistresses, however, watched these 
performances through the lens of racial hierarchy, which masked open mockery as an 
“amusing attempt at sophistication on the parts of their slaves.”440 Sharpe refuses to 
reduce the cakewalk to either a wholly oppressive cultural form or a wholly subversive 
one, arguing instead that this historical formation, like Walker’s art in the present, stages 
a scene in which different audiences, equipped with different knowledges, can and do 
read its meaning differently, while also potentially being made uncomfortable by the 
                                                
439 Ibid., 177. 
440 Nadine George-Graves, The Royalty of Negro Vaudeville: The Whitman Sisters and 
the Negotiation of Race, Gender and Class in African American Theatre, 1900–1940. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) cited in Sharpe, Monstrous Intimacies, 179. 
 208 
paradoxical collusion of subjection and subversion in a particular form or moment. Just 
as white supremacy allowed the mockery of slave owners during the cakewalk by making 
black humanity and culture invisible, so too in the present does white supremacy, through 
its desire to see blackness “rendered transparent,”441 mask the complicated relationship 
between subjection and pleasure—and particularly the role of whiteness in that 
relationship—that Walker’s art explores. Walker’s art might appear to mock its black 
figures, but the presence of white figures within the silhouetted scene points to the source 
of such “disfigurations,” opening the installations to readings that are more critical of 
whiteness than they are of Walker’s black caricatures. Walker’s critics are not wrong that 
her art refigures the cakewalk—as a black artist, she performs in a white space 
ambiguously, allowing white supremacy to mask her critique by rendering her particular 
humanity, and in this case, her artistic genius, invisible or unbelievable.  
 American Icons also engages the indeterminacy of historical relations between 
masters and slaves, but on the plane of threat. Where Walker’s work pushes the viewer to 
recognize their uncomfortable relationship to the tangle of violence and desire stemming 
from the intimate relations of the plantation, Weems portrays that intimate proximity as a 
potential locus of danger for those in power. Returning to Untitled (Salt and Pepper) (fig. 
1), Weems’ composition of the scene and the erasure of the knife could be read, as I 
argued above, as a figure for the invisibility of domestic labor and the threat inherent to 
the present-but-unseen purveyor of meals for white families. The expressions on the salt 
and pepper shakers, however, are ones of shock or perhaps fear, which opens the image 
                                                
441 Sharpe, Monstrous Intimacies, 179. 
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up to an interpretation in which the racist figures fear the master or in which the master is 
wielding the knife. By not answering the question of where the knife is or who wields it, 
Weems references the intimate indeterminacy of power relations within plantation 
households. While the system of slavery (and any scholarship on slavery that indulges its 
claim to totality) located power only with the slaveholders and never with the slave, the 
fact that domestic slaves attended to sick and dying masters and mistresses, as well as 
daily preparing meals, serving meals, and caring for babies and children, means that 
slaves also had access to the vulnerability of their owners and their owners’ families. The 
necessarily intimate relationships produced through domestic slavery both transgressed 
and obeyed the racial boundaries of plantation life, not wholly undermining racial 
hierarchy or the system of violent power that protected and benefitted from it, but 
certainly providing the opportunity for threat—particularly the threat of violence—to run 
both ways in the master/slave relationship.  
 The images clearly engage the history of racialized domestic labor, no matter at 
which reading a viewer arrives. However, it is critically important to understand that 
these objects, despite their overdetermined relationship with historical and contemporary 
racism, maintain the ability to signify on multiple levels, within the artistic context of 
mundane still life. Racist collectibles may have been created to ameliorate white fear and 
provide owners invested in white supremacist ideology with a sense of racial power, but 
as these objects circulate in the world and pass from owner to owner, they might come to 
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mean something different or even to mean multiple things at once.442 Further, when 
placed in an art context, particularly in the genre of still life which has always illuminated 
the social structure of the everyday while also critiquing it, these “American Icons,” like 
Christian iconography for the Dutch, might simultaneously signify both oppression and 
liberation, condemnation and embrace, depending on how the viewer chooses to read 
them. Even more, their indeterminate composition might suggest that even within 
material and historical domestic scenes the images evoke, oppressive power and 
subversive resistance always existed in tension and at play with one another. Rather than 
recognizing white power as total and black subjection as complete, as the didactic 
readings of white critics might suggest they do, these images mark a persistent fear/threat 
within the intimate spaces of domestic life that resists a reading of slave mastery as a 
totalizing or totalized form of power, impervious to resistance. 
                                                
442 Dilworth discusses the complicated meanings of these objects at length: “For a white 
person, obviously, collecting negrobilia could work to reinforce racist thinking and 
feeling: to control and demean a loathed ‘other.’ At the very least the figures suggest the 
fears and desire at work in white Americans’ attitudes toward black Americans, and there 
is a strong element of sadism underlying their comic aspect…These are abject objects, 
designed to remind whites of their own power and the ‘usefulness’ of objectified black 
people. For black people who own or collect these objects, they may represent relics of a 
distant past: it’s safe to collect these things now that that chapter of history is closed. But 
that begat the question of the objects’ appeal. These objects are reminders of how whites 
have imagined, despited, and humiliated black people. For African Americans, a mammy 
salt shaker signifies differently, and the relationship between the collector and the 
collected may become one of redemption. Embracing the objects of subjugation 
reinforces one’s own subjectivity. Like the products of empire that circulate back to the 
colonized communities, these objects have ‘lives’ that reveal the complexity and ongoing 
permutations of the politics of collecting.” See Acts of Possession, 257. 
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SLAVE RESISTANCE AND INDETERMINACY 
 Debates about the nature and impact of slave resistance pepper the historical 
literature on slavery.443 Many of these conversations rotate around the concept of agency, 
and particularly around the possibility for and shape of agency in an ostensibly totalizing 
system. Scholars also debate the nature of resistance itself and what forms of action can 
be counted as resistance, with some scholars arguing that forms of resistance that only 
temporarily disrupt the system cannot be considered true resistance and other scholars 
noting that often these “everyday” forms of resistance weaken systems enough to create 
space for their eventual overturn.444 Regardless of impact, substantial historical evidence 
suggests that slaves did resist power in whatever way they could. While this does not 
necessarily indicate wide-spread, successful, or coordinated resistance, it does point to 
the existence of agency—defined here as the ability to perform effective action to control 
one’s circumstances—even if the strictures of enslavement deeply circumscribed that 
agency. As Damian Alan Paragas reminds us, “Agency should not be confused with 
success.”445 Agency, then, indexes potentiality and possibility rather than outcome—slave 
                                                
443 Beyond Johnson and Glymph, discussed below, see also Hartman, Scenes of 
Subjection; Olwell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects; Ellis and Ginsburg, Cabin, Quarter, 
Plantation; Stephanie Camp, Closer to Freedom. The core canon of plantation 
historiography also touches on resistance. See Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll; Fox-
Genovese, Within the Plantation Household; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone; 
Blassingame, The Slave Community; Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom. 
444 The foremost proponent of everyday resistance as a means of structural or cultural 
change is James C. Scott. See in particular Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance 
and Weapons of the Weak. Olwell (previous note) and Tavia Nyong’o’s The 
Amalgamation Waltz: Race, Performance, and the Ruses of Memory (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009) see subtle resistance as less threatening and more in 
keeping with the Bahktinian carnival, in that it subverts the hierarchy only to reaffirm it. 
445 Pargas, The Quarters and the Fields, 8. 
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agency exists in the lacunas of slaveholder power and provides only opportunity. 
Agentive action on the part of slaves or any other subordinated/oppressed group or 
individual is always at best a gambit, but evidence suggests that such action did occur 
with mixed results throughout the temporal and spatial span of American slavery.446  
 Walter Johnson’s Soul By Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market offers an 
early and important description of slave agency in the historiography. Focusing on the 
New Orleans slave market in particular rather than offering a sweeping description of 
slavery as a whole, Johnson is able to locate agentive moments that exist not in spite of 
but because of the dual status afforded to slaves within the economic system of slavery. 
Johnson conceives of the moment of sale as a complicated interaction between multiple 
competing interests: that of the slave trader, that of the slave owner, that of the slave 
buyer, and that of the slave him- or herself. Each of these interests had to negotiate a 
relationship to the enslaved as both person and as property. Slave traders coached slaves 
on how to perform for best sale, while also sorting slaves into categories based on the 
character traits they held that might make them more salable. Slave buyers attempted to 
glean information about slave personality and behavior from the slaves themselves in an 
attempt to undermine the power of the slave trader’s narrative. Slaves used conversations 
overheard amid the market and gossip spread within the slave pens to exert some choice 
over where they might end up living and to keep their families together or as close as 
                                                
446 I would add that it is important to think about slave agency as well because ignoring 
the tears in the fabric of power through which such action can occur precludes the ability 
of people in the present to locate, step through, and enlarge similar tears in present power 
structures. This idea speaks to my larger claim in this dissertation that the history of 
slavery offers maps to freedom as much as it describes a perpetual violence. 
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possible. At the core of Johnson’s argument is the idea that the moment of sale in large 
part relied on the slaves’ willingness to perform according to expectations, or to “act as 
they had been advertised to be.”447 While the threat of violence and social dispossession 
loomed large in the slave market, vastly circumscribing slave agency, it remains true that 
both slave traders and slave buyers necessarily had to consider the humanity of enslaved 
people—both in terms of salable properties related to personality and in terms of the 
ability to resist coercion by acting disingenuously—when enacting slave sales. A 
misunderstanding or misreading of this humanity, or the manipulation of expectations on 
the part of the enslaved, at times even led to escape for certain brave or opportunistic 
slaves. In the space between person and property within the being of the slave existed the 
possibility of manipulation of the system of value that determined where a slave might 
end up. 
 Johnson’s detailed descriptions of the “mutual sighting”448 of the slave market 
resonate with Weems’ subtle subversion in American Icons. Johnson states that in the 
moment of sale, “the slave traders’ carefully choreographed pageants were being 
interrupted by slaves’ unruly subjectivity.”449 Indeed, it is this unruly subjectivity, or as 
Dilworth called it, a “subversive subjectivity,” that disrupts the ordinary in Weems’ 
                                                
447 Johnson, Soul by Soul, 16. 
448 I borrow this term from Alessandro Portelli, who uses it to describe the negotiations 
between interviewer and interviewee in oral history collections. I find the term useful for 
describing any situation in which it could be argued that one party has control over 
knowledge or information dissemination when really all parties involved have some sort 
of power to affect the outcome and production of knowledge. See Alessandro Portelli, 
The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991). 
449 Johnson, Soul by Soul, 162. 
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images. Weems evokes the memory of this subjectivity in service of the uncanny 
sensation her photographs produce. Freud defined the uncanny as “something repressed 
which recurs,”450 or something frightening that exists within the heart of the familiar. The 
unruly subjectivity of ostensibly objectified enslaved people fits both definitions—it was 
both a repressed knowledge that appeared time and again through everyday resistance, 
flight, or revolt, as well as being something frightening that existed within the familiar, 
particularly in the case of slaves working in domestic spaces. This subjectivity is further 
repressed through the creation of objects like the miniatures features in American Icons 
and the discursive stereotypes that inform them. Weems’ images then call on a doubly-
repressed, doubly-revealed slave subjectivity, eliciting a sense of the uncanny for those to 
whom the history is familiar and legible.  
 Additionally, Johnson notes that the moment of sale did not exist as one thing, but 
rather “like a web of unforeseen connections, the morphology of a sale depended upon 
the point of departure,”451 which is to say that each person—slave or free—involved in 
the sale necessarily saw the interaction differently. Much like the fugitive homes 
described throughout this dissertation, slaves who were aware of multiple systems of 
meaning could readily hide what they most valued from both slave trader and slave buyer 
via a manipulation of visible signs. Performances of acquiescence could mask resistance, 
but well-trained slave traders or slave buyers could potentially see through the 
performance as well. This multiplicity of meanings and significations also resonates with 
                                                
450 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003): 147. 
451 Johnson, Soul by Soul, 14. 
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Weems’ images. One of Johnson’s major interventions in the historiography of slavery is 
the assertion that the condition of slave was not static but rather shifted depending on 
context, due to forces both internal and external to the person reduced to that status 
through the institution of slavery. Similarly, Weems’ photographs register multiple 
meanings depending on how a particular viewer reads both the object and context of the 
photograph. Her ability to produce an image with layered meaning draws on a history of 
the layered interactions between enslaved persons and their owners, buyers, traders, and 
spatial contexts. Depending on the viewer’s “point of departure,” the interaction between 
the miniature and the domestic space which surrounds it in each image might look 
different—for some uncanny, for some didactic, for some enticingly imbued with the 
potential for resistance.452 The reception of the image depends on the system of signs 
through which a viewer understands what he or she is seeing, just as slave bodies were 
themselves once read through a network of competing significations.  
 Thavolia Glymph’s work on domestic slavery, discussed at length in the first 
chapter of this dissertation, further supports a deeper reading of Weems’ images than 
most art criticism has allowed. Where Johnson’s text examines the slave market, a scene 
somewhat removed from the everyday domestic spaces of the plantation, Glymph’s text 
focuses the interactions between domestic slaves and mistresses within ordinary domestic 
scenes. At the core of Glymph’s argument lies the paradox of white Southern domestic 
                                                
452 As with Kara Walker, these images could also be read as humorous. However, the 
scope of this project limits my ability to delve into the fraught and well-studied 
relationship between subversion and humor. For a reading of the grotesque humor of 
Walker’s silhouettes, see chapter four of Glenda Carpio’s Laughing Fit to Kill: Black 
Humor in the Fictions of Slavery, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). 
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ideology: “To function and to meet the standards of domesticity, the plantation household 
required the labor of enslaved women…At the same time, it required negative 
representations of enslaved women and their labor…to deny them consideration as 
anything more than tools of the civilizing mission.”453 White Southern domestic ideology 
held women to the same standard of domesticity as in the North, but social and economic 
structures of the South forced (or allowed) Southern women in the Antebellum years to 
rely on enslaved workers, who, as Best and Johnson have pointed out, were discursively 
and culturally “objects” but retained the human ability to act up and resist power in 
limited ways. In the lead up to war, slaves began to test the boundaries of their 
objecthood as they grew to realize that the system which defined them as such was being 
challenged.  
 According to Glymph, slaves saw the plantation household itself as a key space in 
which to contest their slave status and the ideologies that supported the system of slavery. 
Domestic slaves in particular understood the house to be the “space where the ideology of 
south white womanhood was constructed and reproduced through the labor and 
denigration of black women.”454 Because of this, the destruction of the plantation 
household stood central to imaginations of freedom on the part of the enslaved. Through 
this argument, Glymph’s text offers evidence that runs counter to the depiction of 
domestic slaves as people who “did their job, knew their place, and, after slavery, 
                                                
453 Gymph, Out of the House of Bondage, 65. 
454 Ibid., 136. 
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remembered the plantation mistress and her household fondly,”455 with a particular eye 
toward unraveling the Mammy mythos. Glymph describes the household as being another 
front of the Civil War, noting that “household slaves were the first to make trouble”456 
when rumors of war began to circulate. Domestic slaves “became more firmly committed 
to the destruction of the plantation household” as the possibilities and means of resistance 
began to open up to them during the cultural upheaval of the lead-up to war, in part 
because they had already been resisting the will of the mistress in subtle ways for 
years.457 Historically, then, Glymph illustrates how domestic space had been and 
remained a site of contested meaning, both of the dominant ideologies of slavery and of 
persons who resisted their objectified status. While Glymph’s text has no shortage of 
examples of the violent punishments meted out by mistresses, the ideological acrobatics 
in which mistresses had to engage to justify both their “unladylike” violence and the 
humanity of their slaves reflect the inability of slavery to totally reduce persons into 
                                                
455 Ibid., 100. 
456 Glymph, Out of the House of Bondage, 100. Here Glymph uses “household slaves” 
while I have used “domestic slaves” throughout the chapter. I choose to use “domestic 
slaves” in an attempt to mark those who worked in/near the “Big House” without 
negating the fact that the plantation household ideologically encompassed the whole of 
the master’s property. Under the contemporary definition of “household,” all the slaves 
would have been household slaves. Glymph and I mean the same thing by these two 
terms, however. 
457 Camp’s Closer to Freedom offers additional examples of how slave women resisted 
power through everyday means. I use James Scott’s description of “hidden transcripts” to 
understand how these everyday forms of resistance eventually lead to more wide-spread 
and public revolt or refusal by preparing people to seize power when even a small 
opening occurs. For more information see Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance. 
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objects, or even into the bounded category of slave.458 Domestic slaves were aware of 
their role in the production of white Southern womanhood and used that small bit of 
power to manipulate circumstances to their advantage, both before but especially during 
and after the Civil War.  
 Glymph’s text also indexes the anxiety that stemmed from mistresses’ necessary 
reliance on enslaved workers to produce domestic space and to thereby sustain their 
gendered identity.459 Glymph finds fear of slave resistance couched in terms of 
“behavior” issues in the writings of slave masters and mistresses, but notes that in light of 
the “warring intimacy”460 that characterized the relations between the slaveholding family 
and the slaves that populated domestic space, the language of behavior must be 
understood to mask deeper fears about loss of authority or perhaps even life. Rather than 
acknowledging the real possibility or presence of slave resistance which would could call 
into question numerous ideologies that shored up the institution of slavery, mistresses in 
particular complained about the unwillingness or inability of slaves to behave as they 
should, mistaking intentional resistance to work for an incompetence on the part of 
domestic slaves. The resistance of domestic slaves, who cared for white infants and often 
slept in the same room or even the same bed as their owners, demanded ideological 
                                                
458 I am reminded again of Hortense Spillers’ contention that there “never was a Slave.” 
See the introduction to this dissertation. 
459 Men experienced similar anxieties related to manhood, in that manhood required 
completely control of slaves without violence—manhood relied on slave complicity in 
the system of oppression itself. Therefore, any resistance to the power of the master 
threatened to undermine the master’s power in all spheres of life, as his peers would 
cease to see him as fully enjoying his manhood. For more on that, see Intimacy and 
Power in the Old South. 
460 Glymph, Out of the House of Bondage, 37. 
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constructions that painted black persons as inherently incompetent or incapable of proper 
domesticity. This rhetoric masked the threatening knowledge that slaves were not totally 
subordinated human-objects but rather retained an agency that could be mobilized against 
the slaveholding family at any opportune time. Reading the archive against the grain, 
complaints about slave behavior reveal the existence of an invisible anxiety on the part of 
the mistress, whose life, sense of self, and ability to perform femininity relied 
(precariously) on the complicity of black women.461  
 Both Glymph and Johnson do the important work of animating the concept of 
“agency,” which too often also becomes overdetermined in its own right. Rather than 
resolving “agency” into an absolute relationship of intention and event and thereby 
ignoring the fact that in a lived reality no action guarantees result, these texts discuss 
agency as a function of both limitations to and possibilities for power suffered or enjoyed 
by the enslaved. As I said above, agency is always a gambit for those subjected to the 
power of another person, system, or entity. The failure of agency to produce a desired 
outcome does not negate its presence, however, and the presence of agency among the 
disempowered still can precipitate anxiety on the part of the powerful. The undercurrent 
of agency running through domestic relationships that demand vulnerability of those who 
hold the power certainly suggests a potential for threat and anxiety, regardless what 
actions or events actually transpire. 
                                                
461 For additional discussion of this rhetorical and discursive masking of resistance, see 
Ch. 1. 
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 The images in American Icons then play with this history of slaveholder 
anxiety/vulnerability and slave resistance/agency to hint at the threat or risk inherent in a 
domesticity sustained by enslaved or subordinated labor. Weems’ wider oeuvre supports 
this reading, in that many of Weems’ installations and exhibitions have featured both 
images of domestic objects or domestic objects themselves, imbued with the history of 
slave violence or annotated with captions referencing the long history of racial inequality, 
indignity, and terror that haunts Western modernity. In particular, the collection And 22 
Million Very Tired and Very Angry People (1989-1990) features images of ordinary 
objects, shot in sepia tones and captioned evocatively. For example, a shot of the globe, 
centered on the Atlantic Ocean, is captioned “A Hot Spot in a Corrupt World,” 
referencing the Middle Passage and the African slave trade. Later in the series, a shot of a 
hammer and a shot of a sickle hang next to one another, each labelled accordingly, a 
reference to the symbols of communism. At the end of the series, a picture of a rolling 
pin, parallel to the bottom of the frame against an empty background, reads, “By Any 
Means Necessary.” Here, Weems directly connects the tools of domesticity—a rolling 
pin, common to many kitchens—to the rhetoric of revolution spoken by Malcolm X in 
the heat of the Civil Rights Movement. Weems suggests with this image that the tools of 
revolution need not be solely masculinist and once again calls on the history of domestic 
resistance to assert the primacy of women to the movements opposing the oppression and 
subjugation of black people in the U.S. In light of these other domestic engagements, it 
becomes more difficult to read American Icons as scolding or shaming, reproducing a 
reductive view of domestic history to the end of moralizing for a white audience. Rather, 
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these images all appear imbued with threat and potential, with a history of resistance that 
could invoke the uncanny, fear, hope, inspiration, or anger, in addition to its obvious 
elicitation of white shame.  
ICONOLOGY AND ABJECTION 
 The title of the series—American Icons—points to the need to read these images 
in the context of iconography or iconology, both of which are art historical 
methodologies that interpret artwork through the recognition and cataloging of shared 
cultural symbols that appear in various works. Iconography in the 19th century developed 
visual lexicons that identified and cataloged the encoded subject matter and themes of 
painting and other artworks, and iconology in the 20th century then used that classificatory 
system as a means of analyzing the cultural or social content and meaning of works of 
art. Iconography and iconology, in their reliance on classification and data collection as 
means to uncover deeper or hidden sociocultural truths, clearly descend from the same 
epistemological paradigm as the racial classification and eugenicist programs Weems has 
critiqued in her other collections. In choosing to call this series American Icons, Weems 
indicates that the repeated visual content or theme of “America” has often been these 
stereotypical and racist images of blackness that work on multiple levels to distance 
blackness from the categories of both human and national citizen, to confirm the 
goodness of the institutions of slavery and segregation, and to confirm the whiteness and 
therefore the humanity of those who can own and gaze at these kinds of black images.  
 The iconographical classification of an object, however, rarely reflects the face-
value meaning of it. Rather, iconography seeks objects that evoke mythologies through 
 222 
their repeated associations with the figures/characters or events that form the content of 
myth. By calling the caricatures in these images “icons,” Weems implicitly notes that 
they do not reflect a reality so much as they call up a myth or a mythology. This series 
indexes an American iconography, in which repeated caricatures of black people both 
create and reflect a cultural mythology of slavery/enslavement and black life post-
emancipation.  
 As I mentioned earlier, the racist caricatures that populate American Icons grew 
out of Old South nostalgia during the Reconstruction and, following that, in the Jim Crow 
Era. Many of these caricatures have their root in blackface minstrelsy, where Eric Lott 
has argued both whiteness and blackness as cultural identities, as well as the boundary 
between them, became defined through the process of transgression and reinforcement.462 
The wide use and troping of particular racist caricatures in minstrelsy reflects a desire on 
the part of white audiences to see comforting images of happy and unthreatening slaves 
both during the era of slavery and following its end. Lott reminds us, however, that these 
characters and their cultural work was not static but rather reflected the dynamism of 
racial identity formation. In minstrelsy, these characters grew out of Southern depictions 
of slavery but circulated primarily in the north,463 indicating the cross-regional flows of 
culture that produced the ideology of race in the U.S. and its corollary forms of racism. 
Despite the dynamism of this process of racial definition and codification, however, it did 
                                                
462 Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1993). 
463 Indeed, one of Lott’s primary interventions is his location of this “theatrical practice” 
in the north rather than the south, while still allowing that the practice “ultimately 
depended on the material relations of slavery.” See Love and Theft, 4. 
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in the end create a set of overdetermined and flattened caricatures that had, and continue 
to have, a long cultural life.  
 These flat characters, then, index the American iconography to which Weems’ 
title refers. Racist caricatures reflect and reinforce the mythologies that shored up the 
system of slavery and other descendant systems of racial inequality—the myth that racial 
categories are natural rather than culturally constructed, the myth of black inferiority, the 
myth of slavery’s benevolence. Because slavery is so central to the development of the 
American national project and American conceptions of freedom,464 and because these 
caricatures became solidified within cross-regional culture flows, these racial icons 
reference not just a Southern mythos but one of the foundational national myths that girds 
the whole of American culture. In the same way that Christian or Roman iconography 
indexed prevalent European epistemologies that could then be decoded and used to better 
understand the cultures they reflected, Weems offers this American iconography to 
uncover the racial epistemologies that were disrupted but also masked by the gains of the 
Civil Rights Movement, and which remain foundational to American politics and culture.  
 The myth of black inferiority that these objects reflect justified the oppressions of 
slavery and shaped the reality of both white and black Americans. The western 
investment in rational epistemologies and scientific methods often masks the impact of 
mythology on social and cultural development in the U.S. However, the development of 
eugenics—the rationalizing of racism into a pseudo-science—indicates that the myth of 
                                                
464 See Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial 
Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975). 
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black inferiority held such power that it shifted the course of even those strains of thought 
that imagine themselves to be objective and immune to mythologizing.465 This ideological 
complex comes to influence how both white and black people see others and see 
themselves—a distance from these debased depictions of black life shores up white 
identity, while black people must grapple with the vast chasm between how they are seen 
by others and how they see themselves.466 White people further use this mythos to justify 
unequal treatment of white and black persons, both during the time of the slave system 
and after its historical end. Southern apologists argue for the benevolence of slavery and 
the contentment of slaves within that system using the cultural content of these myths; 
Northerners invest in segregation and discriminatory hiring because of the racial beliefs 
these myths communicate. A whole host of cultural practices and beliefs descend from 
the myth that racial categories and racial hierarchies are the product of natural selection 
rather than social engineering.  
 The stereotypes that reflect these myths also serve to make black persons 
invisible. As Hortense Spillers articulates, the machinations of racism create stereotypes 
“so loaded with mythical prepossession that there is no easy way for the agents buried 
                                                
465 The codification of black inferiority into law traced by critical race theorists like 
Kimberlé Crenshaw also evinces the power of these mythologies. Law is another sphere 
that imagines itself objective and yet propagated and reified these ideological formations. 
See also  Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and 
the Making of Modern Urban America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010). 
466 W.E.B. DuBois’ conception of the “veil” in Souls of Black Folk is of course the most 
often cited discussion of this double consciousness, but Franz Fanon’s essay “The Fact of 
Blackness” in Black Skin, White Masks also touches on this idea. 
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beneath them to come clean.”467 Spillers describes an overdetermination that leaves no 
room for the existence of a black self, a fiction that engulfs anything human that might 
lay beneath it. Christina Sharpe notes the historical/material existence of black female 
domestic slaves and connects their historical existence to the propagation of the Mammy 
figure, but sees these stereotypes as empty rather than the site of a submerged selfhood. 
She states that “for the viewer [the Mammy figure] is an(other) indicator of desire and its 
absence, a placeholder, a cipher.”468 For Sharpe, Mammy might “circulate widely” but 
she “remains invisible nonetheless.”469 This is the paradox of these stereotypes: they 
render black selves invisible or impossible while overdetermining black bodies and 
forcing them into hypervisible realms of existence.  
 This mythology and its material effects resonate with the forms of home present 
in plantation slavery. As discussed in the first chapter, ideological constructions that 
erased or masked the potential for slave resistance formed a major part of the slave-
master’s dominion, while also providing the enslaved with an imaginary in which to hide 
themselves. These discursive formations provided a means of repressing a recognition of 
slave humanity that ameliorated white fear and guilt. Sharpe calls the sensation 
experienced when confronting these stereotypes an “uncanny pleasure,” which she argues 
stems from their repressive function—they work to limit the possibility of black selfhood 
but also disguise the presence of a perhaps (or likely) very angry or very unwilling 
human being within the discursive or legal object. It is fitting, then, that this repressive 
                                                
467 Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” 64. 
468 Sharpe, Monstrous Intimacies, 160. 
469 Ibid., 161. 
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mythology descends from practices of home. In Freud’s canonical essay on the uncanny, 
referenced previously, he analyses the etymology of the German word unheimlich, 
meaning uncanny, the root of which is heimlich, meaning homey or comfortable. Freud 
argues that this etymology evinces a deep linguistic connection between the uncanny and 
the domestic. The racial mythology that masks slave humanity and the corollary 
possibility of slave resistance is no exception.  A viewer aware of the racial mythology 
these stereotypes reflect experiences an uncanny sensation, as the black humanity 
repressed through the machinations of the home subtly threatens to (re)appear.  
 American Icons inhabits the possibility and threat of that uncanny discursive 
space. Without negating the denigrative effects of these stereotypes on black persons, 
Weems’ photographs extend the possibility that the invisibility that these stereotypes 
produce can also mask (fugitive) forms of life that exist beyond-but-within oppressive 
systems.470 The uncanny pleasure of these stereotypes derives from the repressed 
historical fact of black humanity, even within the systems of enslavement that intended to 
exterminate it. Despite (or perhaps because of) the extensive rhetorical, physical, 
discursive, and legal efforts to deny personhood to black slaves, white slave owners 
remained (at least subconsciously if not consciously) aware of the possibility of 
resistance, retaliation, and flight on the part of their still-human property. The threat of 
action and the threat of a returning awareness of one’s complicity in unwarranted, 
                                                
470 My argument here about the function and possibility of stereotype is similar to the 
move I see Ellison making with the character of Mary in Invisible Man. See Chapter 
Two. 
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immoral oppression both summon an uncanny sensation when some event or image 
offers a reminder.  
 The American iconography that Weems’ series invokes and describes is not a 
static system of categorization then, but rather, indexes to multiple systems of meaning—
this singular iconography informs multiple iconologies. Prismatically, Weems’ 
composition of scenes around these static, overdetermined objects allows viewers with 
different relationships to the stereotypes these objects materialize to read the narrative of 
the image differently, bringing their own sense of limitation or possibility for such 
reductive or oppressive ideas and objects to bear on their understanding of the image. 
Much of the criticism of these images, then, has been limited by the inability of 
(particularly white) critics to see the iconography of these domestic scenes from different 
vantage points or to think about how the racist objects the scenes contain might circulate 
beyond the (predominantly white) world of fine art. Weems’ images are not inherently 
subversive but offer the possibility of a subversive reading, just as they are not inherently 
didactic but can be read as condemning a history. The power of this artwork lies in its 
ability to signify on multiple levels simultaneously, to be both oppressive and liberating, 
to offer the kind of paradoxical freedom that inheres in the fugitive strategies of black 
life.  
 Weems’ intentional engagement of indeterminacy indicates a desire to produce 
images that trouble a reductive understanding of racialized power. In this way, her project 
seeks a similar end to the theoretical work undertaken in Darieck Scott’s Extravagant 
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Abjection. Scott’s stated objective is to “trouble the notion of power”471 itself by thinking 
about how even the terms on which non-dominant people engage in struggle are 
determined by the “ego-dependent, ego-centric (and masculine and white) ‘I’ definitions 
we have of power.”472 In Scott’s argument, indeterminacy disrupts the totalized and 
unidirectional kind of power generally considered to be present in racialized interactions. 
While he is careful not to equate indeterminacy with power per se, he does push for the 
possibility that a plurality of power(s) could exist and that one need not seek the kind of 
domination enacted by those who presently hold power in order to find oneself 
empowered and/or free. For Scott, indeterminacy induces recognition of potentialities and 
capabilities for resistance, empowerment, and freedom that might otherwise be missed or 
forgotten by those seeking similar goals through traditional masculinist/nationalist 
political routes. Noting the limitations of such politics, Scott’s project seeks a route 
through oppression that might not appear so prominently on the oppressor’s map.  
 By composing indeterminate scenes using overdetermined objects, Weems 
gestures to a similar desire to disrupt dominant conceptions of power through the 
assertion that positions of abjection—of the kind of alienation from the self which use-
objects like those in the images signify or elicit—might hold the potentiality of threat 
despite their apparent deadness. Weems’ images suggest the animation of objects through 
the evocation of both a narrative indeterminacy within the image itself and a history of 
intimate indeterminacy within domestic space more broadly. Weems does not alter the 
                                                
471 Darieck Scott, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African 
American Literary Imagination, (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 23. 
472 Ibid. 
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construction of the figures, nor does she situate the objects in such a way that their threat 
is explicit or unavoidable. Rather, the locus of threat in the images is the indeterminacy 
of their composition itself—the threat is not of recognizable action but of invisible 
subversion, the slow assault on power performed by those with lots of time and little to 
lose. Weems and Scott both grapple with the animating tension of Afro-pessimist theories 
of black life: if blackness emerges from and remains in the condition of social death, an 
abject, “generally dishonored”473 position, then can black social life even exist? However, 
in seeking the potentialities or structures of black life that are present in abjection or 
social death, scholarship runs the risk of either valorizing perpetual violence or negating 
the very real material and ideological shifts regarding blackness and black people that 
have occurred in the years since Emancipation. Weems and Scott make space for this 
tension through an invocation of indeterminacy—they suggest possibilities for the 
disruption or redefinition of power by refusing to view power as something absolute, 
permanent, or dependent on the recognition of others. They undermine the ideological 
foundation of white supremacist, masculinist domination by calling into question the 
legitimacy of its epistemologies of power.  
 The indeterminate space which Weems’ images makes visual calls to mind Fred 
Moten’s desire to “linger in, rather than jump over, the gap between fact and lived 
experience”474 in “The Case of Blackness,” which he suggests will help illuminate “the 
                                                
473 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 13. 
474 Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 180. 
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ontological difference between being and beings.”475 Referencing the Fanonian “fact of 
blackness,” Moten’s essay questions how the lived experience of blackness might 
complicate the Afro-pessimist assertion of its ontological impossibility, or how lived 
experience might demand Afro-pessimism refine the terms of its argument. In turn, Jared 
Sexton in “The Social Life of Social Death” argues that Moten himself has 
misunderstood the terms in which Afro-pessimism makes its claims, converting 
“impossibility into prohibition.”476 Rather, Sexton argues that to say black life is 
impossible within Western modernity as a ideological, social, and cultural construct does 
not necessarily prohibit black life from existing. For Sexton, this paradox and the tension 
that descends from it marks the contribution of Afro-pessimist lines of theory to black 
studies, and this tension need not be resolved for the discussion to be useful to the field. 
Both Moten and Sexton inhabit a similar discursive space to the images in American 
Icons, holding in tension ontological deadness of black being and the possibility of 
fugitive motion for black beings. The impossibility of black life does not prohibit its 
existence but rather hides its presence, which can be both violence and potentiality 
simultaneously, in turn, and in tandem.  
 Weems’ images map the location of historical possibilities of resistance and 
subversion by illustrating the indeterminacy of power relations within the mundane 
domesticity created or sustained through enslaved labor. Her images resist the reification 
of slave women and men as docile human-objects or of mastery as a total form of power, 
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as well as extrapolating those complicated intimate relations beyond the historical 
boundary of slavery. By doing so, her work takes up the important political project of 
seeking forms of resistance and freedom that do not rely on the capture of mastery or the 
enjoyment of forms of power defined and controlled by those who seek the domination of 
others. Rather, Weems’ images signify on a violent and painful history, suggesting threat, 
play, and uncanniness by animating an ostensibly static set of racialized images. By 
refusing to allow even the most overdetermined and hollow depictions of black life to 
remain still in her still-lifes, Weems seeks a source of resistance and freedom hidden 
within historical and material abjection.  
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Figure 1. Carrie Mae Weems. Untitled (Salt and Pepper), 1988-1989 from American 
Icons. © Carrie Mae Weems 
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Figure 2. Carrie Mae Weems. Untitled (Porter Letter Holder), 1988-1989 from American 
Icons © Carrie Mae Weems 
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Conclusion 
 
 At the time of writing, Barack Obama’s historic presidency is drawing to a close. 
I began graduate school just months before Obama’s election, meaning that my graduate 
career has been spent watching the U.S. react to this hypervisible marker of black 
ascension. The covert and overt racism with which the president has been met and the 
rise of right-wing populists in the primaries for the 2016 election all signal the profound 
disruption to the perceived order of things that occurred when a black man moved into 
the White House. However, that a black man could inhabit the White House—a house 
both literally and figuratively built upon the labor of slaves—indicates the measured 
success of 20th century movements for racially-inclusive democracy and black civil rights.  
 The paradox evinced by the tenure of Obama’s presidency—the profound hope 
proffered by the presence of a man with dark skin in the position he occupies alongside 
an increasing public awareness of perpetual anti-black violence—reveals its roots in the 
changing relationship of black artists and writers to fugitive homes over the course of the 
20th century. How the authors and artists in this dissertation use fugitive strategies for 
home-making suggests how they can gain efficacy—at least psychically, since the novels 
cannot reveal real-world uses of these strategies—as the ideologies that shore up and 
attach to dominion find their cultural centrality at risk. This is not to say that white 
supremacy, patriarchy, or property ownership have ceased to be central pillars of 
American social structure, but if we have a black president with a feminist wife, their 
relationship to one another has certainly changed.  
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 White supremacy and patriarchy faced major blows during the cultural shifts of 
the 1960s and 1970s, and property ownership for the middle-class may still be an ideal 
but became less and less possible following the economic downturn and 
deindustrialization of the country in the 1970s and 1980s. The housing crisis of 2008 also 
undermined the promise of the American Dream of home and business ownership in a 
way that has not yet been resolved. It remains difficult to discern, however, whether 
attachment to these ideals is any less strong for those who still have the most to gain from 
the structures of dominion. The connection between these three interlocking ideologies of 
oppression found re-articulation in political and social responses to both economic crisis 
and Obama’s presidency. For example, Donald Trump’s slogan “Make America Great 
Again” invokes an amorphous nostalgia for some ideal and now nearly-lost version of 
America, and its lack of specificity allows any disaffected voter who believes America 
used to be greater to attach themselves to its promise. For some, it invokes the 
reimagined, white-washed version of mid-century America popularized by Ronald 
Reagan and his supporters, while for others it might invoke the conservative victories this 
imaginary itself spawned in the 1980s.477 In any case, the demographics of his base 
remind us that when facing the loss of economic security, white men and white women 
who benefit from their dominance reinvest in outmoded social ideologies in their 
attempts to ameliorate precarity. However, the profound anxiety of the present moment 
belies the promise of the structures of dominion to make anything great again, let alone 
                                                
477 It is worth noting that Reagan’s reimagining of the 1950s as a time of stability, 
strength, and national unity erases the racial strife Ellison recorded, as well as the work of 
the women activists discussed in McGuire, At the Dark End of the Street. 
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all of America. Lauren Berlant’s idea of cruel optimism is born of the present moment, 
because optimism in this moment becomes increasingly cruel.  
 This cruelness of optimism in this moment does not simply resonate with Donald 
Trump’s predominantly white, male, and working-class supporters; it provokes the debate 
around Afro-pessimism, as well. Where historically dominant groups in America worry 
at the loss of their power, black Americans and black studies scholars worry at the 
persistence of institutional structures of oppression in the face of social change. While 
much of the scholarship Wilderson names as Afro-pessimist appears prior to 2008, the 
naming of the trend and the debates around its central provocation appear a few years 
after Obama’s election. The election of America’s first black president precipitated a 
bevy of articles about “post-racialism,” a fallacious argument on the part of 
predominantly white writers that Obama’s election should signal the end of conversations 
about racism and racial inequality in the U.S. In response, black people in America—
writers, scholars, and citizens—began the project of illuminating the locations where 
anti-black violence and sentiment persisted despite growing social equality. Afro-
pessimism, which at core argues for the inability of western modernity to ever truly 
incorporate blackness, represents the radical scholarly wing of this impulse. Obama’s 
election signaled the failure of a promise made to black America—that political 
ascendancy, respectability, and democratic inclusion might limit the ability of the 
American State to kill black humans with impunity.  
 Born of this moment of disillusionment, however, have been cultural and 
scholarly productions which seek possibility in new and unexpected places. In response 
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to Afro-pessimism, canonical black studies scholars began the project of mining a theory 
of black optimism from the shared recognition that perhaps the structure of the world 
could not radically change via institutional means. Kendrick Lamar writes songs that 
radically affirm black self-love, address the grammatical gap between poor and middle-
class black Americans, and argue that surviving a history of racial oppression can buoy a 
sense that “we gon’ be alright.”478 The Black Lives Matter movement advances a rhetoric 
that makes black life central to its claims, eschewing the language of structural rights in 
an effort to produce a cultural shift. As this dissertation shows, such productions have 
their root in very old practices, but these practices gain primacy in this particular 
moment. The symbolic ascent of a black man into the position of dominion over the 
nation, and the failure of this ascension to drastically alter black lives writ large in the 
present, suggests that perhaps seeking dominion offers less freedom and protection than it 
promises. 
 This dissertation reveals two things: the long historical window in which black 
Americans attempted to use the strategies of home-based resistance that inhere in 
plantation slavery to experience freedom and thriving, and the shifting conception of the 
                                                
478 In the album version of “i,” Lamar includes a recording of a poem after the end of the 
song in which he re-writes the history of the n-word and directly addresses Oprah’s 
discomfort with his using it. He makes the argument that his use of the term descends 
from its African meaning, in which it would have indicated a kind of royalty. Although 
this neo-pan-Africanism may have its own limitations, he speaks across a gap in black 
culture with intentionality, and his revisionist linguistics seem in keep with a project of 
black optimism. This quote comes from “Alright,” the chorus of which references the 
long history of black oppression (“We’ve been hurt, been down before”) and the presence 
of police violence (“We hate po-po, wanna kill us dead in the street for sure”), but ends 
on the hopeful note cited here. 
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possibilities and limitations of strategies born out of oppression to produce legitimate 
freedom. The historical organization of this document reflects my desire to show both 
continuity and change—although the archetypes, formations, and strategies I describe 
persist throughout the 20th century and into the present, different historical moments 
represent and use them differently. This fact alone troubles Wilderson’s totalizing frame 
for racial categories and relations, but it does not serve to wholly undermine his central 
assertion that the violence at the foundation of western modernity continues to haunt its 
cultural productions. This document, however, productively animates the tension between 
Wilderson’s provocation and the desire of black thinkers to refuse his negation of black 
humanity within western social constructs.  
 The preceding chapters lay out a historical trajectory away from a lived 
experience of slavery and toward a post-Civil Rights reimagining of it. As writers and 
artists move further from slavery historically, it becomes less a material reality and more 
an object of theory. The oppressive realities of slavery and its aftermath cloud Ellison’s 
ability to embrace the fugitive home as an unambiguous source of liberation, but as this 
project moves through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it sees writers and artists like 
Morrison and Weems becoming more able to dig for the resistant histories hidden 
beneath the violence. Moten and Harney, writing in the present, speak openly about 
fugitive strategy, and their work circulates well beyond the bounds of a clandestine 
fugitive public. If, in the present, subversive fugitivity has become the explicit topic of 
published book chapters, something about the possibilities for blackness in the U.S. has 
certainly changed.  
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 However, one limitation of this document is that its scope did not allow me to 
sufficiently parse the varied factors that impact this cultural shift. Ellison writes from a 
particular historical position, but he also writes from a masculine gender position, which 
would necessarily make his relationship to the power of dominion different than that of 
Toni Morrison or Carrie Mae Weems. Moten and Harney are tenured academics, and 
their relative security might enable an openness about and faith in the fugitive that belies 
its actual efficacy within the social world. This dissertation additionally gives no space to 
understanding where immigrants, non-white/non-black people, or impoverished whites 
locate themselves within this formulation, or how looking at non-U.S. sites of 
enslavement alters the framework I have presented here. The ability of this dissertation to 
speak to the cultural structures of the present is hindered by its inability to fully theorize 
the broad spectrum of variations that exist on the continuum between the ideals of 
dominion and fugitivity.  
 I chose this framework, despite its limitations, because it allowed me to discuss 
the fraught relations between home, power, and freedom that descend from plantation 
slavery in a way that directly responds to Wilderson’s Master/Slave binary, while leaving 
the door open to complicate this framework through later work. Wilderson, who puts 
scare-quotes around “historical record” in Red, White, and Black, would likely challenge 
my methodology, as he views history as an epistemology which is too ingrained in the 
ideologies of western modernity to be a means of disrupting his theoretical constructions.  
However, Wilderson’s argument rests on the notion that Master and Slave ought to be 
theorized “as positions first, and as identities second,” and I seek to disrupt the notion of 
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static positions not through an invocation of identity or experience, but through an 
exploration of human practice. If people acted according to their position within a 
theoretical model of oppression, revolutions would be a much cleaner affair. 
Unfortunately, people act in secret ways which they hide from power, like the practices I 
call “fugitive” in this document, and these actions can trouble the bird’s-eye view that 
structural positionality proffers.  
 Home is a particularly salient category of analysis through which to bring such 
practice-centered critiques to bear because home often gets ignored or flattened in 
cultural analysis. For instance, in Red, White, and Black, Wilderson argues against the 
universality of domesticity by noting that “slaves had quarters but not homes.”479 Later, 
he reiterates this claim when discussing the “oxymoron” of the black home. He uses the 
quarters to analogize “the absolute vulnerability of Black domesticity,” describing them 
as, “a ‘private’ home on a Master’s estate: a building with walls and a door, the 
vulnerability of which is so absolute that it can be considered neither ‘private’ nor 
‘home.’”480 Note, however, that Wilderson equates home with domesticity, and cites the 
violation of privacy as key to its vulnerability. This formulation refuses the possibility of 
a home built around a recognition of vulnerability, a home which might resist violation, 
not by demanding the master recognize its privacy, but by not appearing to be private or 
not appearing at all. This formulation also refuses the possibility of a slave (or a Slave) 
who absents him or herself from the plantation and makes a home elsewhere. Above all, 
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this formulation denies a recognition of homes beyond domesticity, which dismisses 
actual human practice in the present as much as in the past. Wilderson describes the 
world from the Master’s viewpoint, which of course reifies the dehumanization of the 
Slave. What people do on the ground, and particularly what they do everyday to produce 
intimate relations and cultivate selfhood, disrupts the totality of grand, overarching 
theory.  
 Additionally, by thinking about home as productive/protective of selfhood above 
all, scholars can move away from the conflation of home with blood-family that so often 
occurs in the literature on enslavement. This, like many aspects of the historiography of 
enslavement, descends from its foundation in the sentimental literatures of abolition. In 
an era when producing sympathy for the enslaved among middle- and upper-class white 
women was key to ending an oppressive system, texts necessarily emphasized the 
inability of slaves to protect blood-ties or to produce normative domesticity. This 
emphasis colors the primary documents which sourced later histories. Further, because 
blood-family remains so central to dominant conceptions of home, even in scholarship, 
the relationship between blood-ties and home in enslavement continues to be a key axis 
of the discussion. In light of work being done to complicate “home” in the present 
moment, however, scholars can now bring these redefinitions to bear on history to create 
space within the narrative for more kinds of intimate ties and social worlds.  
 My attempt to theorize a fugitive home in antagonism with dominion, which 
produces the home most in keeping with normative domesticity, reflects my attempt to 
make this type of intervention into slavery scholarship. As contemporary disappointment 
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in long-dominant social structures continues to eat away the layers of mythologized 
history to expose hidden resistance, scholars have the opportunity to more fully describe 
the panoply of responses to power engendered by human practice. In this moment of 
social, economic, and political crisis, such intellectual work holds the promise of 
undergirding real cultural change, not through a reinvestment in outdated optimisms nor 
through a refusal of hope, but through seeking places where freedom has always and 
continues to exist, hidden within the ordinary, in the last place they thought of to look.  
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